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You can't stand up all by yourself, you can't stand up alone ... 
D earlan, 
Two things I'm sure I've thought a lot about are you and 
church-related higher education (though the former has 
kept me awake late at night much more than the latter). I'm 
glad to have this opportunity to think about these two 
together, now, as you begin seriously to explore your 
college options. 
The last couple of years we've noticed how few of your 
friends from school and from church youth group head off 
to church-related colleges, and of those who do, how few of 
them go to a church-related university because it's church-
related rather than, say, because it's a school with Division 
III swimming, or it's a university with a really good graphics 
arts program, or, duh, it's Notre Dame. 
And we've heard your initial view of church-related 
colleges-You think it is important to be exposed in college 
to the sorts of people and the sorts of things you are going 
to be exposed to after college; you think you've been in a 
protected nest all your life, and now you need to move out 
and deal with life without the protections. Church-related 
colleges, as you understand them, are really about 
protecting young adults from the real world, and that 
doesn't sit well with you. 
I tend to think about these things a bit differently, and I 
want to try to explain that here. But first of all, as an over-
simplification of things, let me say a little about higher 
education. There are basically three types of colleges and 
universities: (1) the publics-large or small state universi-
ties, (under)funded by public taxes-think Indiana 
University, the College of William and Mary, and Ball State 
University; (2) the secular privates, most of which were 
originally founded as church-related colleges-think 
Princeton, Yale, Oberlin, and Carleton; and (3) the spec-
trum of church-related and Christian colleges and universi-
ties, some you might attend for four years and never know 
you weren't at a secular private, others of which will have 
you in the chapel for hours on your first day on campus. 
As you know, I have degrees from a widely recognized 
category 3 and a fairly prestigious 1, and I've taught at 
several 3 's as well as a third-tier 1. The first thing you 
should know is that you can get a decent education-what 
I would consider a decent education, not what the schools 
themselves might think counts as one-at colleges of each 
of these types of schools. Each of these types of schools has 
smart students and smart professors. Each of these types of 
schools has faculty who care deeply about their academic 
discipline and their students. And none of these types of 
schools has a corner on good values ("Values" rhetoric is big 
at all institutions these days, and your skepticism about a 
school should be proportionate to how frequently "values" 
are mentioned during your campus visit.). Furthermore, 
religion will often be more prevalent and religious talk 
more tolerated at a public than at a private, even some 
church-related privates. My experience has been that 
church-related faculty are at least as ready to find students 
parochial and in need of re-formation as are public univer-
sity faculty (and a bit more ready to think that this, in fact, 
is their special vocation). Often, the differences between 
colleges and universities of types 1, 2, and 3 are more a 
matter of size and location than the type of schools they are. 
Still, I think you (as well as many of your peers from church 
youth group) really do belong at a church-related college. 
Let me try to explain why with several brief theses: 
1. God and God's creation long for the activity of free 
beings who order their freedom by goodness. Genuine 
freedom is not random choice, but is willed activity normed 
by the Good (which we know as God) and the well-being of 
others. A church-related college should be more likely to 
recognize you as a member of a community journeying 
towards the Good and hold you accountable for a wider 
range of actions. Part of the appeal of going away to college 
is that you have an opportunity to start anew, to define 
yourself as whoever you would like to be. Taking charge of 
your identity is a good thing (though you'll never have as 
much control over who you are as you'd like), but you and 
I believe that there are wrong choices and that it is all too 
easy for folks like us to make the wrong choices. At a 
church-related college you are more likely to find yourself 
surrounded by those who understand the Good more or 
less as you do and who will frown upon behaviors incom-
patible with your journey towards goodness while they 
expect you to advance on your journey. These others will 
mostly be students, I think, but some faculty, too, and some 
residential life personnel as well as the university's chap-
lain. 
Of course some colleges have too many rules. Of 
course some universities have rules about silly things. But 
you and I agree on the importance of being a well-inte-
grated self, of having your act together. That integration 
and the real freedom that accompanies it is achieved in a 
comprehensive, rather than a selective, obedience to the 
Good. "Goodness don't allow no picking and choosin' ."In 
other words, you will better become the person you want to 
be if you are surrounded by folks who agree with you on 
what sort of person it is important to be and who, like you, 
are trying to discipline themselves to become good not 
merely in one or two admittedly important aspects of life 
but in life as a whole, people who will help you as you 
struggle not to care too much about money and to care 
enough about the poor and needy, people who honor but 
do not idolize the human body, people who, like you, are 
trying to love God better, and to love their neighbors as 
themselves, and to love God's creation. College is a place 
for you to explore freedom, real freedom, a freedom that is 
realized only with the help of others. 
2. A grasp of truths about God and God's created order 
is an essential part of love for God and all that he has 
created. A task for educated Christians is to learn to love 
God better by seeing all things in God and learn to love our 
neighbors better by understanding the neighbor as an imago 
dei, and learn to love God's creation better by under-
standing its riches as having been created by God. A college 
education ought to provide you with the requisite skills for 
flourishing after college, to be sure, but the goal of educa-
tion is a love-formed knowledge (or, perhaps it is a knowl-
edge-shaped love). Knowledge is a good thing, but 
Christians believe knowledge is good because, in some way, 
everything that can be known is about the God we know as 
love. In many cases and at many levels the connection 
between God and what we know is not very interesting-
what does the truth that all triangles have three sides have 
to do with God? Why are there flies?-So in some disci-
plines much of the love of God will consist of simply 
excelling in the discipline; love of God not only motivates 
the scholarly activity, the scholarly activity is a way of 
loving God even though no reference is made to him. Still, 
if the discipline achieves knowledge (or even warranted 
belief) the object of that knowledge or belief is somehow 
related to the Creator and Redeemer of the universe and 
achieving that knowledge can be a part of one's love for 
God. 
Some colleges do a better job of teaching one to love 
God, one's neighbors, and the creation than to know and 
love God and all things in God. Other colleges are better at 
discovering truths about the creation and creation's God 
than in fostering the love of God and all things in God. But 
church-related colleges and universities should do better 
than their secular counterparts, private and public, in 
recognizing that the goal of learning is, ultimately, God and 
God's creation, and in their insistence that every effort be 
made to tie things together, not to let stand divided what 
God has created united. 
3. God, our neighbors, and even the creation itself long 
for beauty and the excellent production of human hearts 
and hands. A distinctive calling of the church-related college 
and university is to be a place that knows and teaches the 
value of beauty and excellence and encourages all members 
of the community to value beauty and excellence appropri-
ately. Human beings are makers and doers and all that we 
make and do can be done poorly or well, shabbily or excel-
lently. We and our neighbors and God's creation are better 
off when we learn to pursue beauty rather than mere utility. 
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But our culture tends to prefer utility to beauty and excel-
lence, tends to encourage opulence for a few or efficiency 
for the privileged rather than a beauty that serves our 
neighbor and honors God. A church-related college or 
university ought to be a place where one learns to love 
beauty and excellence. 
In a nutshell, Ian, I've suggested that you are called to 
know and love and live in imitation of God, who is 
Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. You will flourish, you will be 
who you are meant to be, as you grow in the knowledge and 
love of Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. And, secondly, I've 
claimed that the knowledge and love of Goodness, Truth, 
and Beauty is hard to achieve. There are so many things 
pulling us in other directions, teasing us into a longing for 
things that do not last. And those pullings will only increase 
with the freedom in your college years. 
You are one of the world's lucky few who can spend 
four years of your life on the quest to better know and more 
fittingly love Goodness, Truth, and Beauty. That quest is 
more likely to go well for you and, hence, for the world, if 
you are part of a company on that quest, part of a commu-
nity of those who, like you, want to be who they really are, 
who want to know and love well and rightly, who long for 
beauty and excellence. No church-related college will aid 
and accompany you on this journey as well as it might but, 
even so, you will be better for the journey with them, even 




A journey of sorts of my own comes now to an end. After 
three years of editorship, it is time for me to return to the 
philosophy classroom. I have deeply enjoyed the good 
thing that we have done with The Cresset and I thank you, 
the reader, for your support these years. The Cresset has 
never been a one person operation and that remains so to 
this day. I remain deeply grateful to my friend, Gail, who 
believed I could do this work, to the publisher who 
entrusted me with this charge, and for the many writers, 
especially our regular columnists, who have made this 
work so much fun and so rewarding. A special word of 
appreciation goes to my friend A.P. who has written in each 
of my issues save one. Three others deserve mention for 
their dedicated service: John Ruff, whose only vice as 
poetry editor has been his unwillingness to include more of 
his own poetry in these pages, Jenna Hammang, who has 
really done all the work while I had all the fun for the past 
three years, and Josh Messner whose loyalty to The Cresset 
is that loyalty than which none greater can be conceived, 
and whose continuing friendship and encouragement have 
made light many a heavy load. I will be succeeded by James 
Old, to whom I extend best wishes on his new calling. f 
TDK 
writing as an act of faith 
THOUGH I SPEND A LOT OF MY TIME WRITING, I AM NOT 
writer. Not a real writer. Real writers write novels 
nd short stories, poems and plays, even children's 
stories. During my freshman year in college I learned that I 
was not a writer and was not likely to become one. I had a 
little success in the Creative Writing class I took. The prose 
essay I wrote won an Honorable Mention prize in the 
Atlantic Monthly contest; but reading my short story to the 
class was one of the most embarrassing moments of my life. 
It was bad on paper. Worse-much worse-aloud. Nobody 
had to tell me. Like Orual reading her complaint before the 
gods, I was condemned by my own reading. 
So I write about writing, not as a writer, but as a 
philosopher. My thesis is that Jean-Luc Marion, whose 
philosophical work I greatly admire, was wrong-dead 
wrong-when he wrote in God Without Being: 
One must admit that theology, of all writing, certainly 
causes the greatest pleasure. Precisely not the pleasure of 
the text, but the pleasure-unless it have to do with a 
joy-of transgressing it; from words to the Word, from 
the Word to words, incessantly and in theology alone, 
since there alone the Word finds in the word.nothing less 
than a body. The body of the text does not belong to the 
text, but to the One who is embodied in it. 
I have italicized my quibble with Marion. I do not contest 
his account of theology, only his claim that it has a 
monopoly on this joyous pleasure. The writer, too, can 
experience the joy of moving between the Word and the 
words. In a different way, of course. 
Let us find our way to understanding the relation 
between theology and writing indirectly, by talking about 
philosophy. All philosophy, I often find myself saying, is 
faith seeking understanding. The formula, fides quaerens 
intellectum, is Anselm's, and it most immediately describes 
not only his own work but also that of Augustine before him 
and Aquinas after him, philosopher-theologians whose 
faith was the Christian faith. What can it mean to say that it 
applies as well to Plato and Aristotle, Hume and Nietzsche, 
Habermas and Derrida? To say that all philosophical 
writing, which I have already distinguished from real 
writing, is an act of faith? 
It means that every philosopher, whether realizing it or 
not, has taken the hermeneutical turn. This, in turn, means 
Merold Westphal 
first that philosophical writing is interpretation rather than 
intuition. Instead of being the coded expression of the 
immediate and total presence of the subject matter to the 
philosopher's mind (awaiting decoding by the reader who 
will vicariously duplicate that duplicate), it reflects a 
construal, a seeing-as, an interpretation of the subject 
matter that is underdetermined by the latter. The subject 
matter leaves itself open to other descriptions, just as the 
score of a sonata or the script of a play leaves room for a 
variety of excellent performances and a text leaves itself 
open to a variety of excellent translations. 
In the second place, the hermeneutical turn signifies 
that these construals are not the product of the unmediated 
encounter between the writer and the subject matter. The 
philosopher brings to the encounter with the real, like the 
shell on a turtle's back, what Kant called the a priori and 
what has since been called perspectives, presuppositions, 
pre-understandings, conceptual schemes, control beliefs, 
vocabularies, language games, and so forth. The thinker 
does not see the world sub specie aeternitatis (through 
God's eyes, as it were), does not occupy what has nicely 
been called the "view from nowhere," but is rather 
embedded in a metaphysically contingent and historically 
particular linguistic-cultural situation that (pre)shapes 
each construal. As Gadamer puts it, we are always preju-
diced in the sense that judgment is shaped by pre-judgment. 
S 
INCE AT LEAST THE TIME OF PLATO, PHILOSOPHERS HAVE 
sought to escape the hermeneutical cave, deriding it as 
mere opinion (doxa) or belief (pistis) while claiming 
that philosophy can give us genuine knowledge. Perhaps 
the broadest agreement of philosophy since Hegel is that 
this escape is not possible, that the hermeneutical turn is a 
fait accompli even for those philosophers who desperately 
wish it were not so and live in tragi-comic denial. Plato, 
Spinoza, and Hegel, for example, are great philosophers 
because of the power of the vision they articulate, not by 
virtue of the way their arguments convert it into presuppo-
sitionless knowledge. 
But in the present context there are two problems with 
the terminology of opinion and knowledge for expressing 
one or another type of situation epistemology. Today 
philosophers are so deeply divided as to what deserves the 
name of knowledge that to contrast faith with knowledge 
has no clear, agreed meaning. In fact, on some accounts (for 
example that of Alvin Plantinga, following John Calvin, in 
his Warranted Christian Belief) faith is a mode of knowl-
edge. On the other hand, while pistis is also the New 
Testament word for faith, Plato's use, which assimilates it to 
mere opinion, 1) treats it as mere belief without the existen-
tial commitments of biblical faith and 2) correspondingly 
fails to distinguish those beliefs which are peripheral and 
only loosely related to one's deepest presuppositions from 
those which reflect one's deepest identity. 
So, when I say that all philosophy is faith seeking 
understanding, I shall use biblical rather than Platonic 
language. The faith which is the perspective or presupposi-
tion from which each philosopher speaks is not this opinion 
or that belief, but an analogue of biblical faith, a language 
game that is a form of life and that serves at once as the 
cognitive and existential a priori guiding that thinker's 
interpretations of the real. It is simultaneously a 
Weltanschauung and a fundamental project. Then, instead 
of saying that this faith is not (yet) knowledge, I will say that 
even when the faith in question is not Christian faith (or any 
other religious faith, for that matter), the philosopher, like 
the believer, walks by faith and not by sight (2 Cor 5 : 7). Not 
that faith is simply blind, but that its sight is not pure 
insight; it is rather a seeing "through a glass, darkly," "in a 
mirror, dimly," "in an enigma" (1 Cor 13: 12). This seeing-
as is constrained by finitude and contaminated by fallen-
ness; it does not have the finality and objectivity usually 
associated with knowledge. The philosopher does not "just 
see" that this is how the real must be construed; or perhaps, 
like the racist who "just sees" that certain individuals are 
morally and intellectually inferior to "our kind," the 
thinker "just sees" that this is how the real must be 
construed precisely because of the contingent and partic-
ular language game in which this construal is embedded 
and from which it emerges. 
That this faith, both as (pre)cognition and as commit-
ment seeks understanding in philosophical reflection 
means both that it seeks to grasp more fully what the theo-
retical and practical implications of the interpretations to 
which it gives rise might be, and to subject them to critical 
evaluation in conversation with different, even contrary 
interpreters and interpretations. Needless to say, when the 
faith that seeks understanding in reflection is Christian 
faith, as is the case with Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and 
many others, the conversation will include other Christian 
interpreters, other religious interpreters, and pagan or 
secular interpreters. Given the relation of the big .N.s to 
Plato and/or Aristotle, it should be clear that the Christian 
thinker can be at once deeply indebted to and sharply crit-
ical of secular conversation partners. 
N
OW I CAN STATE MY THESIS: WRITERS ARE ENGAGED IN 
the process of faith seeking understanding just as 
much as philosophers, so writing is an act of faith. 
The genres are different, to be sure, but 1) writers are 
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engaged in interpreting the real, sharing their seeings-as 
with us in poetry and in prose; 2) their interpretations do 
not come from nowhere but are shaped by the language 
games in which they are situated, which represent faith 
rather than pure (in)sight, presuppositions that are penulti-
mate in their revisability and replaceability; and 3) the faith 
they explore can be the Christian species of the genus 
defined by the first two characteristics just given. 
Let us suppose that it is. What would writing as an act 
of Christian faith look like? It would not necessarily focus 
on a religious subject matter or invoke religious vocabulary. 
But its seeings-as would be through the eyes of faith. I once 
heard C. S. Lewis described as the most completely 
converted man the speaker had ever met. Whereas philoso-
phers and theologians are apt to talk, appropriately 
enough, of the conversion of the intellect and the will, for 
the writer the conversion of the imagination will be just as 
important. Images and narratives will reflect an underlying 
biblical vision of the world in terms of creation, fall, and 
redemption by grace though (to repeat) not necessarily in 
that language. While this may be conscious and deliberate, 
it need not be. Just to the degree that the imagination is 
converted in and through the spirituality of the writer, it 
may well occur spontaneously and unreflectively. This is 
why I want to deny Marion's claim that the theologian has 
a monopoly on dwelling between the Word and the words. 
The philosopher and the writer can do so as well. 
So far I have talked about the hermeneutical turn, 
something taken for granted by the philosophers who are 
called postmodern. Let me turn to three more narrowly 
postmodern themes. In doing so I hope to show how what 
Marion says about theology can be said of writing as well: 
It diverts the author from himself ... it causes him to 
write outside of himself, even against himself, since he 
must write not of what he is, on what he knows, in view 
of what he wants, but in, for, and by what he receives 
and in no case masters. 
First, there is Lyotard's famous definition of the post-
modern condition as "incredulity toward metanarra-
tives." It is often assumed that since the biblical narrative 
that stretches from Eden to the New Jerusalem is a mega-
narrative it is also a metanarrative. But Lyotard has in mind 
the big stories told to modernity by the philosophers it 
adopts and adores, and these differ decisively from the 
biblical meganarrative in important respects, the first of 
which has just been mentioned. Modernity's metanarra-
tives are stories told by philosophers, purporting to be 
objective, rational, even scientific knowledge of nature, 
society, history, and even God. The key examples are 
Hegel and Marx. By contrast, the biblical story is told by 
prophets and apostles who appeal not to their own insight, 
but to the word, and, eventually, the Word of God. 
Kierkegaard's distinction between the genius and the 
apostle is important here. 
Just for this reason there is a second crucial difference. 
The function of modernity's metanarratives, as Lyotard 
presents them, is to legitimize both the knowledge, scien-
tific and speculative, and the social practice, bourgeois or 
revolutionary, of modernity. The biblical story is more 
nearly a delegitimation narrative. It tells us that we are 
neither God nor the kingdom of God. It is a story of life east 
of Eden: of covenants broken, of power and piety in the 
service of injustice, of disciples more interested in privilege 
than in faithfulness, of churches you wouldn't really want 
to belong to, and so forth. It is at the same time a story of 
divine judgment, mercy, and love-of the in-breaking of the 
kingdom of God, but in such a way as always to remind "us" 
that however much "we" may be called to life in the 
kingdom, "we" (meaning our culture, our society, our 
nation, our church) never are the kingdom. The eschaton is 
not the democratic, capitalist, technological, consumerist 
society we already are; nor is it the cure to all this that 
radical activists would erect if only they were given power. 
This is why biblical faith can never be at peace with moder-
nity, but must mistrust its megalomaniacal metanarratives 
as much or more than secular postmodernism does. 
I 
SEE NO REASON WHY THIS INCREDULITY SHOULD NOT SHAPE 
the writer as well as the philosopher, in which case the 
Christian writer would resemble Marion's theologian 
in writing "against himself, since he must write not of what 
he is, on what he knows, in view of what he wants, but in, 
for, and by that which he receives." This would be to work 
between the Word and the words. By portraying the beauty 
that catches us unaware and the ugliness from which we 
prefer to turn away (perhaps by projecting it onto "them"), 
the writer's words become icons that point beyond them-
selves to the beauty of original creation, the ugliness of 
what we have done to it, and, once again, the beauty of 
promised redemption. So to write is imitatio Christi, for 
the Word performs the same three tasks for those who listen 
to Him. 
Another important postmodern theme is Heidegger's 
critique of onto-theology. He interprets a philosophical 
tradition that stretches from pre-Socratic Greece to 
Nietzsche as seeking to render the whole of being trans-
parent to human understanding and with allowing "God" 
into its discourse only insofar as the Highest Being (which 
takes many forms, including Nietzsche's will to power) 
contributes to this goal. God is reduced to being a means to 
our ends, in this case the aspiration to absolute knowledge. 
A tragic consequence is the loss of a sense of awe and 
wonder before the mystery of being, a loss that reaches its 
culmination in modern technology in which everything, 
including ourselves, becomes raw materials at the disposal 
of our will to power. In suggesting that Christian theology 
has caught the onto-theological virus from the philoso-
phers, Heidegger overlooks the overwhelming consensus 
among those theologians that God is incomprehensible, 
the mysterium tremendum, the ultimate mystery. The 
theologian knows about the mystery of God, the mystery of 
creation, and the mystery of evil. When this faith seeks 
understanding it does not demand total transparency but 
seeks to understand Infinite Love, creaturely goodness, and 
creaturely evil precisely as that which exceeds our grasp, 
our language, our concepts. 
I see no reason why the Christian writer should not 
evoke a sense of awe and wonder before the mystery of 
being just as powerfully as the philosopher and Marion's 
theologian. In fact, Heidegger himself turns to the poet in 
seeking to counteract modernity as the culmination of the 
onto-theological history of the west. Perhaps, just by virtue 
of the primacy of image and narrative over concept and 
system, the writer is less likely than the philosopher and 
theologian to forget "to write outside of himself" about 
"that which he ... in no case masters." Because the 
Christian writer, like the Christian theologian, writes out 
of a biblically formed faith, we should expect to find an 
antidote to the know-it-all hubris of the West. (Perhaps this 
is why literature is such a valuable resource for the preacher 
who reads novels along with Nehemiah and poems along 
with Paul.) 
Finally, there is the death of the author thesis as devel-
oped by Barthes, Foucault, and Derrida. They insist that the 
issue is theological, though it is not about God or the death 
of God (which is presupposed). It is rather about the author 
who is thought to resemble God too closely. The author 
whose death is proclaimed is the author who creates the 
text just as God has been said to create the world. The text 
has in it all and only the meanings that the author intends to 
put in it, and if there is any indeterminacy (the analogue of 
creaturely freedom), it, too, is there by authorial intent. 
Thus the sovereign author unilaterally determines the 
meaning of the text. 
W
ITHOUT DENYING THAT THE AUTHOR PLAYS AN 
important role in the creation of meaning, the 
death of the author hypothesis portrays the 
author in terms of creaturely finitude. This means that the 
text is open at both ends and not under the omnipotent 
control of the author, who is neither the alpha nor the 
omega of the text. At the front end, since the author is the 
bearer of traditions and has been shaped by texts and prac-
tices in ways that are not fully conscious, the "new" text is 
not a creation ex nihilo. It is the product of many voices 
speaking over, under, around, and through the author's 
voice. For the Christian writer, of course, many of these 
voices will be biblical voices. And they will be welcome. 
The "anxiety of authorship" that accompanies the wish of 
genius to be divine, and thus an absolute beginning, is the 
literary version of philosophical modernity's desire for the 
ego, whether individually conceived as in Descartes and 
Locke, or socially conceived as in Rousseau and Hegel, to 
be the ultimate measure of both meaning and being. 
Nor does the author have a monopoly of meaning at 
the other end. Readers who come after the text will find 
more meanings about heaven and earth than are dreamed 
of in the author's intent. The text may be the author's prop-
erty as a commodity in a capitalist society; but at the 
semantic level, as the attempt to portray life as distinct from 
earning a living, the text is more nearly a feast to which the 
author invites all comers, the paradox of a gift that never 
was private property. 
Once again Marion's description of theology would 
seem to apply to writing as well. "It diverts the author from 
himself ... it causes him to write outside of himself, since he 
must write ... in, for, and by that which he receives and in 
no case masters." In relation to onto-theology, this "in no 
case masters" pointed us to the mystery of being. In relation 
to the death of the (supposedly divine) author, it points us 
to the reader as partner in the creation of meaning, along 
with the author, who properly says, "I have received from 
others what I also handed on to you." 
This reference to the reader begs us to consider what it 
might mean to speak of reading as an act of faith. But that is 
a topic for another time. For the present there is enough for 
us to ponder in the thought that the writer can resemble the 
theologian by moving between the Word and the words. f 
Merold Westphal, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at 
Fordham University, presented this essay at the Calvin 
College Festival of Faith and Writing, April2004. 
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same, same! pleasures and purposes of metaphor 
English 213: Introduction to Poetry Writing 
Metaphor is made of two parts, I tell them 
because I must say something: vehicle and tenor, 
and we should know the names of things we do by instinct, 
though I only half believe this. Not that kind of vehicle, 
not that kind of tenor, and yet their poems must move, 
must sing. It's confusing and hard. Aristotle said 
genius sees resemblance in difference. A car is not 
a metaphor, is a machine made of countless metal parts 
that keep us mindful of oil, coolant, a milk jug in the trunk 
in which to dilute it, mindful of all the ways a day can turn, 
pulling into Bloomsburg State, for instance, steam blowing 
from under the hood, I asked a student for the lecture hall, 
campus clock gonging the hour of my talk, but he said, 
"Look, something really bad is happening to your car." 
I have watched water run off my radiator 
as freely as the waters of birth. I have peered 
into the boxy chambers of my master cylinder, drained 
of break fluid, dark and divided as the human heart. 
Unable to start some mornings, I have loosened a wing nut, 
lifted the air filter, and jabbed a pencil stub 
into my butterfly valve, clenched like a catch in the throat. 
So when half the audience walked out of that reading 
to attend a memorial service for some boys, killed 
in a frat house fire, I did what any of us would do: 
paused until the room grew still, then continued. 
In towns like that, mechanics take only cash, 
but the folks who remained bought enough books 
to cover the cost of radiator hose, plus labor, 
that transaction as sweet and pure as the motion 
of any of our lubricious, invisible parts. 
ruBERT FROST'S TERSE DEFINITION OF METAPHOR WAS: saying one thing in terms of another." I. A. ichards called the two parts of a metaphor, 
"tenor" and "vehicle": the tenor is the idea being 
expressed, or the subject of the comparison, and the vehicle 
Julia Kasdorf 
is the image by which the idea is conveyed. So when Robert 
Burns wrote, "0 my love is like a red, red rose," love is the 
tenor and rose is the vehicle. For the purposes of this piece, 
I gather under "metaphor" all types of figurative speech, 
such as image, trope, conceit, simile, metonymy, and so 
forth. By way of introduction and demonstration, I began 
with a poem of mine published several years ago in The 
Common Review. 
Essentially this poem begins as a spoof of our work as 
teachers and thinkers. It claims the car is not a metaphor, 
yet belies that claim by drawing on the everyday American 
trope that compares cars to human bodies, often women's 
bodies, in order to generate an excessive run of 
machine/body metaphors. So, when the car breaks down, 
death can't be far away. But before the end of the poem, 
resurrection occurs through automotive repairs which are 
financed by the audience's purchase of books-salvation 
by means of consumer consumption. Or maybe grace 
incarnated through the economics of a temporary commu-
nity created by the shared experience of language, that 
give-and-take of meaning as pleasurable as the huge 
maroon '78 Impala cruising along before it blew its hose. 
Overt and implicit metaphors drive the poem. Out of the 
play of metaphors, meaning-and maybe even a kind of 
healing or redemption-emerge. 
THESE REFLECTIONS ON METAPHOR FALL INTO THREE parts: epistemology, pedagogy, and pleasure (a big topic divided into even bigger parts). I draw on 
evidence from different spheres of my experience as poet, 
professor, and mother of a small child, despite the fact that 
I haven't been entirely successful at integrating the distinct 
identities and kinds of work that produce art, flourish in 
academia, and nurture children. Most of the messages I've 
gotten are that, speaking on a purely practical level, these 
are probably mutually exclusive enterprises. At the 
Christian college where I used to teach-and I suspect this 
is the rule rather than the exception-family was 
supported, of course, but the teaching and service loads 
were so heavy, I wasn't sure I'd ever be able to keep my job 
and make art, let alone be a mother. I left that position for a 
research university, where the teaching load is much lighter 
and the money better, but where the dominant culture 
suggests that teaching is merely a distraction from the real 
work, research, which is what they call poetry, and as for 
motherhood-well, if you have to do it, that is your own 
mistake to manage. In recent years, the AAUP and the 
Chronicle of Higher Education have published studies that 
reveal the dire situation for mothers in academia, as meas-
ured by dramatically lower tenure and promotion rates. 
The corporate university still has a long way to go to catch 
up with corporate America when it comes to enabling 
parents to succeed as workers. 
Writing, teaching, and mothering can be (and maybe 
should be) full-time occupations; still, I'm a poet, 
"the foot of a mountain," to remind you of a few dead 
metaphors, figures that are so worn they no longer register 
as figures at all. Amelia knew that paws only belong to 
animals, but confronted with the fuzzy, blunt, purple 
objects, she needed a way to domesticate the strange. 
Hands inside mittens do look a little like paws, and lacking 
the new word, she found an old one. In this way, necessity 
transforms all toddlers and adult learners of foreign 




a maker of metaphors, so I naturally resist exclu-
sions and the will to contain things in neat cate-
gories. (And, at least now, it seems that I don't 
have a whole lot of choice in the matter.) Add to 
this the fact that I hate to do anything in a manner 
that, where I come from, we call "half-assed," 
which is a metaphor that means "partially." These 
are the particular pressures under which these 
notes were composed; it's a challenge that feels 
even more complicated than "integrating faith 
And the act doesn't really look that 
different for writers. The animals we struggle to 
name are inexplicable emotions or confounding 
experiences. Most times, the quickest way from 
experience to articulate feeling detours through 
metaphor. Metaphor means "transference," or 
strange on "to carry over." I have been told that you can see 
purpose, 
for fun. 
the word "Metaphoros" painted across moving 
vans in Greece. In psychological terms, the quali-
ties of one thing get transferred onto another; 
metaphor enables us to identify the tenor with the 
and learning," a phrase that, by the way, has always seemed 
kind of blasphemous to me, for I believe in a sacramental 
universe, that "all knowledge is God's knowledge," and 
that reason, belief, and thought are embodied. As a cradle 
Anabaptist, I know that faith and work are one; as a 
converted Episcopalian, I know that word and flesh are 
one. And I think that fretting and arguing about how faith 
and learning should connect seems to suggest some sort of 
prior, violent split between the two that I simply cannot 
admit. 
epistemology 
On a bitter cold morning last November, a month 
before her second birthday, Amelia, my child who yanks off 
hats, kicks off covers, and screams at the sight of the 
sunscreen bottle, stood in the foyer, defiant. It was frigid 
outside, and she had to wear something on her hands. 
Braced for wails of refusal, I thrust a pair of thumbless, 
purple fleece mittens onto the ends of her arms. Stunned 
silence. She looked at the mitts for a long time, silently 
turning palms up, then down, then up again. Then, she 
finally looked up at me with a broad grin, and raising her 
hands to either side of her face, she pronounced with satis-
faction, "Paws!" 
In his aphorisms collected in ''Adagia," Wallace Stevens 
writes, "All of our ideas come from the natural world: 
trees = umbrellas." 
Ezra Pound said, " ... the natural object is always the 
adequate symbol." 
God commanded Adam to name the animals. 
At the root of language is metaphor, the desire and 
human privilege to find names for the unknown. Metaphor 
is a means by which we apprehend the unfamiliar by calling 
it by a familiar term, one that may refer to the natural 
world. We say "the spine of a book," "the eye of a needle," 
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vehicle-often because the tenor is too difficult for our 
minds to grasp in its own terms-too unfamiliar or 
confounding or frightening. That difficulty is demon-
strated by Yusef Komunyakaa, one of our contemporary 
poets who served in VietNam as a writer and editor for an 
Army newspaper, in a poem from Dien Cai Dau (1988). 
The entire poem enacts the mind's desperate attempt to 
figure the facts of a horrible memory into other terms: 
"You and I are Disappearing" -Bjorn Hakasson 
The cry I bring down from the hills 
belongs to a girl still burning 
inside my head. At daybreak 
she burns like a piece of paper. 
She burns like foxfire 
in a thigh-shaped valley. 
A skirt of flames 
dances around her 
at dusk. 
We stand with our hands 
hanging at our sides, 
while she burns 
like a sack of dry ice. 
She burns like oil on water. 
She burns like a cattail torch 
dipped in gasoline. 
She glows like the fat tip 
of a banker's cigar, 
silent as quicksilver. 
A tiger under a rainbow 
at nightfall. 
She burns like a shot glass of vodka. 
She burns like a field of poppies 
at the edge of a rain forest. 
She rises like dragonsmoke 
to my nostrils. 
She burns like a burning bush 
driven by a godawful wind. 
THE UNSPEAKABLE FINDS UTTERANCE THROUGH metaphor, but the temporary name is necessarily a lie. One review of my first book, Sleeping Preacher, 
noted with dismay a surprising absence of any real 
metaphors, which typically are essential elements of 
poetry, the plain-spoken quality of my narratives from 
family and community history, only sparked by irony and 
some occasional metonymy. I realized that this was true, 
and wondered whether I unconsciously avoided 
metaphors because I had internalized a taboo against those 
lies of transference. In my culture of origin, falsehoods and 
excessive uses of language, such as oaths, are strictly 
forbidden. Moreover, Anabaptists have a history of 
extreme iconoclasm, values that are not entirely unique 
among Protestant traditions as they have evolved in the 
New World. And I wonder whether language itself-
because of its slippery, representational quality-might be 
the problem. 
Here is a poem that expresses anxiety about the gap 
between words and things. Some time ago, I was reading an 
article that discussed the materiality of language, a way of 
thinking about language that does not split material from 
immaterial, experience from representation. It's one of 
those ideas I immediately liked in theory, but wasn't sure I 
believed in fact, until I considered it in terms of language 
acquisition, the way very young children who are just being 
initiated into linguistic conventions, chant the names of 
things as if to conjure up the object by magic. At the time I 
was teaching in Oregon, watching Amelia learn the names 
for things as I tried to figure out how to be a parent. 
The Materiality of Language at Lincoln 
Truck, truck she slurs then lunges 
toward a logger rumbling under a load 
of skinned trunks. At seventeen months, 
her words do not express any thing 
but are things, as hard as the stones 
she hides in her fists or the sticks 
she yanks from the wood box. 
Who can say what charms her most, 
a long stick or my sudden, No! 
No sticks! You'll poke your eye! 
as predictable as the blue gills which 
circle and lift while she chants fish 
fish, fish over the mill pond. 
She is one-fourth, and I, one-half 
my dad who said, Stop talking. 
Let's sleep on it and speak again, 
as if anger would turn our words 
into swords that could never be bent 
into spades or thrust into fence posts. 
Better to bite our own tongues 
than wound another. At twenty-one, 
I found that wrong-still do-
but such lessons come later on. 
Now I need only to feed her hunger 
for significant sounds, this one 
who sings tractor, tractor each time 
her finger finds a nut on the hub cap, 
juice, juice, juice to the grinning cup. 
"Better to bite our own tongues than wound another," 
sums up fairly well the ethic of articulation from my back-
ground. Language, as the medium of religion (swords and 
ploughshares), culture (sticks and stones), and charms, is a 
game of high stakes, with silence sometimes the wisest 
response, and what a wonderful confusion for a young 
person with literary inclinations to inherit. 
pedagogy 
After I had accepted my first job as a college professor, 
I read the syllabus from my predecessor for a course I would 
soon be teaching myself, and it spooked me. As a rationale 
for enrolling in the course called "Introduction to Poetry,'' 
he argued that college students should learn to read poetry 
so that they can better understand the words of Jesus. I 
found this troubling, coming from an Anabaptist tradition 
of the Amish-Mennonite sort, which somewhere along the 
line must have been influenced by the great motto attrib-
uted to St. Francis: "Preach the Gospel at all times; use 
words if necessary." Where I come from, it's usually not 
necessary to use words to express matters of faith; what-
ever you do in the world is witness enough. And things 
which are not necessary-and not practical or true in a 
literal sense-are to be avoided. So, I left Jesus off the 
syllabus when I taught "Introduction to Poetry" at Messiah 
College. However, I've since come to see my predecessor's 
point, and I appreciate his attempt to seduce to poetry even 
the fundamentalist students. 
Metaphor must be the primary pedagogical method of 
the Hebrew and Christian literary tradition, after all. I'm 
no biblical scholar, but it seems that whenever God wants 
people to hear something they are unwilling or unable to 
grasp, God speaks through the most unreliable media: 
dreams, which get interpreted metaphorically, or prophets 
who tell strange stories that function as analogues of expe-
rience. Think of King David, "in the spring, at the time 
when kings go off to war," who stayed back in Jerusalem 
and there spied the beautiful Bathsheba, wife of Uriah the 
Hittite, bathing on a roof top. He sent for her, slept with 
her, and she conceived a child. After an unsuccessful 
attempt to get Uriah to surrender his soldier's sense of stoic 
duty and sleep with his wife, David had the Hittite placed 
on the front lines so he might be killed in battle. When 
Uriah's wife heard that her husband was dead, she mourned 
for him. But after the time of mourning, David had her 
brought to his house, and she became his wife and bore him 
a son. According to the text, "The thing David had done 
displeased the Lord." And so the Lord sent the prophet 
Nathan to David. Nathan told the story of two men-one 
rich, one poor. The rich man had many sheep, but the poor 
man had only one ewe which he loved and cared for as if it 
were his daughter. When the rich man needed to kill an 
animal for a feast, he took the poor man's only ewe. When 
David heard this story, he "burned with anger" and sought 
to punish the rich man. Then Nathan said, "You are that 
man!" (2 Sam 11-12:7) 
Jesus continued in the prophetic tradition, teaching 
through analogue-whether they were pointed stories 
designed to rebuke an individual or outrageous metaphors 
to illuminate the nature of the kingdom of heaven. Only a 
few of those metaphors become flustering contradictions: 
the kingdom of heaven is like a mustard seed; 
months, drafting lengthy versions of a poem that might 
capture the flash of feeling when he saw a crowd of people 
emerging from a subway stop in Paris-those gorgeous 
faces before him in a moment of recognition that was both 
immediate and absolutely ephemeral. After many drafts, he 
abandoned any attempt to convey the transcendent 
moment and settled, instead, on an attempt to create the 
experience within his reader: 
In a Station of the Metro 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd; 
Petals on a wet, black bough. 
Pound's terms-liberation ... freedom ... a sense of 
sudden growth-are ways of describing the instant of 
surprise and recognition that comes by means of metaphor. 
As Wallace Stevens put it, "Metaphor creates a new reality 
from which the original appears to be unreal." But in this 
sense of new creation, there is also a sense that metaphor 
must use materials from the known world. The flash comes 
not so much from seeing a novel thing for the first time, but 
the connection between here and there, that sudden surprise 
of something remote being immediate, intimate, and true. 
Those moments of insight or excess-sight are the ones 
we retain over time. When I recall my college 
no, it's like a pearl of great price; it's ten virgins 
who took their lamps and went out to meet the 
bridegroom; no, it's a landowner who went 
out early in the morning to hire two men, and 
so on. Like dreams, which can be bewildering 
or terrifying or utterly absurd, the prophet's 
tropes penetrate a mind's defenses and break 
meaning onto the consciousness, sometimes 
uYour poetry is a 
seeing eye dog 
that leads your 
blind self around 
in the world. " 
and graduate school education, I believe that 
everything that stayed with me was couched in 
metaphoric terms. "Your poetry is a seeing eye 
dog that leads your blind self around in the 
world," Yeh uda Amichai, the late Israeli poet, 
said of that vision that comes with writing and 
finding the right metaphor in one's work. 
suddenly shattering, "That man is you!" or 
sometimes gently making the familiar strange enough to 
see. It's as if metaphor reminds us of something we had 
forgotten. 
Metaphoric language enables us to see our experience 
anew, but with an excess of knowing. In 1913, Ezra Pound 
described the phenomenology of reading the new 
"image" -a kind of speeded up metaphor that was entirely 
immediate: 
An "Image" is what presents an intellectual and 
emotional complex in an instant of time ... [he was 
borrowing the word "complex" from the new realm of 
psychological study]. It is the presentation of such a 
'complex' instantaneously which gives that sense of 
sudden liberation; that sense of freedom from time 
limits and space limits; that sense of sudden growth, 
which we experience in the presence of the greatest 
works of art." 
Pound's famous example of the Imagist poem, also written 
in 1913, is "Ina Station of the Metro." He had struggled for 
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"Your memory is like a museum with a very 
selective curator," he said. "You must trust 
that every object that ends up there is beautiful and mean-
ingful because your memory selected it to remain. Even the 
most terrible object-like the cross-will be the most beau-
tiful." Showing up at poetry workshop each week at NYU, 
Amichai couldn't keep himself from sharing his linguistic 
pleasures. As a speaker of English as a third or forth 
language, the embedded (or dead) metaphors, lost to native 
speakers, were still rich and vivid for him, and at the start of 
each class he shared a few with us. Once he said, "Listen to 
this: traffic jam. Traffic jam." Then he laughed and 
laughed, "Think of those cars smashed up in a jar like straw-
berries." 
The force of Amichai's work (at least for those of us 
who read it in translation and, therefore, without the music 
of the original Hebrew) depends almost entirely on 
metaphor. And his metaphors, like the metaphors of many 
European writers, are extravagant-much wilder than 
figures of speech that typically appear in poems written in 
English. Just as our essay structure permits fewer depar-
tures from linear logic than essays written in Slavic or Asian 
languages, so the vehicles and tenors in English metaphors 
----------------------------------------------------
must be more closely related in scale, the point of resem-
blance more obvious. I don't know how to account for this, 
but maybe blame lies in part with our instinct for practi-
cality and in part with Aristotle, who valued art as a 
metaphor for nature, and cautioned against comparisons 
that were out of proportion and too far fetched. Or maybe 
it lies with American cultural values that extend back to the 
Puritans. During the second half of the twentieth century, 
some poets in this country found the plain-spoken idiom 
inadequate and thus began translating and reading the 
works of European and South American poets, and 
Amichai was discovered and translated during that period. 
But let me show you what I mean by offering one of his 
small poems from A Great Tranquility: Questions and 
Answers (reprinted and newly translated in The Selected 
Poetry ofYehuda Amichai). 
Forgetting Someone 
Forgetting someone is like 
forgetting to turn off the light in the back yard 
so it stays lit all the next day. 
But then it's the light 
that makes you remember. 
We learn by seeing things in striking and new relation-
ship with other things. The point of resemblance can be the 
point of insight, but I. A. Richards has observed that the 
point of difference is often the greater source of meaning, 
because it creates tension and forces discovery. The cogni-
tive dissonance generated by difference animates the 
image. In dead metaphors, particularly, we nod at simi-
larity and miss the difference. Those figures are so deeply 
embedded within our consciousness that they can structure 
our perceptions of reality and blind us. This is the point 
made by Lakoff andJ ohnson in their important early book, 
Metaphors We Live By. 
When I was teaching "Introduction to Poetry" at 
Messiah College, I used to ask the students to really 
consider what it means that Christians metaphorically 
conceive of their church as a body. (Of course that's a 
perfect Lakoff and Johnson example because it explicitly 
grounds perception and reason in bodily experience.) The 
church is a body: so hierarchy is assumed because wegener-
ally associate being "up" with being happy and well; being 
"down" with being ill and depressed. Therefore, based on 
our physical experience of our own bodies, we know that 
the head should be on top. We also know that our bodies 
have an inside and an outside, and that if our physical 
boundaries are penetrated, it's usually a bad thing, 
resulting in pain, wounds, illness from infection, possibly 
even death. (That's leaving sex aside for a moment-prob-
ably that's never a good idea.) When asked to imagine the 
implications of a church being figured as a chunky stew or 
salad, rather than a body, my students were distressed. 
Despite, or because of, their being saturated with Biblical 
language and texts, they hadn't recognized those 
metaphors as merely figures of speech, but how much more 
interesting-and open to change-things might be if they 
had. "Reality is a cliche from which we escape by 
metaphor," suggested Wallace Stevens. And it is also the 
case that metaphor is a means by which we may change 
reality because it enables us to change our minds. 
In the following poem, the speaker, a bewildered 
teacher of poetry writing who resembles this author, is 
confronted with a difficult student text. Only after the fact, 
she responds to the situation by telling a story. And as the 
story unfolds, she finds her way by metaphor, like a 
prophet, to arrive at a clearer sense of both the student's 
situation and her own position. 
Bat boy, Break a Leg 
The student with two studs in his nose 
and a dragon tattoo crawling from his collar, 
who seems always ready to swoon 
from bliss or despair, now flits 
at my office door. I will look at his poem 
drawn onto a music score and find nothing 
to say about chance or HIV. 
Only later I'll think to tell him 
the night before I left home, I slept 
sadly in our old house until a wing 
touched my cheek, tenderly as a breeze. 
I woke to black fluttering at my feet, 
and a mind fresh from the other side 
said don't turn on the light, don't 
Wake the man, don't scream or speak. 
Go back to sleep. The next morning 
I remembered that people upstate 
whack them with tennis rackets, that 
the Chinese character for good luck 
resembles the character for bat-
both so unsettling and erratic-
but it's bad luck to say good luck 
in China, as on stage where they say 
Break a leg, so delicate bats 
must be woven into silk brocade 
and glazed onto porcelain plates. 
Next morning, I found a big-eared mouse 
with leather folded over his shoulders 
hanging from claws stuck in a screen. 
All day, my work made me forget, but 
then I'd remember, passing the window 
where he slept, shaded under the eves. 
He was fine. I was fine. Then at dusk, 
he was gone, suddenly. Pale boy dressed in black, 
Maybe the best that can be said for any of us is that 
once we were angelic enough to sleep with strangers. 
He touched my cheek. I opened the screen. 
He flew in his time. We did no harm. 
That ending surprised me, too, calling up both Allen 
Ginsberg and the biblical Jacob. I now see that the poem 
moves toward its surprising conclusion in this way: the boy 
is like a bat; the bat is like luck; the bat is like a mouse; the 
bat is like the angel and the speaker is like Jacob; the bat is 
like a stranger; a stranger is like an angel; the boy is like a 
bat, and both of them will be safe. In each instance-as with 
all metaphors-the figure is made as the known gropes 
toward the unknown. I cannot claim that the boy is lucky, 
but I can say the boy is like a bat, and the bat is like luck. 
Metaphor must always keep one foot on the ground, which 
is a metaphoric way of phrasing what Aristotle knew: that 
metaphor falls midway between the unintelligible and the 
commonplace. The poem suggests that the encounter 
between teacher and student is like being touched by a bat, 
like Jacob grappling with the angel; it is that violent and 
strange. 
pleasure (the shortest section, naturally.) 
At around eighteen months, my daughter, Amelia, 
became obsessed with recognizing resemblance. She'd 
endlessly point out connections between things by 
shouting "Same, same!" The Winnie the Pooh in the story-
book and the Pooh bear on her tooth brush handle. "Same, 
same!" The banana in the fruit bowl on the counter and the 
tiny wooden banana in her puzzle. "Same, same!" Colors, 
shapes, images, sounds-she never ceased delighting at the 
discovery of similitude, and it seemed an essential means of 
constructing the categories that enable us to learn 
language. I felt as ifl were witnessing what Michel Foucault 
has called "the semantic web of resemblance" and identi-
fied as the primary epistemological method in the West. He 
claims that prior to the end of the sixteenth century, resem-
blance, in various complex forms, was used to construct 
knowledge: it guided exegesis and the interpretation of the 
text of the world or the book, organized the play of 
symbols, illuminated things visible and invisible, and 
controlled the art of representing them. Don Quixote 
represented the first significant break with that way, 
according to Foucault, because suddenly in that novel 
analogues dissolve, words detach from things, and confu-
sion ensues. 
A
LMOST AS SOON AS AMELIA HAD LEARNED THE CONVEN-
tional names for things, she began to call them by 
other names. Metaphor, which initially was a useful 
way of creating a "temporary stay against confusion," 
became a game, a pleasure, and the pleasure seemed mostly 
to derive from deliberate departures from the norm. Only 
a month after "paws" took the harm out of her encounter 
with a new pair of mittens, she held the cord of a pull toy 
beside her head and dangled a wooden cat on wheels. She 
looked up with a smile and said, "Ear ring!" Around the 
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same time she stuck her fingertip into a sliced black olive 
and, pulling it from the pizza, laughed "Puppet!" To the 
huge icicles hanging from the gutters outside my study 
window, she shouted "Rocket, Rocket!" In all of those 
instances, she knew the common names for things--cat or 
earring, olive or puppet, icicle or rocket-but by just two 
years old, as the human animal is still mastering basic 
vocabulary, we begin to call things by other names of our 
own making. Thus, metaphor makes the familiar strange 
on purpose, for fun. I can only imagine the pleasure that 
comes from a complex discovery: an olive is not a puppet, 
and yet it is. The pleasure of metaphor is the pleasure of 
transgression-breaking the law, but breaking it gently. 
The pleasure of metaphor is the pleasure of both invention 
and association-departing from tradition to make some-
thing new, but not deviating so far that others cannot follow 
the discovery. 
At the same time, the pleasure of "same, same!" is 
com pounded by all the ways the things are not the same, the 
pleasure of meeting as well as parting. Calling objects by 
another name creates a temporary coupling of two unlike 
things, and therefore Alicia Ostriker has called metaphor 
"the erotic element in language." Metaphorically casting 
the play of meaning between two unlike things, she writes 
in her ''A Meditation on Metaphor,"" ... the pleasure we 
take in metaphor is a pleasure of consent, an agreement that 
the distance between two things is cancellable because of 
their likeness, whereby each illuminates some inner truth 
belonging to the other." To believe in metaphor, we have to 
believe, temporarily at least, as the ancients did, that the 
world is connected through some deep web of meaning-
animate and inanimate, large and small, across different 
points in time and place. These, of course, are huge claims 
with profound political and spiritual implications, tending 
even toward peace. On some level, I think she's saying that 
not only is Robert Burns's love like a red rose, but that love 
likes red roses. 
Even as I am happily and enthusiastically drawn to 
Ostriker's erotic sensibility, I must also consider the "po-
ethics" of experimental poet Juliana Spahr. Spahr, whose 
poetics is at least partly shaped by the fact that she lives in 
the American colony of Hawaii, is troubled by the nature of 
relationship as structured through metaphor, or what she 
calls "the joined product." She asks, in "spiderwasp or 
literary criticism," whether the relationship between 
vehicle and tenor is one of "dominion and understanding" 
of one thing over another? How is it possible to embrace 
another without absorbing-and thereby erasing-her or 
him? Can we both join with the other and retain the distinct 
identities of both? 
As a person who not long ago walked around with 
another person inside her own body, I do not know how to 
answer that question, but I recognize its urgency. So, I end 
where I began, with bewilderment and a baby-and one 
more poem. 
Mother with Toddler in War Time 
The first soft day after 
an intractable winter 
a child, conceived before 
the Towers burned but born 
after, commands a flock 
of geese: Do this! Do this! 
as her arms flap like wings 
under their scraping songs. 
The only one more vain 
is the mother who knows, 
more than thinks, that nothing 
on our worn earth matters more 
than this one gesture, this 
kid this instant, this lifting. 
The way images work in this poem creates a kind of 
slippage between vehicle and tenor, as often happens in 
metaphors. The child, who is imitating the geese, believes 
that the geese are imitating her. She "commands" them the 
way toddlers boss the world, but given that this is all 
happening during war time, "command" takes another 
meaning. The child is like a commander-in-chief, or the 
commander in chief resembles a toddler? You see how 
metaphors unsettle power structures and replace order 
with eros? And the mother, apparently incapable of caring 
for much more than this child during a war in a distant land, 
is somehow lifted up and out into the world through her 
attention to the one life, despite or because of all that is 
fallen and burning on earth. If only the desirous attention 
for the one could translate into an ethic of care for many. In 
this way, pleasure and purpose would become one. f 
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the Cretan glance 
toward a theory of metaphorical responsibility 
Gregg Muilenberg 
The emotion I felt in walking over the ancient grounds ofKnossos was so 
superabundantly rich, so embroiled with life and death, that I find myself 
unable to analyze it clearly . ... I gazed at the bullfights painted on the 
walls: the woman's agility and grace, the man's unerring strength, how they 
played with the frenzied bull, confronting him with intrepid glances. They 
did not kill him out of love . .. or because they were overcome with fear and 
dared not look at him. Instead they played with him obstinately . ... Perhaps 
with gratitude. For this sacred battle with the bull whetted the Cretan's 
strength . ... Thus the Cretans transubstantiated horror, turning it into an 
exalted game ... conquer[ ing] without annihilating the bull . .. considered 
not an enemy but a fellow worker. As I regarded the battle depicted on the 
walls, the age-old battle between man and bull (whom today we term God), 
I said to myself, such was the Cretan Glance. 
S
OMETIME AROUND 1978, WAYNE BOOTH IS REPUTED TO 
have remarked that by the year 2039 the world would 
have more metaphoricians than metaphysicians and 
more students of metaphor than people. I am living corrob-
oration of that claim. Never has a metaphysician been more 
poorly suited for the study of metaphor. I was trained to 
translate natural language into quantified formulae of the 
first-order predicate calculus and to distrust any language 
that resisted such treatment. But I have succumbed to the 
sophisticated charms and bedeviling puzzles of metaphor. 
As conversion experiences go, mine was unremarkable. 
Most of my colleagues in analytic philosophy had already 
converted and the path was well worn. One might even 
venture to say that during the last two decades the study of 
metaphor has become an essential part of the philosophy of 
language. Metaphors have become serious business. 
a history of hostility 
Such was not always the case. The British Empiricists, 
most notably Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, were cham-
pions of a view that held metaphors unworthy tools for 
philosophical investigation. That view dominated western 
philosophy until the middle of the twentieth century. 
John Locke's famous condemnation of metaphor in his 
Essay concerning Human Understanding is familiar to 
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many of us; but it is worth revisiting as a valuable reminder 
of the eloquent denunciation of figurative language that is 
so much a part of our philosophical tradition. 
Since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the 
world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative 
speeches and allusion in language will hardly be 
admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in 
discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight 
than information and improvement, such ornaments 
as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. 
But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we 
must allow, that all the art of rhetoric, besides order 
and clearness, all the artificial and figurative applica-
tion of words eloquence hath invented, are for 
nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the 
passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so 
indeed are perfect cheat: and therefore however laud-
able or allowable oratory may render them in 
harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in 
all discourses that pretend to . inform or instruct, 
wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge 
are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, 
either of the language or person that makes use of 
them. What and how various they are will be super-
fluous here to take notice; the books of rhetoric which 
abound in the world, will instruct those, who want to 
be informed: only I cannot but observe, how little the 
preservation and improvement of truth and knowl-
edge is the care and concern of mankind; since the arts 
of fallacy are endowed and preferred. 'Tis evident how 
much men love to deceive, and be deceived, since rhet-
oric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has 
its established professors, is publicly taught, and has 
always been had in great reputation: and, I doubt not 
but it will be thought great boldness, if not brutality in 
me, to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like 
the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer it 
self ever to be spoken against. And 'tis in vain to find 
fault with those arts of deceiving, wherein men find 
pleasure to be deceived. 
H
ERE IS ELOQUENCE MARSHALED IN OPPOSITION TO 
eloquence-trope employed against trope, stern-
ness against fancy. Never mind that all this seems 
coy and oh too witty. As Paul de Man observed, there is little 
epistemological risk in a flowery passage like this one 
[Locke's] about wit, except perhaps that it may be taken too 
seriously by dull-witted subsequent readers. That, of 
course, is exactly what happened. Some theorists add Mill 
to the list of plainspoken Englishmen who decry the use of 
metaphor. Mill's grounds of opposition, however, are 
more mundane but only slightly more earnest. He warns his 
readers in A System of Logic that the use of metaphor is 
especially likely to draw one into the fallacy of equivoca-
tion, which fallacy he contends, [is a] "fog which rose from 
this narrow spot [and] diffused itself at an early period over 
the whole surface of metaphysics." 
The goal of these formidable critics was not the elimi-
nation of metaphor from all philosophical discourse. That 
goal would have to wait a century after Mill for the zealots 
of Logical Positivism. These individuals were intent merely 
to contain metaphor within the realm of wit and fancy 
where it could operate pleasantly, producing its semantic 
instabilities without any real harm. The realm of judgment 
(where real philosophy is done) is thereby spared" ... being 
misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for 
another." Their position seems unassailable. Precise philo-
sophical discourse does not welcome the delightful 
vagaries of metaphor. None of our critics actually argued 
that metaphor is antithetical to the concerns of serious 
philosophical investigation. It was simply presumed to be a 
detriment to clear thinking and that presumption was 
judged to be patently obvious for a long time. Thus, this 
domesticated notion of metaphor as an artistic device 
designed for aesthetic pleasure and incidental enlighten-
ment, reigned supreme. 
The domesticated (aka traditional) view had its detrac-
tors, but none were able to mount a serious challenge for 
want of a comprehensive theory of metaphor. Aristotle's 
notion of metaphors as elliptical similes (echoed by Cicero 
and others), truth to tell, provided a comfortable universe 
of discourse. Metaphors, viewed as comparisons of things, 
are rendered tame and merely aesthetic. "My love is like a 
red, red rose" presents no challenge, only a task to be 
performed dutifully and sensitively. There is little or no 
conceptual content in the metaphor or, for that matter, in 
the exercise of comparative analysis. According to this 
view, only aesthetic appreciation and emotional confirma-
tion are to be wrest from the consideration of the likeness 
amidst diversity presented by metaphors. 
So it seems the epistemological cache of the tradi-
tional view of metaphor is minimal and restricted. 
Correspondingly, its moral responsibilities are straightfor-
ward and overt. No metaphor is either good or bad 
simpliciter. Metaphors are artistic devices that can be put 
to good or bad use. If the construction and utilization of a 
metaphor is a phenomenon restricted to the aesthetic and 
the rhetorical domains, then good or responsible 
metaphors will be witty, diverting, pleasing, and some-
times beautiful. Conversely, they should not be trite, 
boring, unpleasant, or ugly. Creativity and taste will be the 
prized attributes of the successful metaphorician. 
Entertainment, not enlightenment, will be the goal-
aesthetic values the focus. Moral values are only mini-
mally involved, since it is difficult to see what moral harm 
there could be in so harmless a pursuit. It might be viewed 
as morally irresponsible to create less beauty than one is 
capable of creating. Or it might be morally wrong to 
pretend to be one thing and, in fact, to be another. But that 
is about it. Metaphors cannot really lie or defame on this 
view. They cannot mislead or prevaricate. All that 
demands conceptual content. So, the only moral dangers 
in the traditionalist's woods are the disregard of aesthetic 
values and the impudent extension of the role of 
metaphor into the domain of "dry truth and real knowl-
edge." These are genuine constraints on wanton metaphor 
construction but not ones to long detain us. 
a pragmatic turn 
All this will strike the modern reader as hopelessly 
anachronistic and clearly indefensible. The modern intel-
lectual climate is very different. Metaphor is seen as essen-
tial not only in literary pursuits but also in the most tech-
nical theoretical endeavors. Investigations of the role of 
models and metaphors in the physical sciences are among 
the best treatments of the tropes. The modern view of 
metaphor argues for its cognitive and epistemological 
power; a power that its traditional counterpart lacks. This 
modern view of metaphor is premised on two fundamental 
contentions. First, metaphor has meaning and makes truth 
claims, although its meaning is different than standard or 
literal meaning and its truth claims cannot be mechanized 
in any available theory of truth. Thus, the modern view 
speaks of metaphorical meaning and its contribution to 
metaphorical truth. Second, the bridge between literal and 
metaphorical meaning is seen to be paraphrase. Paraphrase 
enables us to capture the metaphorical meaning of 
metaphor in literal language and reprocess it in mechanical 
truth theories. For example, when a native Chicagoan says 
that "the Big Lake Razor is soft today," the claim is literally 
false. But understood metaphorically, the statement is said 
to be true. Paraphrased into the literal statement, "The 
wind from Lake Michigan is warm and pleasant today," the 
metaphor is given meaning and a resultant 
truth value. 
Metaphorical responsibility, despite the 
jokes." 1 okes by nature elicit laughter. 1 okes that do not do 
so, are not jokes. So it is with metaphors. They must accom-
plish their proximate purpose too. If they do not, they are 
not metaphors. They may be intended as metaphors, they 
may be taken as metaphors, but if they do not perform the 
function that gives them their existence, they do not exist. 
In reality this is really no harsher an indictment of 
metaphor than that which we make of the other figures of 
speech. Screams, for example, that do not 
alert one to danger or express fear or 
evidence delight are not screams but mere 
feignings. The efficacy characterizing charming ambiguity of the term, quickly 
loses its charm to contradiction and paradox 
on this modern view. Metaphors seem to be 
duplicitous devices designed to mimic literal 
language without being held accountable to 
its rigorous analysis. But that, of course, is 
far too harsh a general indictment. 
Metaphors can be used for innovative 
instruction, for illustration, and for theory 
construction, at least in the initial stages of 
theorizing. But we also know of instances in 
our disciplines where metaphor has been 
Perhaps metaphors metaphor is not semantic, but pragmatic. 
Metaphors can (in fact always do on this 
view) fail to mean; but they cannot fail to do. 
What is at question is just how they do what 
they do. 
are not semantic 
entities at all~ but 
rather pragmatic 
Not surprisingly, promoters of the prag-
matic view resort to metaphors in their 
attempted explanations. Metaphors are 
said to direct our attention like the pointing 
of a finger. They enable us to see something 
ones. Perhaps they 
do not mean, but 
do. 
enlisted to aid a struggling theory by 
relieving it of the obligation of precise theo-
retical articulation; sometimes temporarily, as in the case of 
Quine's "web of belief," sometimes permanently, in the 
case of Locke's "wax tablet." Metaphors can also be used to 
garner emotional support for positions that are difficult to 
justify rationally; and they can be used to take advantage of 
a confusion of literal and figurative language. 
I have argued elsewhere that the paraphrastic theory of 
metaphorical meaning is plagued with intractable difficul-
ties. Metaphors simply are not captured by paraphrases. If 
they were, we would not take the trouble to make them. 
This situation is, however, indicative of a problem endemic 
to this view of metaphors. If literal truth is the goal of 
metaphor, why work through the superfluous medium of 
metaphorical meaning? Why not seek literal truth straight-
forwardly through literal language? No simple answer to 
this dilemma is forthcoming. Perhaps the modern, cogni-
tive content approach jettisoned the traditional aesthetic 
approach too soon. That seems basically right to me, and 
may account in part for the urge to construct metaphor; but 
it is not quite right. Another possibility is that paraphrase is 
so singularly unsuccessful in capturing metaphorical 
meaning because there is nothing to capture. Perhaps 
metaphors have no meaning beyond their patently false 
literal meanings (e.g., razors are not soft). Perhaps 
metaphors are not semantic entities at all, but rather prag-
matic ones. Perhaps they do not mean, but do. 
In one of the first accounts of the pragmatic character 
of metaphor, Donald Davidson remarks that metaphor 
"implies a kind and degree of artistic success; there are no 
unsuccessful metaphors, just as there are no unfunny 
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we were not in a position to see before. A 
delightful example is T. S. Eliot's "The 
Hippopotamus" in which none of its consti-
tutive sentences are really metaphors though the whole of 
the poem clearly is. 
The broad-backed hippopotamus 
Rests on his belly in the mud; 
Although he seems so firm to us 
He is merely flesh and blood. 
Flesh and blood is weak and frail, 
Susceptible to nervous shock; 
While the True Church can never fail 
For it is based upon a rock. 
The hippo's feeble steps may err 
In compassing material ends, 
While the True Church need never stir 
To gather in its dividends. 
The 'potamus can never reach 
The mango on the mango-tree 
But the fruits of pomegranate and peach 
Refresh the Church from over sea. 
The poem violently assaults our conventional ways of 
speaking and thinking about the church and requires us to 
look in a different direction by the comparison it 
constructs. Pointings, alludings, and intimatings are the 
operative entities, not metaphorical meanings. Where 
meaning lies, truth is close at hand. Yet there is no standard 
sense of truth that applies to this poem. 
Metaphors seem to alert us to aspects of the world by 
inviting us to make comparisons between the entities they 
juxtapose. But comparative analysis is not the point. In the 
metaphorical lyric "The Mississippi Delta is shining like a 
National guitar," we are not invited to draw up a list of simi-
larities between the two compared objects and then to 
judge the metaphor good or bad depending on the number 
of shared characteristics. Rather the juxtaposed images, it 
seems to me, are meant to get us to see something else, 
something that is not shared by them in peaceful coopera-
tion but emerges from them in their startling confronta-
tion. 
I
T IS THE CONFRONTATIONAL CHARACTER OF METAPHOR 
that often gives it its "mysterious way." The image of the 
church is juxtaposed with the image of the lumbering 
hippopotamus and the result is in no way captured by a 
paraphrase or a comparison. The poem gets us to see things 
differently regarding the church and to pay attention to 
that which might not have been attended to in normal 
discourse. But it does not tell us anything. Metaphor is like 
the Delphic oracle: It does not speak the truth, it does not 
lie, it intimates.lt appears to do so by putting odd, startling, 
baffling, or repulsive things together in instructive and 
profitable ways. Surprise is its power. The more startling 
the juxtaposition of images, the better and more effective 
the metaphor. But better in what way? If metaphors do not 
have metaphorical meaning and do not make metaphorical 
truth claims, what do they do on the pragmatic view? It 
seems to me that a prima facie case can be made for the 
contention that metaphor is a form of explanation. 
Now that we have finally emerged from that long 
dormant period of explanation theory dominated by the 
covering-law model, we have come to understand that 
explanations belong to the pragmatic branch of language. 
They are designed to solve problems and can take as many 
forms as the natures of those problems. They are not para-
digmatically true or false, but more often good or bad, 
effective or inappropriate, as they fulfill their purposes or 
fail to do so. Their ultimate purposes are multifarious and 
fundamental. Explanations are designed to solve problems 
and address needs. They can calm the fear of death, bring 
individuals closer together in a sense of community, 
prevent us from acting rashly, make us more attentive to 
issues beyond ourselves, and sometimes they bring us joy in 
knowing. Abstract theories are part of some specialized 
explanations but most often explanations do their work by 
telling stories, classifying data, reminding one of history, 
and by getting one to notice what might otherwise go unno-
ticed. Metaphor may differ slightly from other forms of 
explanation, involving as it does the intentional collision of 
images, but its family resemblance is unmistakable. 
Whether or not this pragmatic theory of metaphor is 
correct in all its detail is not of principal concern here. I 
believe it is a creative and promising solution to a set of 
theory-threatening problems. The pragmatic theory extri-
cates modern cognitive theory from a roughly hewn 
paradox: If metaphors have cognitive content, it must be 
paraphrased. If the content is paraphrased, why use 
metaphors? 
More interestingly, this problem brings to light an 
added dimension of metaphorical responsibility hitherto 
blurred by modern cognitive metaphor theory. If 
metaphors do not mean so much as show, and do not 
present truth claims so much as provide explanations, then 
the scope of metaphorical responsibility is broadened 
considerably. It will not be sufficient simply to present a 
purportedly true proposition with a metaphor. That 
responsibility to truth is not diminished by this new notion 
of metaphor. It is rather revered. Metaphor is never an epis-
temologically justifiable substitute for precise articulation 
of closely reasoned views designed for conceptual clarity. 
Literal language is primary. But when theory articulation is 
not the goal, but rather explanation, new responsibilities 
accrue. One will have to consider the need for the 
metaphor in its audience and the strategy for meeting that 
need. One will have to consider the conditional character 
of metaphors. They presuppose a level of knowledge on the 
part of the individuals seeking the explanation. Without 
that knowledge, the trust and intimacy required for a 
metaphor to explain will be broken. Thus metaphorical 
responsibility requires a respect for truth, a primary intel-
lectual value; and it requires moral integrity. 
Kazantzakis and metaphorical responsibility 
Good metaphoricians must be sensitive to the need for 
explanation all about them. Very often that amounts to 
being sensitive to the need within themselves as well. This 
call for explanation, this need to fit the world to our expe-
rience or us to the world is the impetus for an even deeper, 
more subtle, variety of metaphor. The Cretan writer Nikos 
Kazantzakis calls this need "The Cry" and our response to 
it "The Struggle." These are metaphors for the life of faith 
in Kazantzakis's writings. In order to explain these notions, 
to make them other than sterile bloodless abstractions, he 
employed a sophisticated and powerful type of metaphor, 
which for want of a better term I call living metaphors. Let 
us examine this type or use of metaphor and the extraordi-
nary moral responsibility that attends it. 
In 1957, International Peace Prize winner and Nobel 
Literature Prize nominee Nikos Kazantzakis was laid to 
rest on the ramparts of his beloved Megalokastro. His was 
the death and burial of a radical, judged by the Greek 
Orthodox Church as a defamer of the official doctrines 
and a promulgator of new and dangerous ideas about the 
god-man Jesus of Nazareth. That Kazantzakis was 
heretical cannot be denied. That we can learn something 
important about the life of faith and the living metaphors 
he believed necessary for living faithfully is the thesis I 
would like to develop. I am, however, the first to admit 
that I am less certain of how these living metaphors work 
than I am that they work. I have argued elsewhere that 
living metaphors stimulate in us a type of subtle thinking-
a thinking that does not describe life but inspires one to live 
it a certain way. That is part of it, but there must be more. I 
think that more is tied to the unique responsibilities 
attending living metaphors. Elements of Kazantzakis's life 
and work give us hints. 
Kazantzakis's trouble with the church began with the 
writing of Askitiki (AO'lCll'ttlcrl), or Spiritual Exercises, in 
1923. Critics were outraged at the iconoclastic character of 
this youthful work subtitled The Saviors of God. Spiritual 
Exercises is Kazantzakis's catechetical work and, as such, 
makes bold, perhaps rash, claims with little or no argument 
or extra-systemic support. A few examples from a section 
entitled "The Action" should suffice to establish this point 
and also serve as a foundation for a later discussion of 
Kazantzakis's radical religious views: 
I do not care what face other ages and other people 
have given to the enormous, faceless essence. They 
have crammed it with human virtues, with rewards and 
punishments, with certainties. They have given a face 
to their hopes and fears, they have submitted their 
anarchy to a rhythm, they have found a higher justifica-
tion by which to live and labor. They have fulfilled their 
duty. But today we have gone beyond these needs; we 
have shattered this particular mask of the Abyss; our 
God no longer fits under the old features. 
Our hearts have overbrimmed with new agonies, with 
new luster and silence. The mystery has grown savage, 
and God has grown greater. The dark powers ascend, 
for they also have grown greater, and the entire human 
island quakes. 
Let us stoop down to our hearts and confront the Abyss 
valiantly. Let us try to mold once more, with our flesh 
and blood, the new, contemporary face of God. 
For our God is not an abstract thought ... . He is not 
immaculate .... He is both man and woman, mortal 
and immortal, dung and spirit .... My God is not 
Almighty. He struggles for he is in peril every moment; 
he trembles and stumbles in every living thing, and he 
cries out. He is defeated incessantly, but rises again, 
full of blood and earth, to throw himself into battle 
once more. 
He is full of wounds .... But he does not surrender; he 
ascends with his feet, with his hands, biting his lips, 
undaunted .... He clings to warm bodies, he has no 
other bulwark. He shouts for help; he proclaims a 
mobilization throughout the Universe. 
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It is our duty, on hearing his Cry, to run under his flag, 
to fight by his side, to be lost or to be saved with him. 
Within the province of our ephemeral flesh all of God 
is imperiled. He cannot be saved unless we save him 
with our own struggles; nor can we be saved unless he 
is saved. 
My God is not All-knowing. His brain is a tangled skein 
of light and darkness, which he tries to unravel in the 
labyrinth of the flesh. 
My God is not All-holy. He is full of cruelty and savage 
justice, and he chooses the best mercilessly .... He is a 
power that contains all things. He begets them, loves 
them and destroys them. And if we say, "Our God is an 
erotic wind and shatters all bodies that he may drive 
on," and if we remember that Eros always works 
through blood and tears, destroying every individual 
without mercy-then we shall approach his dread face 
a little closer. 
This is hardly an Augustinian credo, but neither is it an 
alternative, heretical orthodoxy. It is not an ideology of any 
sort. It is something far more ethereal. It is a charter myth, 
a sustained metaphor for the struggle we know as the life of 
faith. As one of Kazantzakis's translators, Kimon Friar, has 
written: 
His works are not solid land where a pilgrim might 
stake his claim, but ephemeral stopping stations of a 
moment where the traveler might catch his breath 
before he abandons them also, and again strives 
upward on the steep ascent, leaving behind him the 
bloody trail of his endeavor. The fate of all heresies is to 
solidify, in the petrifaction of time, into stable and 
comforting orthodoxies. It would be the deepest 
happiness of Nikos Kazantakis to know that those 
whom his works have helped to mount a step higher on 
the evolutionary growth of the spirit, have smashed the 
Tablets of his Law .... 
Virtually all of his later fictional works and one of the non-
fictional ones (Report to Greco), as Kazantzakis himself 
contends, are properly seen as commentaries on Spiritual 
Exercises. Actually they are not commentaries so much as 
embodiments of his credo; living metaphors for the 
struggle described so graphically, yet so esoterically, in 
Askitiki. Kazantzakis uses age-old symbols and metaphors 
to speak about the present and, more importantly, to 
directly affect the future. By keeping Christ alive in our 
hearts, he hopes that he can aid one future [hu]man to be 
born one hour sooner and one drop more integrally. 
This need to embody ideas in stories that live and 
inspire began early in Kazantzakis' life and accompanied 
him throughout it. 
Every one of my emotions, moreover, and every one of 
my ideas, even the most abstract, is made up of these 
four primary ingredients: earth, sea, woman and the 
star-filled sky .... Even now, in the most profound 
moments of my life, I experience these four terrifying 
elements with exactly the same ardor as in my infancy. 
Only then, when I succeed in re-experiencing them 
with the same astonishment, fright, and joy they gave 
me as an infant, do I feel-even today-that I am expe-
riencing these four terrifying elements deeply, as 
deeply as my body and soul can plunge .... [f]he four 
joined indissolubly inside me and became one .... 
Within me, even the most metaphysical problem takes 
on a warm physical body which smells of sea, soil and 
human sweat. The Word, in order to touch me, must 
become warm flesh. Only then do I understand-when 
I can smell, see, and touch. 
Myths and metaphors for the life of faith, once vivid, 
have become definitions and necessary truths. God is love. 
God is our Shepherd. God is our Almighty Father. God has 
prepared a Great Mansion for us. Faith is like a Rock. These 
we believe; on these we stand. But they are not guides for 
living a vibrant life of faith. They are dead metaphors. They 
are Tablets of Law to be treated with cool, confident indif-
ference. But living the life of faith is not a matter of 
mastering a creed, adopting a contentious simplification, 
or sleep stumbling through a series of ritualized "Christ-
encounters." Kazantzakis believes it is a battle. A battle that 
we hope, but cannot know, we will win. We can take 
courage from the fact that God is in the same battle, but we 
are terrified by the fact that God is wounded everywhere. 
God is not almighty, waiting with crossed hands for certain 
victory. God's fate is in our hands, as ours is in God's. These 
are the spiritual lessons we need to embody with our lives 
and Kazantzakis can teach us how to do so. 
A careful reading of Kazantzakis's works will impress 
even the tyro with the depth of his religiosity. He may have 
been a heterodox, but he was never indifferent. He was 
heterodoxical because he could not be indifferent to reli-
gion. As he remarks in Report to Greco: 
The face of Christ had fascinated me indescribably ever 
since my childhood. I had followed Him on the icons as 
he was born, reached His twelfth year, stood in the 
rowboat and raised His hand to make the sea grow 
calm; then as he was scourged and crucified, and as he 
called out upon the cross, "My God, my God, why hast 
thou forsaken me?" After that, as one fine morning He 
rose from the tomb and ascended into heaven, clasping 
a white pennon in his hand. Seeing Him, I too was 
scourged, I too was crucified and resurrected. And 
when I read the Bible, the ancient tales came to life: 
man's soul seemed a savage, slumbering beast 
bellowing in its sleep. Suddenly the heavens open and 
Christ descended. He kissed this beast, whereupon it 
sighed sweetly, awakened and became what it had 
always been: a superbly beautiful princess. 
So also, in a moving description of an encounter or a 
dream he had during his six-month pilgrimage to Mt. 
Athos, he says: 
[T]he only thing I found as I roamed the Holy 
Mountain was a veteran campaigner (so he seemed to 
me at first) holding out his wounded hands to the 
monks that passed .... Shivering, his eyes filled with 
tears, he knocked on every door, but no one admitted 
him. He was chased from monastery to monastery, and 
the dogs ran in back of his ragged cloak and barked. 
One evening I saw him seated on a stone gazing at the 
desolate sea .... For a while he remained silent, but 
then, unable to restrain himself any longer, he suddenly 
cried out, "The foxes have their holes, but I have not 
where to lay my head!" A flash tore across my mind; I 
recognized Him and ran to kiss his hand. I had loved 
Him when I was a small child and loved Him ever since. 
Now I searched everywhere, but he had become invis-
ible. Feeling aggrieved, I sat down on the stone where 
he had been sitting. Oh if I could only open my heart to 
him so that He might enter it and not have to wander 
homeless and cold. 
K
AZANTZAKIS WAS NOT A RELIGIOUS MAN, BUT HE 
hoped he was a profoundly religious one. Religion 
is about comfort and reward. Profound religion is 
about struggle. It is about following "the bloody trail, the 
thin red line of ascent" as Kazantzakis so often describes it. 
The roots of this struggle appear everywhere in 
Kazantzakis but always in images and stories. I hope to 
make clear the reason for that directly. But for now let me 
simply list these roots (something Kazantzakis would 
never do) in the hope that the connection to the life of faith 
will be more apparent. 
The profoundly religious person, God's struggler, is 
marked by three traits. First of all, such a person is 
committed to the truth-the truth about the world, about 
ourselves, and the truth about God. This truth is uncom-
fortable and it cannot be made more palatable by fash-
ioning accommodating lies or self-satisfying idols. 
Knowing the truth is dangerous and it produces wounds, 
the wounds of doubt, as Kazantzakis calls them. His 
wounds were grievous and resulted from his despair that 
Christ had killed Apollo and Darwin had killed Christ, as 
he so cryptically put it. We all have such wounds. They will 
never heal but they must be ignored in order to continue 
the struggle. 
Secondly, the profoundly religious person is 
committed to the power of the spirit. This commitment is 
evident in the struggle to transform the world, to spiritu-
alize it in a second act of creation helping to fulfill God's 
creation. Faith put over knowledge does not heal the 
wounds. That would replace knowledge with easy religion, 
an all too common mistake. Faith is rather the will to 
struggle despite the wounds and to believe in the power of 
the spiritual to transform knowledge into faith sufficient to 
sustain the struggle. This relationship of struggling is diffi-
cult to capture in the descriptive language of "dry truth and 
knowledge" and it is trivialized in the abstractions of reli-
gion. Consequently, one must resort to art. Only art-the 
creation of images, metaphors, and myths-can point to 
the struggle and inspire us to fight on. This, then, is the third 
mark of the profoundly religious person. Such a person 
understands the necessity of myth, or systems of 
metaphors, in living the life of faith, in transforming flesh 
into spirit. Kazantzakis understood this necessity well. It 
was the only way he could write and the only thing he could 
write about. This transubstantiation of knowledge into 
faith and faith into action through the use of myth is the 
single greatest insight he has left us. He describes his writing 
in the same terms. "I swaggered as I wrote. Was I not God, 
doing as I pleased, transubstantiating reality, fashioning it 
as I should have liked it to be-as it should have been? I was 
joining truth and falsehood indissolubly together. No there 
were no longer any such things as truth and falsehood; 
everything was soft dough which I kneaded and rolled 
according to the dictates of whim, without securing the 
permission from anyone." 
The struggle has many faces. It is the struggle of the 
oppressed to free themselves of their oppressors. It is the 
struggle of the rich to free themselves of their comforts. It is 
the struggle of the believers to free themselves from doubt 
and contradiction. It is the struggle of the pious to free 
themselves of their smugness. All these struggles are one 
according to Kazantzakis. They are all attempts to spiritu-
alize matter-attempts to accomplish what God accom-
plished-attempts to save God. 
T
HE PROCESS OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION, WHICH 
Kazantzakis affords the highest place in his world-
view, and which he characterizes as our greatest obli-
gation, is rarely discussed and never analyzed. It is also 
known as "the struggle" because it must persist, even 
flourish, without destroying the commitment to truth. It is 
difficult to describe, but it is all about us. It is in the flower 
that blossoms from the mud. It is in the painting that 
embodies the experiences of the artist. It is in the laughter 
that explodes from the full belly of the child. Although 
these metaphors for the process of turning flesh into spirit 
do not define it; they do, however, help us to bring it into 
our own lives. That they do so evidences our commitment 
to the transforming power of the spiritual. They are 
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evidence of the power of metaphor to put flesh on the 
bleached bones of theory. Living metaphors require more 
than merely the interpretative action. They require 
changes in one's life. 
Kazantzakis' works are replete with examples, but I 
will look at three important types, beginning with a group 
of rather simple and straightforward metaphors (though 
no less effective for their simplicity) and ending with some 
complicated and subtle ones. In all this the purpose is the 
same. Metaphors and myths alone hold the power to 
sustain us in the struggle, and to direct us toward our goal 
of saving God. 
When Kazantzakis wants to describe the struggle for 
us, whether it is the struggle we call the life of faith, the 
struggle to fulfill our potential, to bear our obligation to our 
ancestors .... whatever the struggle, he very often appeals 
to metaphors involving his favorite creatures. Among the 
dozens of creatures from roosters to monkeys, from dung 
beetles to goats, none appears so often as the flying fish, the 
chrysalis, and the silk worm. These creatures serve as 
metaphorical, flesh and blood embodiments of the nature 
of that struggle. Kazantzakis claims that he has always felt a 
mystical unity with these three of God's creatures for he 
always imagined that they symbolized the route of his soul. 
The chrysalis, whose struggle is to transform itself into a 
thing of beauty, responds to the natural rhythms and 
harmonies that surround it and sustain it. It cannot be 
hurried, nor can it be helped along its ascent from mud-
encrusted worm to free-floating butterfly. We too, he 
believed, were made grubs by God in order that we, by our 
own efforts, could become butterflies. 
Similarly, the silk worm struggles to transform its guts 
into glistening strands. It does not alter its form, as does the 
chrysalis, but actually transubstantiates its matter into 
something more ethereal and beautiful. The flying fish are 
even more remarkable. They are not content to live in their 
element but strive to transcend it. If only for a few brief 
moments, they escape to a world beyond them, a world 
which cannot possibly be theirs, but which they dare to 
invade nonetheless. Kazantzakis says, "I experienced equal 
joy and excitement at seeing the flying fish on the frescoes 
at Knossos, seeing it soar above the sea on the wings that it 
developed. Now, a thousand years later, I was faithfully 
following in their footsteps: I too was transforming Cretan 
earth into wings." 
Each of these creatures struggles to change, to become, 
to create, to transubstantiate. The change cannot be distin-
guished from the struggle, or the struggle from the change. 
This is one of the reasons why they serve as good metaphors 
for the life of faith. The goal of that struggle, too, cannot be 
distinguished from the struggle itself. 
I will conclude these examples with a metaphor so 
powerful and so radical that I am not sure that it is a 
metaphor so much as a vision. Kazantzakis is describing his 
state of mind when he began to write the Last Temptation 
of Christ. Perhaps the transforming power of living 
metaphors is even greater than I have suggested. 
As I stared into the dying flames, I saw the panic-
stricken Disciples gathered together in the attic. "The 
Rabbi is dead, he is dead." They were awaiting nightfall 
so they could leave Jerusalem and disperse. But a 
woman jumped up. She alone refused to accept His 
death, for Christ had risen in her heart. Barefooted, 
unkempt, half naked, she ran toward the tomb at the 
break of day. Certain she would see Christ, she saw 
Him; certain that Christ had been resurrected, she 
resurrected Him. "Rabbi!" she cried, and inside the 
tomb the Rabbi heard her voice, bounded to his feet, 
and appeared to her at dawn light, walking on the 
springtime grass. 
Kazantzakis makes living metaphors in order to live those 
metaphors. He says that in creating Odysseus he made him 
to view the abyss straight in the eye with a Cretan glance, 
and "in creating him, I strove to resemble him. I myself was 
being created." Metaphor can be put to no more powerful 
use. Explanation is no longer the goal, commitment is. 
THE RESPONSIBILITIES ATTENDING THIS USE OF LIVING metaphors, like those of the other types before, are rather easily deduced. If living metaphors are 
designed to change peoples' lives, then they ought not 
promote morally evil lives-lives dominated by hatred, 
fear, revenge, etc. The responsibilities appear to be much 
more overtly moral than those associated with the previous 
types of metaphors. Those responsibilities were predomi-
nantly aesthetic and intellectual and only by implication 
moral. But when one constructs and employs living 
metaphors the responsibility is unavoidably moral. 
But the situation is actually more complicated than 
that. Few would construct these metaphors with an overtly 
evil design. The Athenians did not frame charter myths in 
praise of xenophobia and gynophobia as cultural virtues. 
They designed them as clever and subtle deceits in order to 
further perverse values they secretly held higher than 
justice or truth.lt was obviously immoral for them to do so, 
but life does not often present itself obviously. Rarely do 
evil metaphors promote explicitly immoral agenda. They 
are more often enlisted in more covert pursuits. Living 
metaphors can be used to evade serious issues, utilizing 
myths that disregard the truth and evade the struggle the 
truth presents. For example, when one employs "bootstrap 
metaphors" to explain how the disadvantaged in our 
society should extricate themselves from degradation by 
exercising free will, one is using metaphor to disguise an 
abstraction that misleads and evades the truth. The truth is 
that moral development and reclamation require a 
supportive and sustaining community. Freewill does not 
suffice. 
Similarly, metaphors that present God as a benevolent 
father guiding children safely through the perils of life to 
the ultimate reward mislead and evade the truth that the life 
of faith is a battle, with no assurance of victory, but only the 
obligation that one fight the fight. The principal responsi-
bility of the metaphorician constructing living metaphors is 
to honor truth through art-art that is able to sustain the 
struggle truth presents. 
Kazantzakis tells the story of a Cretan he once met (or 
dreamt of) offering this advice: 
When you appear before the heavenly gates and they 
fail to open, do not take hold of the knocker to knock. 
Unhitch the musket from your shoulder and fire . 
"Do you actually believe God will be frightened into 
opening the gates?" 
"No, lad, He won't be frightened. But he will open 
them because He'll realize you are returning from 
battle." 
Never did I hear from an educated person words so 
profound as those I heard from peasants, especially 
from oldsters who had completed the struggle. Their 
passions had subsided within them; they stood now 
before death's threshold, tenderly casting a final, tran-
quil glance [a Cretan Glance] behind them. 
Kazantzakis's use of metaphor is both subtle and powerful. 
Because it is so, it is also dangerous, for it has the power to 
change us. It has the power to enable or equip us for the 
struggle that is the life of faith. Nothing else can put vibrant 
flesh on the dry bones of theodicy. Nothing else can rally us 
to climb following the thin red line. This is not the 
metaphor of fancy, nor even the metaphor of truth. It is the 
metaphor of action, and consequently the metaphor of 
moral responsibility. The Athenian charter myths were not 
distasteful or false. Such categories did not apply to them. 
They were morally evil. They changed individuals, 
teaching them how to hate without feeling it and how to 
fear without knowing it. 
The defense against this misuse of metaphor is knowl-
edge; not the knowledge of true and false propositions but 
the knowledge of how images can inspire and produce 
action. This "logic of subtle thinking" is not yet a discipline 
but it must become one as we come to understand and 
acknowledge the real power of art in our lives. f 
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music as an exegetical act? 
Y
S, THE TITLE OF THESE MUSINGS ENDS WITH A QUES-
ion mark. Speculation and disagreement over the 
evocative, provocative power of music as a commu-
nicative medium is, of course, perennial. Nevertheless, I 
believe that music has enormous potential to communi-
cate, to unpack and interpret ideas, indeed to function 
exegetically. As a church musician, this cognitive dimen-
sion of my art has always fascinated and frightened me-
fascinated because as composer or interpreter (performer) 
I'm able to communicate my ideas and understandings as I 
make music. But it has frightened me for the same reasons. 
I would be the first to admit that what I've just asserted-
that music has enormous potential both to communicate 
and to develop ideas-is not accepted by all persons, 
perhaps not even all musicians, and for many there are 
limits to this interpretive, exegetical dimension of music. 
Here I'd like to explore the exegetical dimen-
sions of music, experiment a bit with some of the 
possibilities, and then provide a specific decon-
John Ferguson 
and there is calm after the storm. (An excerpt from William 
Tell is played.) 
Music with sung text is a special kind of programmatic 
music. Here, because words interact with musical gestures, 
music can become more specific and can paint a reasonably 
specific picture. An example: Sunrise in "Oh Day Full of 
Grace" (a recorded example of a musical "sunrise" from F. 
Melius Christiansen's "0 Day Full of Grace.") Certainly 
this is an example of music as exegetical art: a specific kind 
of sunrise-a wondrous, celestial sunrise-is presented, 
though there are, of course, other types of sunrises. 
It is time for a parenthesis: The challenge to the 
composer of programmatic music is to be cautious lest he or 
she be too specific. Last week during our Wednesday daily 
chapel, Susan Bauer, the choreographer for the dance 
setting of Psalm 23 that was shared at the vespers service last 
night, observed that the artist needs to be careful 
about becoming too literal. She encouraged a 
more abstract approach to choreography. In the 
struction of a setting of the Magnificat, a compo-
sition that was produced specifically for this Lilly 
Fellows Program national conference and with 
this talk in mind. 
To begin, let me identify a few fundamentals 
of my thinking about music as exegetical art. I 
Music is a 
kind of 
language .... 
same way, being too literal in a musical setting 
risks turning the musical setting into a parody and 
for composer and performer this fine line is a 
tightrope to be negotiated carefully. 
Let's return to my fundamentals. Absolute 
music, and not just programmatic music, can be 
exegetical to a surprising, even an amazing, 
degree. Since my passion is church music, congre-
think of music as a rhetorical art form in the sense 
that it is a kind of language complete with its own 
system of grammar and concepts that are unpacked 
through a systematic study of music theory, a part of every 
undergraduate music major's experience. Music is not 
specific in the way that words can be, but it does have the 
potential to communicate ideas and, for performers or 
composers, part of its communicative potential is unlocked 
by an understanding of how music is organized and how it 
functions. 
Scholars considering music's expressive capabilities 
often separate music into two categories: absolute music 
and programmatic music. Absolute music is pure, organ-
ized sound. We experience it and react to it depending upon 
how its sounds to our own experiential being. It cannot be 
specific in the way that programmatic music can be. 
Programmatic music has a story that accompanies it. For 
example, in the storm movement from William Tell, the 
wind blows up, then the rain begins. Next there is thunder, 
increasingly violent. Finally, the thunder and rain subside, 
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gational as well as choral, we will explore this exegetical 
potential in absolute music. 
Can a tune, in and of itself, convey a spirit or make a 
statement? Let's try some experiments with some familiar 
hymns, ''Amazing Grace," and "Joy to the World." (The 
audience sings each text to its traditional tune and then, 
reverses, singing each text to the other's tune.) Now, we do 
have a problem here. We know these tunes in relation to 
specific texts. It is easy to propose that our understanding 
of the geist, the spirit, the nature of these tunes is so bound 
up in our associations with specific texts that we cannot 
make an impartial assessment of the nature of the tune. Our 
objectivity seems to have been destroyed by experience. 
Let's try some other examples. First, "When in Our 
Music God is Glorified." (The audience sings this text with 
the tune ENGELBERG as it appears in With One Voice 802. 
The audience then sings the text with the tune FREDERICK-
TOWN, Lutheran Book of Worship 555.) Note how with 
ENGELBERG the hymn seems more proud, with the other 
tune more humble, especially because the musical line for 
the Alleluia refrain "bows down" rather than ascends, as in 
the first tune. Now consider "What a friend we have in 
Jesus." Compare our stereotypic way of singing this text 
and tune to recasting the tune as black gospel. In our orig-
inal way the "friend" seems more like a soft, cuddly teddy 
bear; sung as black gospel, Jesus, our friend, seems more 
like a strong, sturdy lion-a protector. 
Another consideration which has always fascinated me 
is that music is one of the arts that is experienced with a 
mediator, a person in the middle, as it were. The audience 
responds immediately to the painter's work, but there is a 
performer in between the composer's artwork and the 
audience. An implication of this, I think, is that a composer 
may set out to exegete a text, to paint a musical picture, but 
that process relies upon the performers for completion. 
The performers also interpret (sometimes unwittingly) the 
text, changing the hues and colors of the picture. 
A
PERFORMER'S RESPONSIBILITY IS, THUS, ENORMOUS. WE 
all have experienced hearing a set of numbers on the 
telephone-lifeless, clearly done by machine; all of 
us have heard a Scripture passage read by someone who has 
no idea what the words mean-it's as if someone knows 
how to pronounce a language perfectly but has no idea 
what the words mean to convey. In the same way some 
performances reveal that the performers don't understand 
the music; they haven't considered (in the case of music 
with text) the implications of that text in relation to the 
musical setting of the text. 
Music didn't start out that way. The mediator, the 
person in the middle, is a relatively recent development in 
art music or much traditional Church Music. Over most of 
music's history, the composer was the performer, either as 
singer or instrumentalist or as conductor. Today the 
composer lets go. Since no performance instructions in a 
score can be totally exhaustive, the composer must let go 
and trust the performers, invite them to collaborate in 
bringing an expressive construct to life. 
Now, let's move from these more general considera-
tions to a specific application, a case study in exegetical 
composition, a Magnificat for a worship service during a 
Lilly Conference. To set the stage, I'd like to read a poem by 
Gardner McFall: 
The News 
She was going about an ordinary day, 
pondering dinner, washing a dish, 
or sweeping the floor. Maybe 
she was standing in the garden 
or had come in from the garden 
to sit by the window and rest. 
Perhaps she had taken up a book 
or remembered the unfinished sewing 
when she encountered an angel 
in the middle of the room. 
Of course, she was shocked, 
though the angel offered a host 
of assurances. Whatever she thought, 
she didn't hang her head in chagrin, 
collapse in a rattled heap, 
or race from the house. Neither 
did she act like she'd won the lottery 
and could lord it over everyone, 
but, no doubt, picked up the sewing, 
the book, the broom, or the dish 
in which she glimpsed her reflection, 
a woman without any special features 
except for the yellow nimbus now 
hovering around her head, someone 
who didn't even try to strike 
a deal with the messenger, 
though she was certainly going to 
give up a lot being part of this plan. 
The story of the Magnificat as told in the Gospel of Luke 
has always moved and fascinated me. Theologians suggest 
that Mary was a young woman; the poem just heard 
reminds us of the ordinariness of this person who suddenly 
discovers that God has great plans for her. She travels to 
visit her relative Elizabeth, who is also pregnant. Elizabeth 
is overwhelmed and cries out, "Blessed are you among 
women, and blessed is the fruit of your womb." Mary, also 
overwhelmed by these momentous happenings, bursts into 
song, "My soul magnifies the Lord and my spirit rejoices in 
God my Savior." 
As one considers this canticle, at least two major ques-
tions arise. First, there is a kind of tension in the text. It is 
partially a song of praise-My soul magnifies the Lord-yet 
partially a profound statement about social justice-God 
has put down the mighty and exalted the humble. How is it 
that this young woman speaks with such profundity? 
Perhaps she grew up knowing such words from the Psalms 
of the Old Testament and the song of Hannah and her faith 
experience just welled up in her and, with the help of the 
Holy Spirit, it just poured out. Or, Luke wanted to make 
some points and put them in Mary's voice. 
Either way, this poem presents a challenge for someone 
who sets it to music. Is it an essay addressing significant 
societal issues? Or is it the response of a stunned teenager, 
flabbergasted and anxious to tell the news that she is going 
to have a baby? 
The second issue, thesecond question for the composer 
to address, is the scope of the piece. There are many 
wonderful, larger settings of the Magnificat. In a useful 
little book, The Magnificat-Musicians as Biblical 
Interpreters, Samuel Terrieu does a wonderful job of 
analyzing some of these larger settings that, in today's 
church music practice, I consider to be more concert 
settings than liturgical settings. 
However, because the Magnificat was chosen as a 
canticle to be sung during one of the daily monastic offices, 
smaller, liturgical settings have been produced over the 
centuries, probably numbering in the thousands. Yet, many 
of these settings-especially those in English, most of 
which come from the English Anglican cathedral/ collegiate 
choral tradition-are too difficult for most church choirs to 
tackle. 
Now, in addition to Evening Prayer, its original litur-
gical "home," the Magnificat appears in the ecumenical 
lectionary during Advent, yet another opportunity for it to 
be sung at worship in a liturgical setting, if the setting is 
compact enough to work as an element in a larger liturgical 
construct. So we have two considerations: (1) How do we 
approach the text-is it essentially a joyful song of praise or 
will we emphasize the profound social implications of the 
text? And (2) for whom do we set the text-will it be diffi-
cult and performed primarily by professionals or more 
accessible for many more typical choirs? 
I 
HAVE CHOSEN TO SET THE PIECE AS THE SONG OF AN 
amazed young person, essentially a sunny, simple, 
happy song of praise. Most of the piece is in triple 
meter-a waltz of praise, a happy dance from someone so 
excited, so amazed, by what is happening to her that she 
rushes off to share the news with her relative, Elizabeth. I 
have chosen to set the text in a manner accessible enough 
for church choirs to be able to learn it, even during the pres-
sure of a busy Advent season. Yes, I know at our conference 
we heard it sung by a college choir, a group more sophisti-
cated than many church choirs. Yes, I know I'm blessed to 
work with such talented singers. But, I'm not that blessed. 
Over two-thirds of the choir is new this year; we've only 
been together for six weeks; and even though we may 
rehearse three days a week, at no time is everyone present 
because the realities of life here are that choir conflicts with 
other activities, including science labs. This is not a 
complaint-it's merely a rehearsal of realities. We are more 
like a church choir than some might imagine. Neither the 
organ part nor the trumpet part of the piece is that difficult; 
so I hope this piece is something that can be used out there, 
not just in here. 
Another useful thing, I believe, is that this setting uses 
the words of the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 
Most English settings use the elegant King James Version. 
Especially in the context of the ecumenical lectionary, it 
seemed appropriate to use the NRSV. As I began work on the 
piece I thought, "How about telling the larger story, placing 
the Magnificat in its Biblical context?" So this piece has two 
parts, the story leading up to the Magnificat and the canticle 
itself. The canticle portion can stand alone or it can serve as 
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conclusion to the entire story as told in Luke 1:26-55. 
Part One is envisioned for reader, trumpet, and organ. 
If possible (and when blessed with a marvelous musician 
like Marty Hodel of the St. Olaf music faculty) the more 
mellow voice of the flugelhorn can substitute for the 
trumpet, adding a new color to the mix. In this part we tell 
the story leading up to the canticle. Part Two, for choir, 
trumpet, and organ, is the canticle itself. Now, a comment 
or two about the musical structure of the piece. 
Music as an art form unfolds over time; for the 
composer a major concern is always the ordering of time, 
the coherent unfolding of musical events. One of the most 
common organizational techniques is statement, contrast, 
restatement. (It's a little bit like the cliche about speeches-
first you tell them what you will say, then you say it, then 
you tell them what you've said.) The challenge in setting a 
Biblical text is that it often doesn't reflect this kind of struc-
ture; it is through-composed. 
In the case of the canticle itself, I chose to divide the text 
into three parts: an opening section of praise, a middle 
section exploring the social justice themes in the text, and a 
last section in the spirit of the first, an affirmation of thanks-
giving for God's constancy. Thus the musical ABA' -state-
ment, contrast, modified restatement-form carries the 
text logically, resulting in a musical coherence not possible 
if one generates all new musical material for a through-
composed text. 
Then, for the introductory, narrative portion of the 
piece, written after the canticle setting, I chose to excerpt 
musical gestures, especially the principal A theme, thus 
unifying the narrative Part One with the canticle, Part Two. 
Part One also explores its own statement, contrast, restate-
ment structure, thus providing an underlying musical, 
structural cohesion independent from the narrative. 
It is up to the listener to determine whether all of this 
works. No matter how creative the "structure," the final 
consideration is not just structural coherence but a more 
basic question, "Does it work?" 
AE 
THERE SPECIFIC EXEGETICAL MOVES, SPECIFIC TEXT 
aiming musical gestures in the piece? Well, the 
iddle section slows a bit, gives us more time to 
consider the profound implications of the text. The rich are 
sent away empty as first the organ and then the women drop 
out, with the men left holding a single, "empty," pitch. The 
proud are scattered energetically through repeated, 
layered rhythmic patterns in trumpet and choir, reflecting 
the sound and meaning of the word, scattered. These are 
not radically dramatic musical things, yet the text did influ-
ence the musical fabric and gestures at these places. 
As I worked with and manipulated the musical mate-
rials in this piece, especially the "licks" for flugelhorn and 
trumpet, I began to wonder about something else. Is it 
possible that we don't know the most important portions of 
Mary's song? Is it possible that this song of praise was 
accompanied by sighs too deep for words, by ecstatic 
shouts that transcended words? Perhaps without first 
intending it, the soaring lines of the flugelhorn and trumpet 
become companion to the words of the canticle, suggesting 
once again that when mere words are inadequate, pure 
song-gracious, soaring melody-takes over. 
Now let's listen to a recording of this Magnificat. After 
sharing some of what influenced my compositional work, I 
hope you will be enabled to listen with different ears-not 
better ears, just different ones. (Readers may listen to this 
piece at our website http://www. valpo.edu/cresset) 
A sentence in our music department mission statement 
reads: Inspired by the conviction that music is a divine gift, 
we will continue to cultivate a spirit of exploration and 
innovation, seeking and celebrating the transcendent and 
transforming power of music. Working, teaching, making 
music in this college of the church is wonderful because I 
am affirmed in my attempts to embrace the challenge and 
joy of synthesizing my faith with my discipline. Making and 
teaching music here can be duty and delight. Certainly it is 
not just work. Certainly it is vocation. f 
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integrating faith and learning? 
D
URING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS, THE CONVERSATION 
about the role of religious identity in the academic 
practices of Protestant colleges or universities has 
been centered largely on what some refer to as "the integra-
tion model." While the antecedents for this model predate 
it, the publication of Arthur Holmes' book, The Idea of a 
Christian College (1975), focused attention on integrating 
faith and learning because Holmes argued that this (and 
only this) ideal distinguished secular from Christian higher 
education. Moreover, he argued that integration fits best 
with our deepest and widest theological commitments. 
This ideal of integration has been influential in two 
important ways. First, many Protestant Christian colleges 
or universities have intentionally adopted this language of 
"integrating faith and learning" as a way of expressing their 
missions as religiously-identified institutions of higher 
education in distinction from their secular counterparts. 
Second, in so doing, many have linked the self-conscious 
embrace of the language and practice of integration to insti-
tutional resistance to secularization. Indeed, the publica-
tion of edited or authored books by George Marsden, 
Secularization and the American Academy ( 1992 ), The Soul 
of the American University: From Protestant Establishment 
to Established Nonbelief (1994 ), and The Outrageous Idea 
of Christian Scholarship (1997), further fueled the notion 
that various scholarly practices of integration not only 
identify what is distinctive about religiously-identified 
colleges and universities, but also that institutional 
commitment to integration is an essential resource against 
secularization. 
Scholarship and Christian Faith: Enlarging the 
Conversation by Douglas and Rhonda Jacobsen attempts 
to break with these themes and the trajectory of Protestant 
higher education in significant ways. The authors' 
announced aim is to enlarge the conversation about the 
nature and role of Christian scholarship by providing a 
framework that better enables persons who embody 
different styles of Christian scholarship to converse 
respectfully and intelligently with one another and with 
their non-religious peers in the academy. The authors want 
to encourage Christian scholars and the institutions they 
inhabit and the traditions they embody to think more capa-
ciously, constructively, and conversationally about the 
nature of, and prospects for, Christian scholarship. 
Thinking capaciously includes a serious invitation to 
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scholars from different Christian traditions to think anew 
about how their particular angle of vision or their charisms 
might enrich both teaching and scholarship, not only 
within their own institutions, but also as they converse with 
others in the shared work of enlarging what we know and 
love about the world. With this professed aim of the book, 
readers will eagerly, easily, and happily agree. 
T
HE BOOK OPENS WITH A PROLOGUE BY FORMER MESSIAH 
College president, Rodney Sawatsky, in which he 
declares that the worries about increasing secular-
ization in our culture in general, and in the American 
academy or university culture in particular, are ideological 
and pathological and not real worries. We then find five 
chapters authored by the J acobsens. Each of their chapters 
is complemented by an essay from a faculty colleague from 
Messiah. Chapter One, "More Than the "Integration" of 
Faith and Learning" critiques the integration model, and 
the complementary essay offers an alternative metaphor-
"imbricating." Chapter Two, "Living the Questions of 
Learning and Faith," explores the personal dimension of 
Christian scholarship, emphasizing both the existential 
and social nature of scholarship, in contrast to its logical 
and abstract dimensions, hence its complexities, on the one 
hand, and its practical, non-esoteric character, on the 
other. The complementary essay, "Is There a Christian 
History of Science?" aims to show that moving from an 
earlier form of "history of science" scholarship that privi-
leges the logical dimension of scientific inquiry over the 
personal and social to one that gives the greater weight to 
the latter has produced both a more accurate picture of 
science and has undercut the myth that science and religion 
are necessarily at war with one another. Chapter Three, 
"Scholarship and the Varieties of Christian Faith," affirms 
"the traditioned nature of our thinking" and, thus, that 
different traditions of faith and learning will and ought to 
exhibit different approaches to the matter of relating faith 
and learning in teaching and scholarship. In short, we 
should expect a pluralistic rather than a monolithic 
approach to Christian scholarship and faith and learning. 
The complementary essay argues that there are distinctive 
Anabaptist themes implied by the Anabaptist under-
standing of faith including, among others, commitments to 
nonviolence and to serving the poor and oppressed. 
Characteristic kinds of research, thus Christian scholar-
ship, the authors suggest, will emerge from these commit-
ments. Chapter Four, "Scholarship Defined and 
Embodied," expands the notion of scholarly practice 
beyond the typically analytic or empirical methods to 
include strategic aims and empathetic modes and motives. 
With its complementary essay, this chapter contends that 
disinterested scholarship is often inadequate to the realities 
we study and that faith, as instinctual and passionate, 
rightly completes scholarship, as an ally rather than a 
competitor. Chapter Five, "Contours and Contexts of 
Christian Scholarship," explores the creative interaction 
between faith and learning which benefits both the church 
and the academy, affirming Christian scholarship as 
including a self-critical but committed faith, one capable of 
serving the world through serving the church. 
THE BOOK HAS MANY POSITIVE FEATURES. LET ME FOCUS on two of its strong points. First, the Jacobsens and their colleagues at Messiah draw attention to the fact 
that the way in which the integration of faith and learning 
has been implemented in many Christian colleges or 
universities and the way in which integration has been 
expressed by some Christian scholars have had overall 
deleterious consequences. Thus, we should read their book 
as a corrective of certain identifiable, overblown, and even 
self-defeating tendencies. For example, they and their 
colleagues are right that certain tendencies prevail among 
some institutions that embrace and use the language of inte-
gration. Some advocates of faith and learning speak as if the 
intellectual world is wholly hostile and unwilling to permit 
Christian scholars to participate fairly in the "tournament 
of narratives." Consequently, warfare metaphors come to 
dominate the discussion and either conquest, siege, or 
ghetto mentalities become the unhealthy but dominant 
way of engaging the larger academic culture. Arrogance 
and triumphalism or despair and defeatism are sometimes 
the dominant attitudes on display. 
In addition, the rhetoric of some institutions or some 
scholars may suggest that authentic Christian scholarship is 
expressed as a "worldview" which gives a systematic and 
complete account of not only the main topic, but also its 
connection to the much larger arena of issues fundamental 
to human beings, and thus the rhetoric provides much too 
tidy answers to all the practical and theoretical questions 
human beings are inclined to ask. Third, all too often only 
intellectual matters are emphasized. Thus, faith becomes 
merely "propositional" and integration is primarily about 
theoretical issues, an exercise that favors the disciplines of 
philosophy and theology. Consequently, some disciplines 
will regard the integration model as being irrelevant to 
their work, except insofar as one construes faith as prima-
rily about such things as caring for students, and consisting, 
privately, only in the right relationship to God in Christ. 
These are real worries and we should affirm the valu-
able correctives suggested by the J acobsens and their 
colleagues. Correctives include viewing non-Christian 
scholarship as a welcome source of new ideas, affirming the 
task of seeking truth wherever it may be found, having no 
expectation that, necessarily, faith requires a systematic 
and complete account of how faith and all the disciplines fit 
together, and emphasizing not only the intellectual but also 
the non-intellectual dimensions of integration. Faith is ulti-
mately about our whole orientation to God and God's 
creative and redemptive initiatives. Thus, faith includes not 
only our thoughts and beliefs, but also our affections and 
our actions. 
Furthermore, the book raises a very important theoret-
ical question. Is "integrating faith and learning" a model or 
is it a metaphor? On the one hand, I contend that "integra-
tion" is a useful metaphor, and that despite some limita-
tions of the metaphor, no practice of Christian education 
that does not understand its primary activity as that of the 
integration of faith and learning-in some sense-is as 
robustly faithful as it should be. On the other I hand, I deny 
that it is necessary that Christians have a systematic theory 
of integration in order for "integration" to be a useful 
metaphor. Indeed, the book's own critique of the integra-
tion model and the various authors' best efforts to provide 
an alternative to it support the usefulness of the ideal of 
"integration of faith and learning" as a metaphor. 
What can be said about integration as a metaphor? 
First, it rules out a certain kind of secularization-call it 
"strong secularization" -that claims Christian faith has no 
place in the university. On this view, neither curricular 
(except as a matter of descriptive study) nor extracurricular 
expressions of religious identity are permitted. For 
example, no administrator or faculty member may offer a 
prayer at a convocation or at the beginning of class for any 
reason, though all faculty could treat students kindly and 
justly. 
Second, the metaphor of "integrating faith and 
learning" rules out "weak secularization" as well. "Weak 
secularization" admits that the Christian faith has a place in 
Christian universities, but only in the extra-curricular 
dimensions of such universities. On this view, while faith 
may complement the intellectual tasks of the university, it 
must remain essentially distinct from those intellectual 
tasks and practices. For example, a Christian college or 
university may rightly encourage a variety of religious prac-
tices as non-curricular and non-academic opportunities in 
an effort to nourish the religious dimension of its students 
(and faculty and staff), but it should restrict such influence 
from "encroaching" into academic practices. Voluntary 
bible studies, retreats, mission trips, and the like are permis-
sible, but not, for example, a required academic course on 
the normative aspects of Christian pacifism for students at 
an Anabaptist college. 
What is included within the parameters of the 
metaphor "integrating faith and learning" as acceptable 
views and practices? To begin, it rejects both strong and 
weak secularization as I have construed them above. In 
brief, and as a formal matter, the integration metaphor 
suggests that not only is it permissible for the Christian faith 
to have a role in the Christian university, but also that that 
role includes both the non-curricular and the curricular. 
Moreover, it insists that the relationship need not go only 
one way, from learning to faith. Indeed, the integration 
metaphor permits Christian scholars to challenge the 
criteria of their academic disciplines on what counts as 
good scholarship or on whether X is an adequate theory, 
not only on purely standard disciplinary grounds, but also 
on grounds that the criteria is in conflict with essentials that 
are included with the domain of faith. For example, for a 
time, only claims that were consistent with the notion ofthe 
human being as a complex of behaviors best understood 
when reduced to stimuli and responses were candidates for 
acceptable psychological theories or explanations. Since 
not only on purely philosophical grounds, but also on faith-
related grounds, Christians believe that humans are more 
than mechanistic accounts admit, it is appropriate for 
Christians to challenge such theoretical accounts. In short, 
the relation between faith and learning may go both ways. 
That the relation of faith and learning may go both 
ways presumes the following. First, the Christian faith 
includes commitment to the truth of at least a small set of 
theological propositions. Second, that these propositions, 
or statements entailed by them, can in principle and will in 
practice, stand in epistemic relations to propositions in 
various academic disciplines (learning), for example, these 
theological propositions may be compatible with or incom-
patible with claims typically assumed in a discipline. When 
there is a conflict between disciplinary and faith commit-
ments, Christian scholars ought to attempt to resolve the 
conflict. The integration metaphor, formally, does not 
prescribe how that adjudication goes. Much more content 
has to be filled in to do so and surely it can vary across 
particular Christian traditions as well as across the various 
academic disciplines with their unique criteria and partic-
ular practices. Fourth, because the metaphor, the "integra-
tion of faith and learning," has theological and philosoph-
ical roots in unity-in-diversity, it is not surprising that many 
scholars will seek a coherent and unified understanding of 
the universe, society, and the human good that incorpo-
rates theological insights. Still, it does not seem to me that 
those who use the metaphor are committed to the necessity 
of producing a systematic and comprehensive "world-
view." Moreover, I do not think that Christian scholars 
must have a model or grand theory of integration. And, 
perhaps, this admission might ameliorate some of the 
concerns that motivated the J acobsens and their colleagues 
to write the book. 
Similarly, we might imagine that what worries the 
Jacobsens most is that the effort to produce a single, mono-
lithic and exclusionary understanding of the relation of 
faith and learning is that not only is it principally a theoret-
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ical enterprise but, also, that this is dangerous in identifi-
able ways. Such an effort, it may appear, is inevitably reduc-
tionistic, concealing some and distorting other proper 
faith-learning practices. Moreover, the artificial strictures 
or overblown claims suggested by some proponents of inte-
gration may encourage a crass subjectivism and, finally, 
may prod Christians to become cynical about the very 
important tasks of relating faith and learning in rich and 
true ways. 
Is there a way out? I think so. We might suppose that 
words like "faith" and "learning" allude to networks of 
concepts and related practices by which people may live 
their lives. These concepts and practices may cohere more 
or less well or poorly. They may prompt more or less 
successful relations to what is true, good, and beautiful. 
They may assist or hinder in the worship of the one, true 
God and our service to God and our neighbor. Hence, it is 
appropriate, even obligatory, to pay careful attention to 
these networks and relationships, with an eye for coher-
ence, integrity, and truth. Some sets of attitudes, disposi-
tions, and truth claims may not fit with others. Fine. Such 
discoveries are typical of intellectual endeavor. Interesting 
and demanding discussions, whose aim is deeper, richer 
understandings of what counts as more or less faithful 
Christian practices, are the ultimate aim. These aspirations 
need not, and probably should not, express themselves as 
unfilled unless articulated as an impregnable system of 
thought, one that has defeated all its competitors. Although 
our destination remains the Holy City, we limp towards 
Jerusalem. 
L
ET'S, THEN, ENLARGE AND DEEPEN OUR CONVERSATION 
among and across various Christian and non-
Christian communities. If we take "faith and 
learning" as a metaphor but not a theory, we may entertain 
systematic accounts without the notion that such efforts are 
the only faithful forms of Christian scholarship. I am with 
the Jacobsens in rejecting that chimera. Nonetheless, we 
must continue to support one another as teachers and 
scholars as we, of necessity, work out the various mutually 
enhancing ways faith and learning relate to one another, 
both in a community of Christian scholars and teachers, as 
well as in each of our lives. 
While the book's stated aim of enlarging the conversa-
tion is salutary, the book does have weaknesses, in my view. 
Consider these two. First, the book contains some rather 
puzzling claims. For example, the Jacobsens observe 
approvingly that "scholarship ultimately is of only 
secondary concern to most Christians ... " and then suggest 
that "[p]erhaps Christian faith should push scholarship 
into second place well behind the love of God and 
neighbor ... , " where scholarship is rightly regarded as a 
kind of hobby, albeit a serious one, that has to be set aside in 
order to help one's friends, families, and neighbors in more 
concrete and immediate ways." If this assertion by the 
Jacobsens were taken seriously, it would emasculate 
Christian colleges and universities of any reason to be in the 
business of higher education. Clearly, the assertion assumes 
a false dichotomy. Read charitably, the Jacobsens are 
making the point that our vocation as scholars should not 
be pursued as our first and only love. Granted, some (for 
example, Max Weber) have conceived of the academic 
vocation in such a single-minded way. And, as Mark 
Schwehn has pointed out, those of us involved in the 
modern academy will, no doubt, feel the pressure to accept 
this all-too secular notion of vocation. Resisting it and 
offering an alternative is one of the callings of Christian 
higher education. In contrast to a secular understanding of 
the academic vocation, Christian scholars will join 
Augustine in insisting that love of God should order all our 
other loves, and love of neighbor (family, friends, fellow 
citizens, and strangers) is second among our re-ordered 
loves·. . 
T,ONEIMPORTANTWAYOFLOVINGBOTHGODANDOUR 
neighbor is via excellent scholarship. On the one 
hand, we both honor God and show our gratitude by 
using our God-given capacities to investigate reality, by 
displaying our knowledge of the universe in all its 
complexity, by investigating and proposing various social 
and political ways of pursuing the good for human beings, 
by creating cultural and artistic artifacts that honor both the 
beauty and the sorrow of the world and the human condi-
tion, and by pursuing wisdom about the moral qualities 
befitting human beings. 
In addition, as we improve what we know about 
nature, human nature, and the human good, we are able to 
improve the lives of our fellow human beings and are able 
to become much better stewards of our world. Much is at 
stake here. For example, think of the scholarly studies 
needed to investigate how we might better ameliorate 
poverty, hunger, and human disease, how non-violent 
methods of reconciliation and negotiation might address 
real life problems from Kosovo, to Israel, to Iraq, and to the 
Sudan, and how cooperative, rather than competitive, 
forms of economic development might impact third- and 
fourth-world development or one's vision of environ-
mental stewardship. In short, the fundamental theological 
commitments of Anabaptists, for example, have important 
and far-reaching possibilities in a wide variety of domains. 
Surely, we need more Anabaptist scholars, not fewer, to 
challenge some of the prevailing orthodoxies in economics, 
domestic and foreign policy, environmental stewardship, 
and entertainment in the popular culture. Just as the 
Protestant reformers insisted that vocation is not limited to 
religious acts of ritual and worship, so they insisted that it is 
not limited to "good deeds." Yet, the suggestion that we 
need fewer scholars and more "good deeds" is dangerously 
close to the reductionism the J acobsens rightly deplore. In 
my judgment, Christian communions, my own (Baptist) 
included, need more Christian scholars, not fewer. And 
there is no reason to think that such scholars must ignore 
their love of neighbor in response to the vocation of schol-
arship. 
Finally, it is easy to construct from positive comments 
the Jacobsens (and their fellow essayists) make about 
relating faith and learning an argument for the integration 
metaphor, as I discussed it above. At the very least, the inte-
gration metaphor includes the following: (1) a commit-
ment to seeing the person as one (holistically), despite 
various capacities (which, ideally, are being brought into an 
integral harmony with one another, thus reflecting a unity-
in-diversity); (2) an understanding that the various 
academic practices, both curricular and extra-curricular, 
that constitute the university aim both to reflect and to 
achieve this integration or unity-in-diversity or harmony; 
(3) a belief that faith itself is multi-faceted and includes the 
intellect, the affections and passions, human actions, and 
their consequences. Again, a harmony, or unity-in-diver-
sity, is not only an aim but also an achievement of the educa-
tional endeavor; thus, ( 4) the recognition that faith and 
reason or faith and learning are to be mutually enhancing 
areas of human endeavor. In short, these are not merely 
complementary areas of human experience but also mutu-
ally overlapping human endeavors. Reason not only has its 
own relative autonomy, but also is needed to nourish faith, 
and vice versa. 
If we think of the integration of faith and learning in 
this way, it is easy to see that the authors and contributors to 
this book are not really offering an alternative to integra-
tion, but rather are underscoring the need that the integra-
tion of faith and learning be instantiated in serious but 
multi-faceted ways in the various colleges and universities 
that constitute Christian higher education and that integra-
tion be self-consciously embraced by Christian scholars. 
I
NDEED, ACCORDING TO ONE OF THE HEROES OF THE BOOK, 
the late Earnest Boyer, former director of the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, the 
primary task of Christian scholarship "is not to defend 
Christian truth against secular learning but to celebrate the 
majesty, the integration, and wholeness of God's creation." 
Isolating Christian scholarship from the rest of learning or 
the human community would deny "the interconnected-
ness God has woven into the created order." But these 
points merely underscore the main emphasis of the integra-
tion metaphor. It presumes that faith and learning are 
mutually enhancing areas of investigation and exploration 
and that they encourage a quest for connections justified by 
our confidence that all truth is God's. As the Jacobsens so 
powerfully say, since "faith is a part of life, and the struggle 
to understand faith in the light of scholarship and scholar-
ship in the light of faith is ultimately both unavoidable and 
potentially deeply rewarding,"" ... Christian scholarship 
is always a two-way street: faith influences learning and 
learning influences faith." What could be more consistent 
with the integration metaphor, fairly and generously 
understood? 
their own emphases not only fit with, but also provide 
reasons for using the integration of faith and learning as a 
metaphor to explain some of the more important ideals of 
Christian colleges and universities. If I am right, the capa-
cious and constructive conversation the Jacobsens and 
their colleagues hoped to encourage will continue in light 
of, rather than despite, the language of "integrating faith 
and learning." f 
In short, I have argued that the Jacobsen's book neither 
shows the integration metaphor, at its best, to be suscep-
tible to the various criticisms the book advances nor does 
the book provide genuine alternatives to it. Whether it is 
fair to criticize the book because it does not offer an alter-
native is unclear to me, since theauthors explicitly say that 
they do not intend to do so (despite Crystal Downing's 
explicitly offering an alternative). Michael Beaty is Professor and Chair of the Department of 
Philosophy at Baylor University. He is grateful to the current 
Lilly Fellows, and especially to Heath White, for generously 
discussing this book with him. 
On the other hand, the offering of alternatives appears 
an essential part of the book's objective of "enlarging the 
conversation." More importantly, however, I contend that 
32133 The Cresset Trinity 12005 
SONNET 
after Jane Kenyon & Psalm 96 
Let every planet follow its orbit 
Let the prevailing winds blow where they please 
across the water May the moon move seas 
in tides high on the Bay of Fundy It 
is not within our strength to make it quit 
Let every lake reflect all that it sees 
so paths of light will shimmer May the trees 
reach skyward & every flower submit 
to its own blooming May all on the earth 
cycle down paths that follow their calling 
like migratory birds' instinctive ways 
Let rain & snow submit to their falling 
& babies in the womb to their own birth 
But mostly may this all be done as praise 
D. S. Martin 
lessons from the pit 
E
VEN WHEN I GO TO THE MOVIES I AM RARELY ABLE TO SET 
aside my social and political concerns. And as I write 
this essay on film, I am worried about the increas-
ingly bitter partisanship in Congress. I am dismayed that a 
Republican-Party-controlled House of Representatives is 
willing to change its ethics rules to shield its leader, Tom 
DeLay, from investigation and possible prosecution. I am 
· offended that in his · determination to court the hard 
"Christian" right, Republican Senate majority leader Bill 
Frist, a medical doctor, is willing to offer medical opinions 
in the Terry Schiavo case contradicting those of doctors 
who had actually examined her. Most notably, I am 
concerned that the Republican majority in the Senate, in a 
fierce determination to exert its will, is poised to stifle the 
voice of the minority by eliminating the filibuster and that 
Senator Frist, a presumed 2008 presidential candidate, has 
joined the right-wing Family Research Council in alleging 
that use of the filibuster is "an act against people of faith." 
This last outrages me as an American, a Democrat, and a 
person of faith. One might not think these concerns as rele-
vant to the films I discuss below, but they are. 
psychotic myopia 
Like many Westerners, I have looked with judgmental 
horror at the political strategy of suicide that radical 
Islamists now routinely employ as a weapon of terror. In 
Israel and Iraq, and in America on 9/11, fanatics have killed 
themselves in service of a cause never entirely clear. What 
kind of sick madness, I have often wondered, does radical 
Islam foster that would lead some adherents to indulge such 
hatred that they would sacrifice their own lives and those of 
their young? But as I watched Oliver Hirschbiegel's 
Downfall, I was reminded (as I shouldn't have needed to 
be) that self-destructive violent extremism is hardly an 
invention of those who call God Allah. In the waning days 
of World War II, the Japanese produced their kamikaze, of 
course. Two millennia earlier, the Jewish zealots at Masada 
ended their lives en masse rather than surrender to the 
Roman legions at their gates. And in uncomfortably recent 
history, we in the Christian West have produced Jim Jones 
and, infinitely worse, the murderous, monstrous true 
believers of National Socialism. 
The history of Nazi aggression and its attempt to exter-
minate the world's Jews has been well established and 
addressed repeatedly in various cinematic treatments both 
Fredrick Barton 
documentary and dramatic. We have learned that Adolf 
Hitler and his inner circle were even more devoted to geno-
cide than they were to world domination. Thus, as illus-
trated in both James Moll's documentary, The Last Days, 
and Istvan Szabo's .drama, Sunshine, Nazi troops were 
diverted from trying to halt the Russian advance on the 
eastern front and from the defense of the European coast in 
the weeks· leading up to D-Day in order to round up 
Hungarian Jews f()r shipment to concentration camp gas 
chambers. As Hitler remarks about himself in Downfall, 
the infamous "Final Solution" would be his enduring 
legacy. But in all the chronicling of Nazi evil, less attention 
has been paid to the ultimately suicidal bent of its fanati-
cism. For Hitler himself and an astonishing number of his 
most devoted followers, the operative motto was a perver-
sion of Patrick Henry's defiant call to arms: "Give me 
triumph or give me death." 
Two recent films look more closely at the self-absorp-
tion of the Nazi inner circle. Hirschbiegel's Downfall 
dramatizes events in Hitler's underground Berlin head-
quarters during the last days of Der Fuhrer's life. Andre 
Heller and Othmar Schmiderer's documentary Blind 
Spot-Hitler's Secretary, meanwhile, focuses on the expe-
riences ofTraudlJunge, a young Bavarian who took dicta-
tion and typed letters for Hitler, who lived in close prox-
imity to him, who saw his true nature bitterly and perhaps 
despicably late, but who was unwilling to sacrifice her life 
for her boss's glory. Blind Spot serves as a critical source for 
Downfall, and footage from the documentary appears in 
the closing minutes of the drama. 
Based on books by Joachim Fest and Melissa Muller 
with Traudl Junge and written for the screen by Bernd 
Eichinger, Downfall was a commercial hit in its native 
Germany and in this country landed an Oscar nomination 
for Best Foreign Language Film. It is the story of Adolf 
Hitler's nightmarish refusal to surrender long after the 
slightest hope remained for victory or even a negotiated 
peace. Hunkering down in a bunker outfitted with fine 
china, crystal goblets, and a vast liquor cabinet (for his 
attendants-Hitler, himself, didn't drink), surrounded by 
servants and sycophants, Hitler (Bruno Ganz in a brilliant 
performance) refuses to let his troops lay down their arms 
in a war that was lost on the Normandy Beaches and 
Russian Plains one and two years earlier. As the film opens, 
Berlin is surrounded, the German air force is destroyed, 
and save for surviving generals and other high-ranking offi-
cers, the Nazi army now consists of old men and children. 
Allied air raids and Russian artillery rain death on a civilian 
population that is starving and seeking refuge in rubble. But 
Hitler orders his generals to fight on, and indicative of the 
national insanity that brought Hitler to power, they do so. 
An unthinking viewer, I suppose, might find something 
heroic in the German army's willingness to stand and resist 
in the face of certain defeat and almost certain death. But 
with regard to Hitler's followers, the point of the film is 
that they were loyal to their Fuhrer and not to their 
country's people. By following Hitler's orders to refuse to 
surrender, they were complicit in inflicting continuing and 
pointless suffering on the civilian population caught in 
harm's way. Downfall illustrates that Nazism was a death 
cult all along. At some point in his diseased mind, Hitler 
may have planned merely to enslave the world's Jews, but 
once he could see he would not rule the world after all, he 
ordered the brutal deaths of six million Jewish souls. Here 
he declares his sneering pride in the Final Solution's 
program of mass murder. 
TOTHEEND,HITLERSUFFERSFROMACASEOFPSYCHOTIC myopia astonishing even today. He is the Chancellor of Germany, but the defeat of the German army, the 
destruction of German cities, and the deaths of millions of 
Germans are only indirectly among his concerns. On the 
one hand he is delusional, gathering his generals around 
him and issuing orders about attacks he has no troops to 
mount. He appoints a new commander for an air force that 
no longer exists. He promises surprise relief from secret 
divisions that march only in the recesses of his poisoned 
mind. He announces an aerial assault by one thousand jets 
that have been designed but never built. Like Nero fiddling 
while Rome burned, Hitler studies an elaborate scale model 
for an imaginary Berlin of the future and counsels those 
with him that the bombs of his enemies will simply make his 
grand rebuilding project easier and quicker to accomplish. 
For a decade he had managed to transform his will into 
reality, and apparently he can't understand that he can no 
longer do so. 
On the other hand, when he acknowledges that the end 
of his rule is no longer measured even in weeks, but in days 
and hours, he rages against his cruel personal fate. He has 
not failed; he has been betrayed. His generals are fools and 
traitors; his soldiers are cowards and turncoats. Here he is 
at his most despicable. Told that the defense of Berlin has 
cost the lives of twenty thousand young officers, he retorts: 
"What are young men for?" He is beseeched to evacuate 
women and children from the war zone to the country in 
the scant window of safety that remains, but he refuses. 
Compassion is for weaklings, he declares. He will not shed 
one tear for innocent women and children who die in the 
needless last days of the war. They are getting what they 
deserve for failing to rise to the greatness of his leadership. 
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If Hitler and his vision cannot endure, then all of Germany 
should perish along with him. The German people should 
pay for their inadequacy and weakness with their blood and 
that of their children. 
Hitler's villainous self-absorption is fueled by the idol-
atry of followers who do not depose him even as he leads 
them all to the gates of hell. Finally, the dying moves inside 
the bunker. Hitler's doctors dispense cyanide tablets and 
instructions on how to use them. Der Fuhrer doesn't want 
to be thought unmanly for using a pill, but is afraid he will 
suffer if he shoots himself. Finally, he decides to shoot 
himself in the two seconds of life remaining after biting the 
poisoned capsule. After he commits suicide, many of his 
followers do the same. Soldiers in the field fire pistols into 
their mouths or chests rather than hand them over to 
Russian troops. Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels 
(Ulrich Matthes, looking like a demon fresh from the fires 
of Pandemonium) and his wife Magda (Corinna Harfouch) · 
follow Hitler into self-inflicted death, but not before 
Magda delivers the film's most chilling sequence. 
The Goebbels have brought their entire brood of beau-
tiful blond children into the bunker with them. Looking 
like poster figures for Hitler Youth, the six youngsters laugh 
and cavort and sing patriotic songs, evidently oblivious that 
the world their parents have wrought lies dying in agony in 
the city above their heads. Before bed one night, with the 
help of a Nazi doctor serving as her facilitator and assistant, 
Magda makes all her children take a powerful sleeping 
potion. Later, she returns, pries open their unconscious 
mouths, places the cyanide between their incisors and 
forces their jaws to bite down on their doom. She would 
rather see them dead, she says, than let them live in a world 
without National Socialism. Elsewhere in the death spiral, 
other parents do the same. 
And even after Hitler's death, with the Russian enemy 
within gunshot, with German generals, finally freed of Der 
Fuhrer's orders, desperately trying to arrange a cease fire 
and surrender, the true believers of the SS hunt down and 
murder old Berliners who have avoided conscription and 
inevitable death to impede the Russian advance for what 
would have been measured in seconds. And thus we are 
reminded, a mad man can only rule when he can convince 
other mad men to do his bidding. 
taking dication 
In Downfall we meet Traudl Junge (Alexandria Maria 
Lara) when she is hired by Hitler after a typing audition in 
1942. She appears in the film thereafter as a witness to activ-
ities in the bunker where she develops a kind of little sister 
relationship with Hitler's mistress Eva Braun Uulian 
Kohler), who knows the end is upon them and waxes 
between melancholy resignation and champagne-fueled 
hysteria. In the drama, Junge is neither a blind follower nor 
an entirely innocent bystander, and that's just the way she 
portrays herself in the documentary which was filmed in 
2001 when Junge was eighty-one. She died of cancer a year 
later. 
Fundamentally, Heller and Schmiderer's Blind Spot-
Hitler's Secretary is an edited conversation with Traudl 
Junge who tells the story of working and living with the 
Nazi Fuhrer in his various headquarters, and ultimately in 
his Berlin bunker. The man Junge describes is polite, soft-
spoken, gentle, immensely charismatic, utterly delusional, 
ultimately paranoid, and monstrously narcissistic. The last 
three of those descriptions are rendered convincingly in 
Hirschbiegel's Downfall. Junge illustrates Hitler's person-
ality in a story about his relationship with his beloved dog, 
Biondi. All who surrounded Hitler knew of his pride and 
affection for Biondi. (In Downfall, Eva Braun complains 
that Hitler was more fond of the dog than of her.) He 
bragged about the tricks Biondi could perform. He kept her 
by his side most of the time. She even slept in his bedroom 
in the bunker. Then, as the Russians closed in, Hitler fed 
Biondi cyanide. He killed his dog, not to spare her from any 
of the ravages that might follow defeat, not to spare her 
from hunger or deprivation or disease. Rather, he had 
begun to suspect that the cyanide Heinrich Himmler had 
supplied for Hitler's own suicide might be fake. So the 
Fuhrer, who had already sacrificed his entire nation to his 
own vanity, killed his dog to make sure that his supply of 
suicide tablets would work when the time came. 
Junge was twenty-two in 1942 when she was employed 
as one of Hitler's four private secretaries. She doesn't know 
if she was chosen because she typed and took dictation well 
or because she was young and pretty. She does remember 
with abiding shame that she was enthralled by Hitler and 
breathless with eagerness to work for him. She saw her job 
as a chance to associate with greatness. Hitler's work habits 
required that all of his secretaries live in his own compound 
and make themselves available twenty-four hours a day. 
Rather than labor in an office, they remained in their apart-
ments until they were summoned to perform some task. 
Among their duties were to take tea with Hitler every after-
noon and to dine with him at lunch and dinner. The nature 
of their close association might lead one to wonder about 
sexual obligations of the sort that other such charismatic 
madmen as Charles Manson, Jim Jones, and David Koresh 
extracted from their followers, but Junge admits to no such 
connections and wonders if Hitler even had much of a 
sexual relationship with Eva Braun. Downfall makes the 
same insinuation, and, in fact, when Hitler kisses Braun 
after she declares her loyalty to him, Bruno Ganz plays the 
scene as if he's just discovered her presence at his side. 
Junge stayed with Der Fuhrer through his reversal of 
fortune in World War II, and all the way to his suicide. She 
recalls with dismay her joy when Hitler survived an assassi-
nation attempt by one of his own generals. She remembers 
the details of her years with Hitler with remarkable clarity 
and expresses her memories with unusual vividness. We 
gather from her comments that she spent the fifty-six years 
after Hitler's death trying to come to terms with her having 
liked and admired a man she subsequently came to under-
stand as one of the most evil human beings ever to have trod 
the earth. Junge's willingness to challenge, chastise, and 
examine herself is repeatedly demonstrated as she sits in 
front of Schmiderer's camera and submits to ten hours of 
Heller's interviews. Though interrogated but never prose-
cuted after the war by allied jurists and though a witness in 
four earlier documentaries, it is only in Blind Spot and in 
her posthumous memoir that the entirety of her story 
emerges. Heller believes that Junge finally talked publicly 
because she knew she was dying. 
T
HE FILMMAKERS' STRATEGY FOR THIS DOCUMENTARY IS 
boldly stark. As anyone knows from watching the 
History Channel, voluminous archival film footage 
exists for showing the places and events that Junge 
describes. They accessed none of it. The camera always 
remains on Junge's face to capture the swirl of emotion she 
feels as she tells her story. In a strikingly novel follow-up, 
Heller shows Junge footage of his earlier interviews with 
her and encourages her to comment. She is obviously 
uncomfortable, pronounces herself banal, and wonders 
how she could ever have been so blind, so brain-washed 
with admiration, to have stored such recollections in her 
memory bank. This technique serves as a perfect metaphor 
for the entirety of this film and the bulk of Junge's life, 
looking back at herself with dismay and harsh judgment. 
Traudl Junge was raised by her divorced mother under 
strained economic circumstances. And she's almost 
certainly right that Hitler was a father figure for her. But 
recognizing that fact about her youthful self provides her 
no comfort. She was not educated beyond high school, but 
she is obviously highly intelligent and much more articu-
lately introspective than most people. Her eyes began 
finally to open during the days in the bunker when Hitler 
began to rage against international Jewish conspirators and 
the failure of the German people to be strong enough to 
realize his vision. But she began to see far too late, she 
believes, and she reveres the memory of a young woman 
her own age who was captured and executed for serving in 
the Resistance. And that girl's story is Junge's message for 
us about the Hiders who may rise in our midst in the future. 
Whatever our circumstances, there is no excuse for not 
recognizing and resisting evil when we see it. 
lessons from the pit, part one 
When Blind Spot opened in a limited number of 
American theaters in late 2002 and 2003, it was greeted 
with critical praise. Some controversy, however, has 
attended the release of Downfall, with some critics 
complaining that certain segments of the film portray 
Hitler sympathetically. These passages, almost entirely, are 
those that portray Hitler's interaction with Junge and other 
clerical and domestic underlings and stem directly from 
Junge's memories, to her enduring horror, of having 
admired and liked her boss. 
New Republic critic Stanley Kauffman has worried that 
Downfall portrays Hitler and his lieutenants as "conse-
crated idealists who believed in what they had done and 
were willing to pay with their lives for their actions." J. 
Hober took a more flip approach in her Village Voice review 
but finally dings Downfall as "grimly self-important and 
inescapably trivializing." David Denby complained in The 
New Yorker that "the achievement (if that's the right word) 
of Downfall is to insist that the monster was not invariably 
monstrous. But is this observation a sufficient response to 
. what Hitler actually did?" 
W
ITH SUCH CRITICAL RESPONSES, I RESPECTFULLY 
disagree. Strongly. No single film can relate the 
enormity of evil that Hitler and National 
Socialism perpetrated on the world, and this film does~'t 
attempt to do that and can't be faulted for failing to do it. At 
the same time, there's no doubt that Downfall does portray 
Hitler as a human being. He was one. Proceeding from 
Junge's observations, he's a man who appears to love and 
take delight in his dog, a powerful man who is nonetheless 
capable of small acts of court~sy to his subordinates. But, in 
short, so what? Is it sympathetic to say that a man is not a 
cannibal? Downfall tells us that Hitler was a vegetarian. 
Will that odd fact make him sympathetic to people who 
don't eat meat? I think not, for the film also shows us that 
Hitler was a megalomaniacal monster who attracted to his 
company other human beings who were less monstrous 
than he only because they possessed less power. National 
Socialism was evil, but it was not other worldly evil. It was 
evil imagined, campaigned for, and executed by human 
beings. In the half-century since Nazism was stomped into 
silence, other, lesser tyrants have arisen, from Pol Pot to 
Saddam Hussein, to practice comparable evil diminished 
only because more limited in scale. Thus, as long as we walk 
this earth, we must remain on guard, for always such evil 
will lurk in the shadows around us. 
lessons from the pit, part two 
Let us not forget that Adolf Hitler carne to power legit-
imately. His Nazis were hooligans, but they were elected. 
And their strategy to consolidate power was first to margin-
alize and ultimately to silence dissent. I am assiduously not 
claiming that George W. Bush Republicans are fascists. But 
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I worry mightily over their urgent moves to emasculate 
their opponents and, at the same time, to hold their own 
leadership beyond public scrutiny. Republican President 
Nixon may have been guilty of illegal activities, and 
Democratic President Bill Clinton may have been a sexual 
scoundrel, but they both yielded to bi-partisan pressure and 
appointed special prosecutors to investigate their own 
governments and their own actions. It's hard to imagine the 
current Republican leadership doing the same. 
The maintenance of power is not a good unto itself. 
And in free societies power must always be limited. That's 
why we have regular elections, in some cases term limits, 
and rules that protect the voices of those without power . 
That's why we have ethics rules. That's why we restrict the 
· ability of the majority to impose its will on a united 
minority through such measures as the filibuster. Changing 
rules ro protect minority opinions that have been in place 
for the whole history of our Republic is not, in and of itself, 
fascism, but it can facilitate the advent of fascism in a way 
we had best guard against. We should heed the warning that 
William Butler Yeats delivered to us in his great poem, "The 
Second Coming," about a time when "The best lack all 
conviction, while the worst/ Are full of passionate inten-
sity." I may not like the politics of George W. Bush and the 
Republicans who surround his administration, but he is not 
Hitler, and they are not Nazis. Nonetheless, I think we 
should all worry, as Yeats does, about some future when a 
charismatic spokesman for extreme positions, a person 
able to play upon the fears and resentments of an electoral 
plurality, a person fond of dogs and polite in his dealings 
with the Traudl Junges in his or her service, ascends to the 
American presidency. When that happens, we don't want 
to have erased the checks and set aside the balances that 
restrict the power of a single individual or branch of 
government. Ever we must imagine and protect against that 
which we consider unimaginable, lest we put at risk that 
which we hold most dear when that "rough beast, its hour 
come round at last/ Slouches toward Bethlehem [in our case 
Pennsylvania, perhaps] to be born." f 
Fredrick Barton is film critic for Gambit Weekly and author 
of the novels The El Cholo Feeling Passes, Courting 
Pandemonium, With Extreme Prejudice, and A House 
Divided, which won the William Faulkner Prize for fiction. 
He is Professor of English and Provost at the University of 
New Orleans. 
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the beginning of survival 
I
N 1971 jONI MITCHELL SANG, '~L ROMANTICS MEET THE 
same fate some day /cynical and drunk and boring 
someone in some dark cafe." 
She was taking the voiCe of her first husband, Chuck 
Mitchell. And if she'd included "bitter," he'd have 
described her perfectly. 
Leaving a trail of ~xposed lovers behind her, a new J oni 
emerged from her late '60s work, the "manless woman, 
lonely, love-hungry woman, the successfully 'dumb' 
woman who is actually a man trap." This description is 
from Aida Pavletich's Rock-a-Bye, Baby (1980), one of the 
first serious treatments of women in pop music. Pavletich 
saw what so many fans and critics refused to see, that 
Mitchell's affected tone of exhausted passion, of knowing, 
clear-eyed acquiescence, was the crowing of a Casanova, 
not the seeking of the reckless daughter of Don Juan she 
thought herself to be. She was soul-sister to Mae West, 
Pavletich wrote; "Her songs changed from sentimental 
idealist to romantic realist, with a dash of bitterness to keep 
from cloying." 
A different bitterness emanates from The Beginning of 
Survival, a collection of confrontational songs from 
Mitchell's later albums. In a Vanity Fair conversation with 
Elvis Costello (November 2004), Mitchell insists, "This is 
my best work, and it has not gone into the culture." So here 
it is again. 
Survival is the companion to Dreamland, a collection 
of chart singles and popular album tracks. A similar attempt 
to bring her "best work" into the culture was made with 
Hits and Misses, two compilations released in 1996, and 
still in print. With only one album of new material between 
them, Survival contains seven of the same misses, 
Dreamland nine of the same hits. ("Nothing Can Be Done" 
and "For the Roses," both previously misses, have been 
elevated to hits). Track for track, the earlier volumes are the 
strongest. They surprise with their juxtapositions, a telling 
warmth to their mix and match approach. But the fact 
remains that Mitchell's work does not mix and match well. 
She remains an album artist. If one wishes to experience her 
topical work of the '80s, the way to go is The Complete 
Geffen Recordings, released in 2003. 
Mitchell grew bored with her love life around the same 
time as her audience. But what she next offered left many 
listeners deeply troubled, turned-off or, worse, bored 
again. Uncomfortably center stage, but thankful for the 
]. D. Buhl 
moment, she would ruthlessly root out lover's failings and 
her own shallowness with soul-stripping introspection, 
and was admired for this; stridently turning those 
dissecting skills on the rest of us, she was not so appn!ci-
ated. 
"[These songs] were introduced into a very awkward 
period in American culture," she told Costello, "when 
people just didn't want to look at it." The old themes 
remained-there was love, there was friendship, there was 
lost or stolen innocence. But this more political material, 
protest songs of a sort, had none of the verve of her high-
water work. This is partly due to the production-the '80s 
were unkind to most pop musicians-and the leaden 
arrangements. Mitchell complains to Costello that the 
songs "had been deemed sophomoric and negative" at the 
time; they seem no less so now. 
And in her man-trap days, Joni always walked a fine 
line between introversion and narcissism. Here she avoids 
the latter only by displaying empathy with those crushed 
beneath the passionless play of the privileged. The many 
young women who grew up listening to her records, 
finding there justifications for flight and fancy, may never 
have developed such fellow feeling. For them, as for 
Mitchell herself, the search for romantic love was no longer 
paramount; it was the inevitable loss--or abandonment-
of it that had become the prize. 
G
OING AFTER THE RICH AND POWERFUL THEN WOULD 
seem a natural move after all those years of love 
addiction. Finally free, happily married (at least for 
a while), with time on her hands, Mitchell turned her 
artist's eye to the world coming in on television broadcasts, 
magazine pages, radio waves and newsprint; she stopped 
obsessively producing aural self-portraits and made sound 
paintings about the mess we find ourselves in and the rich 
and powerful who keep us there. From Native Americans 
to the environment to televangelists to the phantoms of 
advertising, she found her causes and targets and splashed 
her words across sonic canvases that grew progressively 
more sleek, more taunting. 
She was angry then, rightfully so. But anger only occa-
sionally makes for great albums. Between them, the four 
Geffen releases and her two most recent on Reprise supply 
enough good songs that one good album could be assem-
bled, and Survival attempts that. 
She was also right. The degradation, isolation, and 
exploitation to which these songs speak have become so 
entrenched that it might surprise some listeners to hear 
that we were warned. There is reason to re-experience 
these songs, but they do not become great just because she 
keeps pointing at them. In fact, such limp screeds as "Sex 
Kills" and the hopeless sound collage "The Reoccurring 
Dream" will never sound good, no matter how many times 
they are anthologized. 
Mitchell fails in the same way as her brothers Crosby, 
Stills, Nash and Young. The five of them enjoy-and 
deserve-reputations as social justice and peace activists, 
prophetic voices in the values-neutral world of pop music. 
But with occasional exceptions (usually involving Crosby), 
when these convictions are set to song, the results are 
awkward at best, often preachy and punchy at worst. The 
selections on Survival fall roughly into two types-the 
denunciatory and the narrative. Nowhere do we get the 
riskier "music as news" of Young's "Ohio" (straight out of 
the folk tradition they all share), or even the giggly social 
commentary of Mitchell's own "Big Yellow Taxi." Instead 
these songs either say, "That's bad," or tell us a story about 
what is bad. It is this latter type that has held up best over 
time. 
"The Beat of Black Wings" recounts Joni's encounter 
with Killer Kyle, a universal soldier who knows "the old 
pick wars, we die in 'em." With what sounds like the refrain 
from "Johnny Angel" in the background and horrible, 
shimmering sheets of synthesizer, the young man's 
haunted, hateful aftermath is made memorable. "The 
Magdalene Laundries" and "Passion Play" both use first 
person narrators, an unnamed twenty-seven-year-old in 
the first, who says she's been sent to the sisters "for the way 
men looked at me," and Zachius, the wee little tax collector 
in the second. These two sinners, real and supposed, 
become our guides through the world Christianity built. 
Ironically, this singer Robert Christgau once dubbed 
"The Poet of the Me Decade" was trying to lead us away 
from the intense focus on self that she had popularized and 
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made art. Her audience, except the most politicized, had 
their own love lives to pay attention to and resented her 
changing from the chick with the guitar to the professor at 
the chalkboard. But the problem now is not that Joni left 
her folkie recriminations for larger subjects. It's that her 
bitterness with the music industry has made her dishonest. 
Not only has she misplaced her emphasis, she has become 
expert at one of the industry's favorite games: reissue, 
repackage, and rewrite history. With CSNY and other of her 
contemporaries-Lou Reed, for instance, Paul Simon 
certainly-the weight of regurgitated material is stag-
gering. Who can accommodate all those box-sets, live 
albums, anthologies, and collections? Can't fans be 
allowed to make up their own minds which songs are hits 
and which are misses? 
I
N NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND, DOSTOEVSKY'S MOUSE-
hole dweller observes, "again and again, we see our 
romantics turn out to be such shady dealers, displaying 
such a grasp of reality and such practical agility, that ... the 
public can only stand by clicking their tongues and gaping 
at them in surprise." Does Mitchell really want to be 
remembered for these songs? I don't know. What is clear is 
her ongoing interest in making her past our present. From 
Hits and Misses to the orchestral re-interpretations of 
Travelogue to the Geffen Recordings to Dreamland and 
Survival, fans are being hit over the head with Mitchell's 
need to control her artistic legacy. In the Vanity Fair inter-
view, Mitchell and Costello laugh over their being invited 
to contribute to a movie soundtrack. "I can write one kind 
of song and one kind of song only, right now," Joni told the 
producer, "I hate show business." I wonder. For years she 
kept saying she was going to retire and concentrate on 
painting. Perhaps she finally has. But it seems she wants her 
retirement to be as unpleasant for us as it is uncomfortable 
for her. f 
J. D. Buhl serves as adjunct faculty in philosophy and 
theology for several San Fransisco Bay Area institutions. 
hope in the balance 
I
STILL REMEMBER, AT THE CEREMONY AT WHICH I WAS 
named a Doctor of Philosophy, the chancellor telling us 
that the university was equipping students with the 
skills that would be required for life in a world where tech-
nology was ubiquitous, and where scientific literacy was 
increasingly important for maintaining economic compet-
itiveness and improving quality of life in our society. We 
graduates were from a variety of academic fields, not just 
the natural sciences, and I had mixed feelings about this 
culminating admonition to the graduates. I appreciated the 
affirmation that knowledge of the physical universe is valu-
able. I was concerned that some of my colleagues might 
start thinking that economic competitiveness was the 
measure of quality of life. And at the time I was curious 
about what scientific literacy really was. 
As a faculty member in the College of Arts and Sciences 
at a "university under the cross," I am still uncertain about 
scientific literacy, but now, at least to some extent, I actually 
have to act on what understanding I have on behalf of my 
students. As a university under the cross, however, we have 
not been left entirely alone to resolve this quandary. We 
may lack specific divine instruction about how best to 
structure science education as part of a university educa-
tion, but we know enough of our Master to take our steps in 
humble confidence, walking by faith despite and because of 
the cataracts through which we see as through a glass, 
darkly. In faith, hope, and love, we attempt to proclaim the 
truth while acknowledging our finitude. 
I have several fundamental hopes for my students. One 
is that in their university years, they will develop a fuller, 
more accurate picture of the world that they inhabit; collo-
quially, that they will get a better idea of what's out there. 
Secondly, I hope thattheywill develop a better idea of what 
could be out there-of how things could be made better by 
human effort. And finally, I hope that they will gain a sense 
of how they themselves can contribute best to bringing 
what is closer to what should be. Some might consider these 
hopes utopian, but I think that they are more like a sincere 
response to Jesus' parable of the talents and the pounds 
than the cynics may be prepared to acknowledge. Giving 
myself the benefit of the doubt, I'd like to imagine what 
general education, and specifically general education in 
and about the natural sciences, might look like within this 
framework of hope. 
Members of a Christian university should understand 
0 
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the institution's identity as a body acting within, or at least 
partially within, the body of Christ. That is a good model 
for students. I often tell my advisees, with apologies to 
Hugh of St. Victor, not to try to learn everything. As 
members of a body, we were made for dependence, and 
attempting to ingest the entire academic smorgasbord will 
only land one in the intellectual vomitorium, a place that 
Christians committed to good stewardship of their gifts 
ought sedulously to avoid. At the same time, interde-
pendent members of a body should make the effort to 
become somewhat self-reliant, both to equip themselves 
for everyday generosity and so as not to become an undue 
burden on their neighbors. Therefore, the decision of how 
much coursework in and about the natural sciences to 
require of students as part of a balanced academic diet is 
based on a hopeful tension between encouraging passion 
for the particular and guaranteeing basic nourishment with 
morsels of knowledge that are too precious to miss, even if 
force-fed. I have no formula for this, though I tend to err on 
the side of freedom, believing that force-feeding can spoil 
both the taste and nutritional benefit of even the most 
delectable and edifying cheese and chutney sandwich. 
THAT SAID, REQUIRED COURSEWORKFOR THOSE STUDYING the natural sciences, professionally or not, needs first to honor and to draw on the identity of a univer-
sity under the cross, as does coursework in other fields. 
Therefore, course content ought to be crafted to foster an 
appreciation for the vastness and intricacy of the created 
order. Such study is justified not merely by the student's 
own curiosity, but also by creation's intrinsic worth as a gift 
of God, a gift worthy of exploration. With this under-
standing, scientific work then becomes a way of loving God 
by opening and exploring His gift. Furthermore, by using 
what we learn to develop technology for the material 
benefit of others, scientific work can be an act of love for 
our neighbor. Francis Bacon termed the intellectual and 
technological purposes of science "luciferous" and "fruc-
tiferous," respectively, the one in which ignorance is put to 
flight by the light of knowledge, and the other in which 
material fruit is borne in the form of technological 
improvement of tools, toys, and works of art. 
Introducing science through the people who 
perform(ed) it is one of the most effective ways to help 
students learn to care about exploring creation through 
scientific inquiry. Science is, after all, a human endeavor, 
and the purposes of science are in fact personal-they are 
the purposes of those persons who commission or practice 
it. The divorce of scientific theory and practice from the 
lives of the scientists who use and develop them is a contin-
uing source of intellectual poverty among science students 
today. The most that we can expect from a good general 
chemistry textbook is coverage of Boyle's Law is a small 
biographical box consisting of a portrait of Robert Boyle, 
an identification of the time during which he lived, and 
perhaps a caption saying "Robt. Boyle: an Englishman with 
an inordinate fondness for pressurized airs." This is not to 
say that such texts should become biographical works, but 
the fact that the human context of science is often consid-
ered to be superfluous to the education of budding scien-
tists is obviously problematic if we expect them to see scien-
tific work as significant, in need of moral direction, and 
worthy of their personal investment. Furthermore, 
approaching science through the lives of its practitioners in 
historical context exposes students to the development of 
the natural sciences as disciplines, and provides valuable 
insight into how what we now think of as "scientific" issues 
relate to other areas of inquiry. Boyle, for instance, 
regarded his investigation of nature by empirical methods 
to be an act of religious devotion, a philosophical response 
to scholasticism, and a means through which to obtain 
theological understanding. 
S 
TUDENTS LEARNING ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES NEED 
to be introduced to the basic methodology of scientific 
inquiry, including how to design an experiment to test 
a hypothesis and how to design a hypothesis worth testing. 
Scientists have limited resources of time, energy, and 
funding, and need to prioritize their tasks based on criteria 
with metaphysical roots.lt follows, therefore, that students 
of science should also be made aware of the difference 
between the practice of scientific inquiry and naturalist, 
positivist, or empiricist epistemologies which leave no 
room for knowledge not empirically obtained. Knowing 
the presuppositions, limits, and benefits of scientific 
inquiry is an essential part of educating the scientist and the 
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non-scientist alike. 
It goes without saying that general education in the 
natural sciences should include some kind of physical 
description of the world as well as an introduction to the 
tools by which the world is observed. Priorities will differ 
here, ranging from discussing ideas of mass, energy, and 
elementary forces, to observing molecular behavior in 
chemical reactions, to performing genetic manipulation 
through plant breeding. The universe is a big place, and 
there is a lot going on. As with university-wide general 
education requirements, a balance of hope must be sought, 
while maintaining respect for freedom and for mystery. 
Finally, students of natural science benefit from consid-
ering how they might use what they've learned. Coming 
full circle, we've talked primarily about "what's out there," 
which often bears the label "worldview." What about voca-
tion-the role of the student in using their newly acquired 
gift of knowledge to make the world closer to how we'd like 
it to look for Christ's return? In most cases, the answer will 
be primarily luciferous: the goodness of living with an illu-
minated appreciation of the natural world-a good too 
often unnoticed or undervalued in the absence of this kind 
of reflection. 
I have no prescription for how these tasks could be 
shared best among departments and the faculty members 
who comprise them. I would venture to say that there is 
more here to be done than would conveniently fit into a 
semester-long three hour class. Furthermore, the experi-
ence of laboratory work in which the matter of creation is 
handled, probed, and wondered about can effectively 
incarnate lecture content for students. This, of course, 
makes further demands on students and faculty alike. 
Despite the inherent difficulties, however, I hope that the 
basic framework proposed here for general education in 
and about the natural sciences will help those of us at 
colleges and universities under the cross (and those of us 
under the cross at colleges and universities that don't share 
our commitment) more faithfully to live out our vocations 
as members of the larger body of Christ. f 
Martin Erhardt teaches chemistry at Valparaiso University. 
dope slaps will set you free: an inquiry into truth 
I
'M NOT NAivE ENOUGH TO THINK THAT PARISHIONERS ARE 
uncritical of the clergy, but one of my greater frustra-
tions is how reluctant parishioners are to share critical 
comments. (Admittedly, I pastor a church in the "nice" 
Midwest; perhaps things are different elsewhere.) People 
expect clergy to be overly sensitive to criticism, so we do 
not hear much of it. Sometimes we are blind-sided by 
people who have long-standing grievances that they have 
been reluctant to share lest our feelings be hurt. To these 
people I say, "Tell me the truth; I can handle it." 
This has not always been the case. Earlier in my career, 
even the most innocuous comments felt like criticism. 
Criticism itself could be crushing. Now, with fifteen years of 
experience in ministry and more than six years tending the 
same congregation, the truth really will set me free. That is, 
it would, if people would share it with me! 
A few years ago we remodeled the entryway to our 
building. We removed a wheelchair lift that was no longer 
necessary because we had added an elevator. We reoriented 
the church office and changed the color scheme of the 
hallway that leads to the preschool. A committee met to 
decide what colors the carpet, wall coverings, and trim 
should be. Everyone agreed that our choices had been 
aesthetically pleasing. Shortly after the carpet was 
installed, however, a long-standing member of the church 
commented to me that the carpet had been a bad choice; she 
called it "a catastrophe." 
"What's wrong with it?" I asked. 
"Well, it's a light, solid color and we have twenty 
preschoolers walking over it five days a week with snowy 
boots. It's going to show dirt from Day One. And it's not a 
high-traffic pile, it would be fine in your living room, but 
we're going to have to replace it in two years." 
"Sandy, I was on the committee that picked the carpet." 
"Oh! It's lovely!" she responded. 
And it was lovely, and the color scheme would have 
worked in my living room. But Sandy was right; the carpet 
was a bad choice for that spot. Luckily, after about six 
months of the new carpet our custodian dropped a bottle of 
bleach on it and we were able to use insurance money to 
cover most of the cost of replacing the carpet with a sturdier 
weave that hides stains better. 
In my six years here I can count on one hand the people 
who have disagreed with me about a sermon I have 
preached. I am certain that more people have disagreed 
Thomas C. Willadsen 
with my sermons, but only five people have come to me and 
initiated conversations about what I had said in the pulpit. 
One of them has a marvelous ability to point out contradic-
tions without making me feel defensive. He can also 
disagree without being disagreeable. I have found that I seek 
his reactions to sermons. He truly can speak the truth in love 
to me in ways that have helped me grow as a preacher. 
Another of the five left the church because, among 
other things, I do not get my news from Fox and I believe 
that our state is wrong in seeking to exclude un-married 
couples from privileges similar to those that married 
people enjoy by "the ink stains that have dried upon some 
line." When I realize that I've preached more than three 
hundred sermons here and have driven only one person 
away, I realize how timid and vague my sermons have been. 
Perhaps if I told the truth more openly, if I spoke as bluntly 
as jesus did, I would drive more people away. And the truth 
would make us all free. At least the truth would set me free 
from those who disagree with me! 
Still, I know that the truth is powerful and, like a 
weapon, must be respected and handled with great care. I 
learned this lesson first hand from Brother Brown. 
Brother Brown was the custodian/handyman of a non-
profit organization I interned with in Chicago twenty years 
ago. In the midst of his daily chores around the office, 
Brother Brown shared his wisdom with one and all. Once, 
while emptying my waste basket, Brother Brown observed, 
"They say, 'The truth will make you free.' Brother Brown 
says, 'The truth, at the wrong time, will mess you up!"' 
(Brother Brown originally used an earthier verb than 
"mess," but you get the idea.) 
I have often reflected on Brother Brown's quote, espe-
cially in counseling sessions, when I desperately want to 
scream, "Wake up and smell the cat food, knothead!" and 
realize that the truth, at the wrong time, will simply destroy 
a psyche, rather than bringing healing and insight. 
Emily Dickinson made the same point as Brother 
Brown, when she said, "Truth must dazzle gradually, or 
every man be blind." Still, when I need a quote about truth's 
power, I go with Brother Brown. 
Last year I discovered a veritable fountain of refreshing 
truth in my community. I needed to meet someone for 
breakfast midway between Oshkosh and Appleton. A 
colleague suggested Sassy Sal's in Neenah. Sassy Sal has 
been slinging hash for more than thirty years. Sassy Sal 
takes exactly no crap from anyone. 
After my first visit, I said, "Sassy Sal hates me." 
"No, no, Tom, not just you, Sassy Sal hates all men." 
I felt a little better. But it was only the fact that Sassy Sal 
makes the best sausage omelet in the Fox Valley that assured 
a return visit. [If I do not eat pork sausage at least once a 
month I get a rash ... right ... here.] 
After becoming a regular, and hearing about the hard-
ship caused by Neenah's smoking ban and the pain of 
running a diner on two knees without cartilage, Sal and I 
had developed a relationship built on trust and I was ready 
to be "dope-slapped." 
Fans of Car Talk on public radio know that dope slaps 
are Tom and Ray's disciplinary tactic of choice when 
spouses are driving a great distance together. Dope slaps 
are administered by the passenger to the back of the 
driver's skull by the palm of the hand. A well-placed and 
timed dope slap enables the lucky recipient to see the truth 
with great clarity. Sal is a true black belt of the art of dope-
slapping. 
One morning, an hour after I'd finished my omelet, Sal 
asked if she could take the ketchup bottle to another table. 
"Sure, Sal, I gotta cut down. I'm driving anyway." 
SMACK. 
"You had that co min' and you know it." 
"Yes, Sal." 
When she brought the check I said what I have said 
about every restaurant check I have received since 1986, 
"This is an outrage! She won't pay!" 
SMACK. 
I said, "You know Sal, I think these dope slaps are doing 
me some g ... " 
SMACK. 
And I was enlightened. Now, I must say, I prefer the 
Zen enlightenment that goes like this, "Have you finished 
your rice?" 
"Yes, master." 
"Then wash your bowl." At this moment the novice 
achieved enlightenment. 
Zen enlightenment does not put my glasses out of 
shape, nor rearrange my fillings. Unfortunately, dope 
slaps are the only mode Sal uses to dish out enlighten-
ment. And for days at a time, they are the only media that 
reveal this truth to me: My smart comments are not 
always appreciated. 
My parishioners will not tell me that. My sons do not 
understand them and my wife has given up on me. Even 
members of my Rotary Club are much too nice and accom-
modating to me. Only Sal with her whip-like right hand 
reveals the truth to me. 
And sets me free. t 
The Reverend Thomas C. Willadsen pastors First 
Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, Wisconsin. 
NORWEGIAN PANCAKES 
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They are best in quiet morning, 
eaten on the screened porch with the tang 
of berries sweet and sour to the taste. 
Seeds of grace and sorrow there. 
The brunt of knowledge clips my tongue 
as summer, leaving, keeps me in her thrall. 
Over the back pasture fence green bitter 
walnuts drop in idle showers, 
and in still sultry gardens, midday, 
tomatoes ripen on the tangled vine. 
The brilliant squash flowers burn toward fall. 
Warming my plate, brown-edged and heavy 
with the season's last red fruit, this is all 
that I could savour, this is all. 
Diane G. Scholl 
the Chinese (Christian) century? 
A
NYONE WHO VISITS CHINA AND TREADS THE FAMILIAR 
tourist circuit comes away impressed by the ambi-
tion of the builders of the system of great walls. The 
walls are a centerpiece of Chinese pride for the sheer scale 
of the accomplishment, determination, and sacrifice they 
represent. But they also symbolize the paranoia of China's 
rulers over two millennia, desperate to keep the barbarian 
hordes at bay. Imperial China was characterized by an atti-
tude of cultural superiority. Yet this superior culture was 
always susceptible to challenge or even destruction from 
without, requiring vigilance and strenuous effort to mini-
mize the threat to the Chinese way of life. Whether or not 
the Chinese ever believed that the defensive walls would 
really keep the wild northerners in their place, the walls did 
serve an important totemic and psychological function. 
They stood as a visible reminder that the tribes that reside 
beyond are foreign, strange, uncivilized, and to be feared. 
Indeed, one could argue that the walls were more for 
internal reinforcement of China's cultural superiority than 
they were a viable defensive military tactic. 
How does one contend with an enemy that has already 
breached the walls? Such an enemy exists today in the form 
of a Christianity that challenges the Communist Party line 
of materialist atheism. Christianity has existed in China for 
nearly 1400 years; yet this matters little because this fact is 
not taught, and so it remains largely unknown. Rather, 
typically the church is believed to be a recent Western impe-
rialist imposition. After coming to power in 1949, the 
Communist Party recognized early on that Christianity 
could not be eliminated by force and has clung tena-
ciously- but increasingly pessimistically-to the belief 
that the opiate of the masses will die away in a socialist 
utopia. The strategy has been to marginalize Christianity 
by emphasizing and highlighting its foreignness. Through 
the instrumentality of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
(TSPM), the officially licensed Protestant church consor-
tium, the government has, since 1951, supported an entity 
which has all of the trappings of the Western church circa 
1930, from the architecture of the buildings to the size and 
shape of the offering plates; a church which conveniently 
has the outward appearance of an imperialist institution. If 
the majority of Chinese regard the church as a foreign insti-
tution, the job of containing the growth of the church is 
rendered that much easier. 
The growth of Christianity in China has occurred 
Brent Whitefield 
primarily in the underground church context. The unregis-
tered 'house' church bears little resemblance in appearance 
and style of worship to its Western counterpart. Yet the 
government has intermittently but brutally persecuted this 
body of Christians. From the standpoint of preserving 
China's commitment to atheism as the state dogma, the 
government's strategy is sound. To allow a Sinicized church 
to prosper is to risk its wider acceptance as an institution of 
and for the Chinese people. 
L
ITTLE IN DAVID AIKMAN'S RECENT BOOK, jESUS IN 
Beijing, will allay the worst fears of the Chinese 
authorities concerning the growth of Christianity 
and the depth of involvement of foreigners in the suste-
nance and vision of the house church movement in the 
Middle Kingdom. Aikman catalogues many of the histor-
ical and ongoing evangelistic efforts of Chinese and 
Westerners alike to grow the church in China. What he 
foresees and welcomes is not a Christian re-colonization of 
China, but the development of a partnership between 
Christians in the West and China, with the Chinese taking 
the initiative in certain areas, particularly pioneer evan-
gelism. He also sees considerable scope for further 
warming of relations between a Christian America and a 
Christianizing China. His claim that "China is in the 
process of becoming Christianized" is wishful thinking, but 
does reflect the truth that Chinese intellectuals are carving 
out for the faith, particularly the ethics of Christianity, a 
place in China's religious and philosophical plausibility 
structure. 
Aikman's book has provoked considerable contro-
versy on both sides of the Pacific by naming names and 
making heroes of some figures who would no doubt prefer 
to remain in the shadows. There is little question that the 
authorities are aware of the activities of Chinese and foreign 
evangelists in China. However, Aikman's exposing to a 
popular audience the activities of foreign missionaries, all of 
whom carry tourist or work visas, nearly compels the 
Chinese government to do something about the situation. 
The burden of the crackdowns that may have been caused 
(or at least intensified) by Aikman's work will fall not on the 
foreign evangelists, but on the Chinese house church leader-
ship. He may have concluded that the time was right for 
public exposure of Christianity's advances in China, but the 
decision to "out" vulnerable church leaders was almost 
certainly not his to make. 
If the book threatens the safety and livelihood of 
Christian leaders, it is no less threatening to the Chinese 
government itself. Aikman notes that the vast majority of 
evangelical Christians in China are "pro-American" and 
would support closer ties with the U.S. on a variety of 
fronts. This could excite suspicion, already present here 
and there, that conservative Chinese Christians represent a 
seditious, pro-democracy fifth column, thus inviting even 
closer scrutiny and restraint. More threatening than the 
prospect of a closer alliance with American foreign policy 
imperatives, however, is the exposure to a wide audience of 
spurious claims of religious liberty frequently asserted by 
Chinese authorities and often accepted at face value by 
those seeking to remove obstacles to closer Sino-Western 
cooperation. The Chinese government can use all of the 
good press it can get on the subject of religious liberty, and 
Aikman's much-publicized work does not help. 
The potential for the growth of the Chinese church, 
both in numbers and influence, is enormous, particularly if 
urgently needed efforts at the unification of Chinese 
Christians are undertaken. This unity is necessary on two 
fronts: First of all, TSPM and house church believers must 
be willing to lay aside decades of mutual suspicion and 
competition. There are already signs that this is happening. 
In some parts of China with a large Christian population, 
the lines between the house and TSPM churches are begin-
ning to blur. In the process, genuine differences in theology 
and practice should not be ignored, but neither should they 
represent insuperable barriers to cooperation and common 
cause. 
A
SECOND IMPORTANT FRONT FOR UNIFICATION AND 
communication lies between the largely rural evan-
gelical church and urban Christian intellectuals. In 
the vacuum left by the nearly universal disillusionment 
with and abandonment of Marxist-Leninist-Maoism there 
is ample room for the Christian message. A growing body 
of thinkers and scholars, Christians and sympathetic non-
believers, are working hard to claim and maintain this space 
for Christianity. Though their numbers are relatively few, 
they have made significant contributions to Chinese 
thinking about Christianity. Many Chinese are convinced, 
for example, that Christianity is one of the secrets to the 
economic and political success of the West, while the theory 
that Christianity played a key role in bringing down the 
Iron Curtain has attained the standing of a truism. 
Christianity, these scholars argue, simply delivers the goods 
in terms of political and economic prosperity and should be 
taken seriously and studied, if only selectively, by a country 
looking to reform itself on several fronts. 
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Yet the gulf between these urban, less publicly devout 
intellectuals and rural, zealous house church Christians is 
considerable. While the intellectuals mine history and 
ethics to see what Christianity can do for China, Chinese 
house church evangelicals are far more interested in what 
China can do for Christianity. House church evangelicals 
are not content to see the Gospel spread throughout China, 
but have concocted ambitious plans for foreign missionary 
endeavor, with special emphasis on unreached (read 
Muslim) nations. These plans call for nothing short of the 
re-conquest of Jerusalem for the faith through the recruit-
ment, training, equipping, and dispatch of 100,000 
Chinese missionaries. This "Back to Jerusalem" movement 
will be a Chinese affair in nearly every way, and may repre-
sent a unique Chinese contribution to missiology. These 
Chinese missionaries will resurrect the idea of the faith 
mission, going out without support and trusting in God for 
continual and miraculous supply-an idea championed by 
the nineteenth-century British missionary to China, 
Hudson Taylor. More importantly, they will eschew the 
establishment of bricks and mortar churches and instead 
replicate the house church model that has served them so 
well under persecution. These Chinese Christians believe 
that they possess certain advantages over Western mission-
aries, including greater access to sensitive areas, experience 
with and connections to large Muslim populations in their 
own country and, most tellingly, poverty. There is a wide-
spread belief that the wealth of Western Christians has 
made them more reliant on monetary solutions to prob-
lems and less willing to take risks for the advance of the 
Gospel. Chinese missionary mobilizers believe that the 
poverty of house church Christians makes them more 
willing to go forth, unencumbered by worldly concerns, 
and more reliant on God for their supply. 
There is little communication now between the theo-
rists and the practitioners, the scholars and the mission-
aries, who seem at times to be working at cross-purposes. 
The ultimate prosperity of Christianity in China is contin-
gent on many factors, including the vicissitudes of politics 
and economics, the activity of high profile cult groups, and 
the intervention of foreign interests. However, no factor is 
more likely to redound to the success of Christianity in, and 
emanating from, China than a genuine unity and coopera-
tion between the missionary and the scholar. They need 
each other, and together they can accomplish much for 
China and for Christianity. How ironic it would be if 
Christianity, which China spent much of the twentieth 
century trying to keep out, becomes a signature Chinese 
cultural export in the twenty-first century. f 
Brent Whitefield teaches history at Valparaiso University. 
centers that hold 
T
WENTY YEARS AGO, IN AN AGE OF ARGYLE KNEE SOCKS 
and skinny ties, of spikey mullets and tidy perms-a 
time, in other words, when college students were 
trying to figure out how to be hip without being hippies-a 
boy I know went off to college. Sting and Thriller filled the 
air, Cosby and MTV the screen. And the genial pep of 
Ronald Reagan, contagious in its way, was already making 
the poor guy the Democrats sent up into a sacrificial lamb, 
though the election was still two months away. 
All of this was the stuff of mystery to this boy, the fledg-
ling collegian. He had been overseas for several years, and 
had just returned home that summer. John Travolta, 
flowers, and transistor radios had given way to Boy George, 
plaid, and boom-boxes. All this was unsettling, in an 
exciting sort of way, and the young man was eager to jump 
in. And he was scared to jump in. 
How does one safely enter something as powerful and 
vast as a culture? From the protection of the family room? 
Maybe behind the wheel of a car? On the curb of a city 
street, perhaps? 
But this way of putting it makes it sound abstract. 
There was nothing abstract about re-entering America for 
this young man. Not only was he trying to find his way in a 
country only strangely familiar, he was, by leaving the 
safety of home, and of childhood itself, putting himself on 
the line. It was a reality show without the show, with no 
national audience observing and no hefty paycheck 
awaiting; just the boy in his cramped dorm room, 
attempting, as they say, to "adjust"-you know, trying, 
while his hick Elvis-impersonating roommate is belting 
out off-color Conway Twitty songs, to figure out ifN-1-K-
E is pronounced NIKE or NIK-EE. 
The boy had jumped, and he was in. But he wasn't in the 
family room (until fall break, when, to his mother's 
consternation, on his first night home he slept for more 
than eighteen hours). He wasn't behind the wheel of a car, 
since he didn't have his license yet (he was only seventeen, 
and eighteen was the legal driving age in the country where 
he had been living). And he certainly wasn't on a street 
curb. No, he was at a small Christian college in a semi-
suburban, still largely rural, part of southeastern 
Pennsylvania, living on something called a "campus." This 
was his primary entry point into that bewildering, indeed 
ominous-sounding world of America, 1984. 
Fortunately for him, this college was a familiar place: it 
was his dad's alma mater-if not the mother of his father's 
Eric Miller 
soul, then certainly its governess. His father had attended 
the college while the boy was in elementary school and had 
been a presence on campus. Everyone knew the boy's dad, 
it seemed, and many of them even remembered the boy. 
Father and son shared many professors; it seemed both 
impossible and completely natural that such legendary 
figures as Dr. Figart and Mr. Osborn, his father's mentors, 
were now his teachers too. He was playing on the same 
soccer field upon which ten years earlier he had watched 
the amazing Jude Nixon perform magic with ball and net. 
This was, in short, a safe place, and a beloved place-just 
the sort of place that he, at this delicate and critical moment 
of re-entry, needed. 
But, unfortunately, the college was struggling, and 
struggling at many levels. Enrollments had been low for 
several years. Salaries had always been low. Professors were 
worn down and out from years of overwork. And the cafe-
teria food was bad-well, bad by today' s standards, at least. 
M
ORE DEEPLY, THIS COLLEGE WAS STRUGGLING TO MAP 
a course for itself in that world of 19 84-a world 
that was not just bewildering to freshmen, but to 
the grown-ups, too. Having come into being fifty years 
earlier in response to what its founders had perceived to be 
serious, even tragic, wrong-turns that other colleges and 
seminaries-and indeed, the entire culture-had taken in 
the first decades of the twentieth century, it intended to 
provide re-orientation and direction for Christians seeking 
to live faithfully in a troubled time. It was a noble aim. 
But it's one thing to set out to be a college; it's another 
to actually achieve it. To attain to the reality of college is no 
simple task, after all; in the least, to truly be a college 
requires that the educational community in question 
possess both social integrity-people living together as 
humans should-and intellectual integrity-people 
thinking together as humans should. By taking upon itself 
the holy responsibility of instructing humans in living and 
thinking, a college community publicly obligates itself to 
enact those high ideals for which it stands in all aspects of its 
life: from the way it structures its pay-scale to the way it 
structures its classrooms; from the attention it gives to its 
students to the attention it gives to its food preparation. If it 
fails at discerning the nature of the good life or at practicing 
this understanding, it will not possess integrity and will 
look ridiculous-and, indeed, be deserving of ridicule. The 
social and intellectual spheres must come together to form 
one philosophical, ethical, aesthetic whole-this is what 
the ideal of college means, and teaches-and if the commu-
nity in question actually comes to embody the most central 
and elemental human ideals, college is achieved: the name 
fits. 
As you might suspect, the particular college commu-
nity the boy found himself in was filled with earnest, smart 
people striving to achieve this highly demanding ideal. But 
their confusion and disorientation were palpable, even to 
freshmen: confusion about what it meant to live as a 
Christian; confusion about what it meant to live as an 
American and as a Christian; confusion about the ideas 
emanating from the broader academy; confusion about the 
direction in which the world was moving; and confusion 
about its own vocation within the Church and the world. 
Both its social and its intellectual integrity, in short, were 
under threat. It was struggling to overcome a profound if 
elusive sense of disorientation. And in this, it was not alone. 
B
ECAUSE AS IT TURNS OUT, THIS SORT OF PERVASIVE AND 
fundamental confusion about who humans are and 
how we should live was, arguably, the defining 
quality of the entire twentieth century, a quality whose era-
shaping hold marks our own day-and perhaps our own 
college-as well. What Are People For? is the title of one 
book I've assigned in classes, and the very need to ask that 
question aloud gives some sense of the dimensions of the 
cultural and political crisis that frames our everyday life. 
Older understandings of humans, and history, and time, 
and God, have in the past two hundred years been cast 
aside, with no small amounts of relief and conceit. But the 
century that those living one hundred years ago expected to 
deliver us to the Promised Land, to the New Jerusalem, and 
beyond, turned out mainly to leave all who survived it 
asking fearfully, confusedly, this one enormous question: 
What are we, after all, for? In the aftermath of a century that 
featured political brutality of cataclysmic proportions, that 
saw what was perhaps the most culturally, intellectually, 
and economically sophisticated nation in the West seek to 
destroy the Jewish people, that has seen a gaudy and tran-
sient form of wealth triumph only at outrageous cost to the 
earth and its creatures, we cry out, with tears bitter and hot, 
What are people for? What is our purpose? Is there 
anything worth fighting for? What is worth living for? 
Our disoriented college freshman, attending this 
disoriented little college, found himself looking for 
answers to these questions as they emerged inchoately from 
his soul and worked their way into his mind. He found 
some professors who had serious ideas about the shape of 
the present. He found others who were more concerned to 
preserve a sense of the world that was passing. In this 
second category was Dr. Joan Tompkins, a great and 
passionate student of English literature, the advisor of the 
drama club that he joined, and one of the college's most 
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infectious, demanding, and fiercely wholehearted 
teachers. One fall he enrolled in her Major English Writers 
course and was promptly saddled with a massive tome. In 
time he discovered that The Norton Anthology of English 
Literature: Great Authors Edition contained many 
searching, learned meditations on all of these questions 
regarding the nature of the civilization, and the age, and the 
even more fundamental matter of human identity. One 
took the form of a poem that begins like this: 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot hear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, 
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere 
The ceremony of innocence is drowned; 
The best lack all conviction, while the worst 
Are full of passionate intensity. 
This poem, William Butler Yeats' "The Second Coming," 
written in the darkening years that followed World War I, 
stands among the most famous of the thousands of attempts 
to capture in concentrated form the nature of our times. 
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold . .. Things fall 
apart; the center cannot hold ... Things fall apart; the center 
cannot hold . .. This one line has become so embedded in 
our souls over these eighty years because it reflects both the 
reality of our deeply fallen creaturely estate and of our 
current civilizational circumstance. A brief glance back-
ward reminds us, again, that we have not always regarded 
our situation in such a dire fashion. In the eyes of our nine-
teenth-century forebears, the center was not just holding, 
but was growing ever more strong as the deity of Progress, 
with dazzling pillars of fire and cloud, led the nations 
forward. Things were falling together, not apart; 
triumphally-if not always merrily-we went along. 
But then things changed. The shock of discovering that 
history might actually have been moving in a quite unbe-
lievably different direction, palpable in Yeats' poem, regis-
tered vividly in the mind of the great American social critic 
Lewis Mumford, who years later put it this way: 
We all had a sense that we were on the verge of transla-
tion into a new world, a quite magical translation, in 
which the best hopes of the American Revolution, the 
French Revolution, and the Industrial Revolution 
would all be simultaneously fulfilled. The First World 
War battered and shattered those hopes, but it took 
years before the messages received through our eyes or 
felt at our fingers' ends were effectively conveyed to 
our brains and could be decoded: for long those 
ominous messages simply did not make sense. Until 
well into the 1930s we could always see the bright side 
of the darkest cloud. We did not, while the spirit of our 
confident years worked in us, guess that the sun upon 
which we counted might soon be in eclipse. 
Little that has happened since World War !-whether 
the terrifying things like global depression, Hiroshima, and 
the Cold War, or the dazzling things, like television, smart 
bombs, and the World Wide Web-has strengthened the 
center to which Yeats referred; quite the opposite, in fact. 
Those traditions that had helped to construct that center-
including varying forms of Christian belief and practice-
had lost their shaping power, and the se~rch was on to fill 
the vacuum they left. By the mid-twentieth century the 
West was in the final stages of the long and slow process of 
shifting for whatever cohesion it still required to another 
center, to what we might call, simply, a self-center: not a 
polity founded upon a broad (if unstable) consensus about 
a deity who creates and commands, but instead a polity 
devoted, most fundamentally, to a self that deserves and 
demands. 
Put differently, we-Americans, and others in the 
West-have chosen, or perhaps defaulted to, not one tran-
scendent center but rather to millions of human centers, 
each self a law unto his-or-her-self. Once our old binding 
agent lost its hold, we fell apart. And fallen apart we remain. 
W
E HAVE TENDED, IN A HOPEFUL BUT Fuzzy WAY, TO 
call our new estate "freedom." And indeed, in the 
course of this long-coming fracturing we have, 
true to the odd and eminently unpredictable way in which 
history moves, made political and cultural gains that have 
led to an enlarged sphere of true freedom. With our height-
ened perception of the self have come various movements 
and laws that have won vital protections and liberties for 
those who had been systematically marginalized and 
oppressed due to gender, race, or ethnicity. 
But, paradoxically, at least in part these gains have been 
made possible by this vast cultural and social fragmenta-
tion, and the bonds that we-the-liberated have grasped 
hold of to tie our little self-centers together are not so 
impressive. Usually when we-the-liberated wish to feel a 
sense of belonging to some person or group we end up 
looking for the code and symbols of those who are part of 
our own self-selected, generation-driven market niche and 
follow distantly along, being sure to reserve the right to 
leave (whether a job, church, town, or marriage) at a 
moment's notice, and so protect our "freedom." Sadly, this 
form of belonging is a faint shadow of the sort of thick 
membership that words like "commonwealth" and "neigh-
borhood" and "family" and "tribe" and "church" and 
"college" describe and demand. Our more shallow way of 
connecting cannot, and does not, hold. Inevitably, we, 
disconnected and distant, find ourselves looking inside 
again to face once more that lonely, looming question: 
What am I for? Just "good times"? "Fun"? "Pleasure"? 
"Work"? "Success"? "Me"? 
We're not just disoriented-we're barren. We don't 
know to whom or to what we belong, or to whom or to 
what we should belong. In Aristotle's useful way of framing 
it, we know neither our formal end nor our final end. We 
awaken and find that we have jumped into a culture moving 
at breakneck speed, powered by great economic forces 
dedicated to expanding and servicing the appetites of the 
voraciously hungry selves we've become, and we eat and 
eat and eat and we're just as hungry as before, so we eat and 
eat and eat ... and we're still empty. Still hungry. Still alone. 
And we realize that we have become, as we see in flashes of 
dark honesty, tiny centers, the tiniest centers imaginable. 
And these tiny centers are not holding. 
Like our bewildered collegian of two decades past, we 
need help. We need safe places, beloved places, vital places, 
places whose integrity teaches us who we are and how we, 
in these strange times, should live-and, perhaps most 
crucially, how we can become a "we." 
And so one day we, like that freshman, find ourselves 
sitting in an academic convocation at the start of a new year. 
And against all odds, a moment of insight occurs: perhaps 
colleges like this one might actually exist for this one thing: 
not to train students for "careers;" not to provide fun, or 
"culture," or even an improved vocabulary; but, rather, to 
help us, postmodern pilgrims that we are, to gain the 
rooting-spiritual, intellectual, moral-that we with every 
fiber of our souls long for, and that might aid the transfor-
mation of the lonely and hollow selves we've become into 
the robust and rich people God has called us out of darkness 
to be. 
And what of the old "Christian" West? Maybe it was 
time for it to go. Like a college, a civilization that fails to 
incarnate the ideals it has championed deserves, if not 
ridicule, at least a stern rebuke and a sober exit. Maybe 
instead of fighting so hard to preserve a dying civilization, 
we should allow the most noble ideals of our Western 
heritage to call into existence a new people, one that more 
faithfully adheres to that ancient, timeless vision of the 
good life, a people that will begin this time with a markedly 
improved awareness of the worth of each particular crea-
ture of God, and, indeed, of the inestimable worth of the 
entire creation. 
Perhaps this people's intense and passionate conviction 
will call multitudes back to their Maker, as ceremonies of 
innocence, and justice, and peace forge new centers: 
centers that hold. f 
Eric Miller teaches history at Geneva College in Beaver 
Falls, Pennsylvania. 
public education, federalism, and democracy 
I
N THE CLASSICAL ERA, ARISTOTLE COUNTED EDUCATION OF 
the citizenry as too important to be left in private hands 
and since then the connection between education and 
political legitimacy has been apparent to most who have 
thought about democracy and education. Brown v. the 
Board of Education, the historic decision that ended racial 
segregation in schools, made the connections between 
democratic legitimacy and public education explicit: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of ... governments. Compulsory school atten-
dance laws and the great expenditures for education 
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in 
the performance of our most basic public responsibili-
ties, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foun-
dation of good citizenship. Today, it is the principle 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in 
preparing him for later professional training, and in 
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the oppor-
tunity of an education. 
Nonetheless, fifty years after the appearance of Brown, 
in some ways, public schools are worse off than before. In 
the contemporary era, Bill Gates delivers a jeremiad on the 
ability of future generations to compete, given the inade-
quate training in math and science students receive. The 
very name of national legislation, "No Child Left Behind," 
concedes that children are left behind in the existing 
system. More affluent parents, who used to purchase a 
quality education by the expedient of buying a home in a 
good neighborhood, after Columbine no longer feel as 
secure in that option. Numerous urban school districts, 
such as Chicago's, are still under federal court order to 
achieve compliance with Brown-decades later-and 
many of these districts are more segregated now than they 
were before. In debates over racial equality and urban 
education, the plight of poor, rural children is not even on 
the radar screen. 
Given these phenomena, it is not surprising that 
Americans rank education as one of their highest political 
priorities. But few realize that as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law, there is no fundamental right to a public 
education. How, then, can President Bush seek to be the 
"education president," when from the perspective of 
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constitutional law, this is an oxymoron? This paradox 
comes from a confluence of factors, mainly structural and 
decisional. The structural piece of the puzzle stems from 
the American brand of constitutionalism known as feder-
alism; the decisional aspect arises from the United States 
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a right to education 
more than a generation ago in a pivotal opinion, San 
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, (1973). 
Under the structural blueprint of the American 
Constitution, only specific enumerated powers were origi-
nally ceded to the federal government; plenary powers 
were reserved to the states (U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 8}. This is 
the concept of "our federalism." The primary exception to 
this was the Bill of Rights, which comprised a group of 
rights that originally could be enforced against the new 
national government, and then after the Civil War, became 
enforceable against the states due to the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Under this scheme, responsibility 
For the garden variety of everyday legal relations, things 
such as making a contract, selling a piece of property, or 
getting a divorce, were matters of state law and states' 
rights, unless one could constitutionalize the issue by 
posing the legal question in terms of fundamental rights 
protected by the Fourteenth amendment or, eventually, a 
violation of equal protection, also protected by that 
amendment. 
Originally, education was not of particular national 
concern, as there was virtually no publically funded educa-
tion in the Colonies and people could prosper through 
apprenticeships and the like. Whether and how to create a 
general school system was something that came later with 
westward expansion, evolving organically from the 
founding of towns and counties. It fell, therefore, into the 
plenary powers of states, reserved to them under the 
Constitution. Being a matter of local concern and support, 
the funding source for America's first public schools arose, 
some might say naturally, from local property tax revenues. 
But, extreme localism in public education, both in 
authority and funding, also allowed school systems to 
reflect local distinctions in race and class, so that the educa-
tional opportunity available to an American child 
depended first on race, and second on socio-economic 
status. Geography and racial pedigree were destiny in 
American public education and the ideal of local control 
took on a bad odor when seen in the context of these reali-
ties. It was not until the system of racial apartheid in public 
education was challenged in Brown that the idea of unfet-
tered local control became vulnerable, as well. But, the 
logical extension of Brown,s reasoning was foreclosed by 
Rodriguez. To understand the stance of Rodriguez, one must 
understand the doctrinal limitations of Brown itself. 
The issue before the Court in Brown was not whether 
states had an affirmative duty to provide an education to 
their citizens that could be federally enforced-they did 
not-it was a more modest one, namely whether when a 
state has chosen to provide the entitlement of education, 
that provision must take place on equal racial terms. 
Rodriguez involved a challenge to San Antonio's system of 
public school finance on equal protection grounds, and was 
mounted by poor, minority children living in the urban 
sectors of the city. Their core argument was that the scheme 
by which Texas forced local districts to fund schools 
unfairly burdened children in areas with low property tax 
revenues and exacerbated the de facto effects of past de jure 
racial discrimination. They attempted to show that the 
comparative inequality of the resources made available to 
them deprived them of educational opportunity. In a 5/4 
opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court insulated the 
Texas scheme against attack, expressly declaring that, 
among other things, education is not a fundamental federal 
right. 
THE RODRIGUEZ MAJORITY GAVE A VARIETY OF REASONS for refusing to intervene in state education. Not surprisingly, federalism played a central role. From 
Justice Powell's perspective, public schooling is a matter of 
uniquely local concern and is heavily intertwined with the 
taxation policies of the states. The possible consequences 
for state autonomy of a federal right to education were, to 
say the least, worrisome. The apparent impact of the 
Rodriguez decision was twofold: at the theoretical level, it 
permitted states to maintain plans for public school 
funding with a disparate impact on various sectors of their 
populace, thus continuing barriers to educational opportu-
nity by allowing a system of economic discrimination to 
replace a system of state racial discrimination; at the prac-
tical level, it focused the political fight over school finance 
reform on state constitutions, legislatures, and courts 
where in many jurisdictions the fight has stalled in political 
1m passe. 
In addition to these specific effects, Rodriguez should 
have reduced or limited federal intervention in state educa-
tion policy, but it did not. Federalism has not, in fact, 
prevented the national government from attempting to 
influence the states through its spending power, rather than 
its direct regulatory power. The federal government has 
come to shape education by passing a variety of legislative 
enactments using the technique of the spending power and 
categorical aid to promote its views-this is the basis for 
"No Child Left Behind." But, under current constitutional 
anomalies, it gives financial resources to states for educa-
tion conditioned on local performance on nationalized test 
standards while fundamental local economic inequalities 
in school funding and school attendance are left intact. 
Perhaps most tellingly, and as James E. Ryan and Michael 
Heise pointed out in their Yale Law Journal article, "The 
Political Economy of School Choice," virtually all choice 
programs such as vouchers and charter schools still retain 
historic geographic restrictions in place, as does "No Child 
Left Behind." Even now, it is generally not possible for a 
poor, inner city school child to spend her voucher to gain 
entry to an elite suburban public school or to achieve a 
transfer to such a public school if her inner city school fails 
national standards. Apparently we are willing to talk the 
game of improved public education, but we are not really 
willing to share on an equal basis the educational resources 
to be divided, or to have our children attend schools with 
those of different racial, ethnic, and economic back-
grounds. Why is this so? Because the constitutional frame-
work still reserves to the middle and upper classes-of 
whatever race-the exit option of fleeing lesser performing 
public school districts by buying a home in a different locale 
or sending their children to private school. 
It is difficult not to indulge in questions of what might 
have been had the Court decided the other way in 1973. 
This is especially poignant as we seek to export democracy 
to other parts of the world, even as we pay little attention to 
the impediments to the necessary conditions of real democ-
racy here at home. In its ideal incarnation, democracy is 
about inclusion, and the commitment to inclusion as a 
structural feature of the political system itself. In an ideally 
democratic system, every adult subject to its authority has 
an equal right to participate in the creation of its official 
values, official institutions, and official practices. A public 
space is a thing in itself, over and above mere social space, 
and its unique mark is the right of individuals to move 
within it, and to constitute it, in their roles as citizens. 
P
UBLIC SCHOOLS IN A REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
should provide a public space, one committed 
through both symbol and practice, to democratic 
values. While public education may not be as closely 
connected with representative democracy as voting, it 
shares voting's basic characteristics in that we could not 
replace it with a system of private education without signif-
icant cost to our democratic ideals. It is unfortunate that a 
public desperate for a fix to public education may seize 
upon privatization without realizing the missed opportu-
nity that confronted the United States Supreme Court atthe 
cusp of the civil rights movement. Perhaps before jetti-
soning public education as a uniquely public responsibility, 
we ought to revisit the question of whether education 
should be an entitlement protected by the federal constitu-
tion, as is free speech and voting. f 




'm a police officer, and when I'm not at work, I some-
times find myself out among people. Here I speak of 
wedding receptions, theme parties, and coffee circles. 
Often, when those in attendance find out what I do for a 
living, they ask piercing questions. Here are some of the 
most common questions and my answers to them. 
1. Have you ever had to fire your gun at anyone? 
I am asked this all the time, sometimes even before I've 
taken off my coat (or flak jacket, in the case of some coffee 
circles). I have mixed feelings about this question. I 
certainly understand the curiosity factor, but the question 
itself has always struck me as, at best, indelicate. If I have 
fired my gun, it probably occurred in a situation where 
someone was badly hurt, or even killed, and why would I 
want to discuss such a solemn event with someone I barely 
know? "Sure, I shot a guy through the throat once. Now 
how about passing that shrimp plate?" I've had some close 
calls, but the answer, for the record, is no, which is kind of 
nice, because I didn't take this job to put bullets in people. 
2. I often see cops pull up next to each other in their squads, 
sometimes in the middle of traffic. Is that just to chat? What 
are they talking about? 
I'd like to say we're discussing criminal procedure, or 
exchanging information about the dope house down the 
street or the fearsome new street gang. And sometimes we 
are. But often the conversation wanders towards where to 
go for dinner, or when bowling league starts, or what's the 
name of that leggy new girl in Property Crimes. We don't 
have a water cooler, you see, so that's how we roll. 
3. What is the scariest experience you've had on the job? 
I was called to an assignment where a mentally ill man 
off of his medication tried to end his own life by using what 
is known as "suicide by cop." His method consisted of 
hurling a carving knife at me from about fifteen feet away 
and then stalking towards me with a second knife in his 
hand and a homicidal gleam in his eyes. We both ended up 
surviving that encounter relatively unscathed, although 
when I look back and ask how, I don't chalk it up to either 
lack of will on his part or any specialized training or skill on 
mine, but rather to pure, dumb luck. The whole ordeal 
lasted about forty seconds, and it was scary as hell. 
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4. Why don'tpolice shoot to disable instead of to kill? Why, 
for instance, don't cops just shoot the guns out of people's 
hands? 
Police are trained to shoot only when someone (the 
officer or a citizen) is in imminent, life-threatening danger. 
If this is the case, we are trained to shoot in order to stop 
that imminent threat. The quickest way to do this is to aim 
for what is called the upper hydraulics of the body, i.e., the 
lungs, heart, and chest. If you dance around, wasting valu-
able seconds trying to trick-shoot a knife or a gun out of 
someone's hands like you're Annie Oakley, you and/or the 
person you're trying to protect are going to die. 
5. Do cops really kick in doors all the time? How many 
doors have you kicked in? 
Maybe half a dozen, and three of them in one month. 
And each time, my surgically repaired lower back lets me 
know about it for the next few days. For this reason, I'm not 
as enthusiastic about booting in doors as I once was. Now I 
tend to look around for some younger officer who seeks a 
little street credibility so I can pawn the task off on him. Or 
I call the fire department. They have sacks of tools with 
which to punch through doors, and they're more than 
happy to use them. Firefighters don't even have to write 
any reports after they break stuff. 
6. Do cops eat a lot of donuts? 
Yes. People eat a lot of donuts. Cops are people. 
Therefore, cops eat a lot of donuts. I'm pretty sure that 
follows, though it's been a while since Logic 140. I think 
one reason cops eat a lot of donuts is because they think 
they're supposed to; that's what they've heard cops do.lt's 
a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. 
7. How many cops are corrupt? 
If you're talking about the weighty stuff like police 
shaking down dealers for dope and cash, taking payoffs, or 
planting evidence, my guess is a very small percentage. 
Obviously there's no way to be sure, but I personally 
haven't observed anything like this, although I know it 
happens (L.A.'s Rampart scandal for one). Responsible and 
discerning police departments aggressively pursue these 
officers for criminal charges and termination because there 
is no greater stain on a department and no quicker way to 
lose the public's trust than to have cops who have gone to 
seed on the payroll. It probably seems like there is a higher 
percentage of corrupt officers than there actually is because 
you frequently read about them on the front page of the 
newspaper. I'm not knocking the media; it's their job to 
report these things and it certainly is news people are inter-
ested in. And I don't know that cops are singled out in this 
way any more than are high school teachers who sleep with 
their students or ethically shaky C.E.O's. But while you'll 
always read about the cop who went bad, the cop who goes 
to work every day and does her job and treats people 
decently and tries to make things better rather than worse, 
that officer will never see the headlines. And that's the 
majority of us. 
8. Has this job changed you? If so, how? 
It has. Probably in some ways that I don't always recog-
nize. But I do know that I'm more cynical now than when I 
began work as a policeman. I'm less likely to give people the 
benefit of the doubt. I'm quicker to go hands on to prevent 
a situation from deteriorating into violence. My language is 
a little saltier because that's the language I'm constantly 
around, which reminds me of a passage from Tom Wolfe's 
The Bonfire of the Vanities where a character notes that "in 
a room full of 'ain'ts,' he couldn't get an 'isn't' out of his 
mouth." 
I have more aches and pains now. When I drive places 
off-duty, I am ever looking for guys with felony warrants or 
people breaking into cars, because it's hard to turn it off 
when you leave work. 
I also, after often seeing people and situations at their 
chaotic worst, have a better sense of what's important in 
this life. I have a better grasp of people's pain. I am more 
familiar with the progressive, burn-the-house-to-its-foun-
dation problem of drug addiction. All of this combines to 
make me more thankful for my family, who raised me in an 
environment where I was both disciplined and loved, and 
to know that I have been given a good life, a good life that I 
did not earn and cannot repay. 
9. Do you listen to music while you patrol? 
No, except when my partner breaks into one of those 
old Frank Sinatra tunes-typically, "My Way" -and if you 
could hear my partner you would know that in those cases 
it isn't clear that we're really talking about music. Our 
squads are only equipped with police radios. Some folks 
bring their own portable radios in, particularly when the 
big game is on. But this is against department policy. It's a 
fair policy, I think. Commercial radio is distracting. There's 
nothing more embarrassing than driving right past an 
armed robbery in progress because you're jamming to Jay-
z and Linkin Park's newest collaboration on K-101. 
10. What is a realistic cop TV show? 
I don't know that there are too many realistic cop 
shows. Maybe I just don't watch enough television. Law & 
Order, maybe? Actual police work does not usually lend 
itself to a scintillating hour of entertainment. There's too 
much sitting around at crime scenes, writing reports, 
making phone calls, going to the bathroom, following up 
on leads that go nowhere ("negative results" is the police 
buzz word), and thinking about donuts. We are not as 
attractive, or interesting, or dynamic, as our TV counter-
parts. Our one-liners aren't as clever. Our hairlines are 
higher. But I posed this question to a learned friend of mine 
not long ago and he noted that Arthur Miller had once said 
that drama is always a compressing of time. You have to 
make a lot of things happen in a short period. You leave the 
boring stuff out because everything has to be heightened, 
for the story's sake and to keep the audience engaged. So if 
some of these cop shows aren't the most realistic, maybe 
that's just the way narrative works. 
11. How the devil is it that such a rakish, debonair, well-
versed Renaissance Man such as yourself, with your clas-
sical training, startling command of French wines, and 
grace on the dance floor, is a street cop? Shouldn't you be 
some kind of sultan, or international delegate or, at the very 
least, Under Secretary of Commerce? 
Okay, actually, I've never been asked that. 
12. Why do you write your columns under the initials A.P. 
instead of using your actual name and the name of your 
department? 
There is a section in my department's rulebook that 
forbids speaking or writing publicly about the department, 
while acting as a representative of that department, 
without prior approval from upper administration. So if I 
wanted to name names, such as my own and my depart-
ment's, I'd have to run each column by a police supervisor 
for approval, and then to The Cresset editor for approval 
round two. I don't wish to do this. One editor is enough. I 
do feel that by not naming myself or my department I am 
well within the spirit of this police policy. So I remain 
cloaked in obscurity. Which I like. I can still go to the super-
market without being mobbed by Cresset-crazed teenage 
girls demanding my autograph and trying to tear off a lock 
of my hair as a keepsake. 
Furthermore, for what it's worth, I've noticed that 
although the editor of The Cresset has known me for almost 
fifteen years, he still can't get my name right. 
13. What is a typical patrol day like for you? 
There's no such animal. There's no way to know what 
the day will bring. I could be dispatched to a homicide scene 
straight out of roll call, or spend an hour trying to corral a 
pair of stray German shepherds running in traffic, or maybe 
be sent to the hospital to guard a felony prisoner (which is 
not so bad, because at the hospital one often encounters 
free sandwiches and juice and nurses who laugh at one's 
jokes). 
14. Do you carry a truth lasso like Wonder Woman? 
No. 
15. What is the most frustrating thing about police work? 
Domestic violence-related calls stand out here. I'm 
talking, for instance, about the man and woman with 
mutual restraining orders against each other who get back 
together for one sweaty, alcohol-fueled night. Then the 
next morning, when all the old problems that initially 
broke them apart resurface with a vengeance, each calls the 
police and demands that the other be arrested for violating 
that restraining order. Or the husband who throws his wife 
down the stairs in front of their children. Or the son who 
breaks his elderly father's nose with his fist because he 
won't give him money for drugs. And then, as is often the 
case, the victim doesn't show up in court because the victim 
and suspect have reconciled, or the victim is scared, so the 
suspect walks free and then you get called to the same house 
soon afterwards for the same problem. A circle of too-
familiar violence that never seems to close. And you know 
you did the right thing in making the initial arrest, and you 
know that domestic violence is complicated and it's easier 
said than done to leave an abuser and start a new life. But 
you can't help but wonder, what's the point? 
16. How do you deal with this frustration? 
Everyone deals with it a little differently. Some cops 
fish. Some work on their cars. I hit the heavy bag every 
week. Police need something to address the frustration, 
because if you don't, the frustration turns to anger and the 
anger turns to rage. Sometimes this rage is pretty raw and 
sometimes it has more of a self-righteous quality to it 
because as a police officer, you almost feel entitled to it. But 
the bottom line is that raging cops aren't good for anyone. 
I've felt this rage before. All cops have. But I've never taken 
a cheap shot at somebody, never used more than what I 
considered to be the minimum amount of force necessary 
to control a situation. And that's why I hit the heavy bag-
to keep things that way. When you lose control on the 
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street, you can lose everything, starting with your job and 
ending with your self-respect. 
17. You've been a cop for almost four years. What's the 
worst thing you've seen? 
The Ice Capades. 
18. Did you always know you wanted to be a cop? 
When I was younger, I wanted to be a social worker. 
Maybe I am one now-just a heavily armed social worker, 
in a car with lights, who occasionally has to throw people 
against walls. 
19. What does it feel like to be sprayed with pepper spray? 
I can answer this with conviction, because I've been 
soused with it on more than one occasion, both in training 
and also on the street by other officers with erratic aim. The 
effects of pepper spray vary. Some people can shake it off, 
like a bee sting. For others, particularly those fair-skinned 
among us, it is as though rivulets of barbed wire have 
wrapped themselves tightly around your corneas in a fiery 
embrace and all the devils of hell have crawled under your 
skin and are cackling at your ill-fortune. (Okay, I happen to 
be one of the fair-skinned folks). You cough. You sweat. You 
burn. You can kiss your contact lenses goodbye. Water 
doesn't provide much relief; indeed, it just helps to spread 
the pepper spray around more. And all the snot you've ever 
had, or currently have, or ever will have, streams down the 
front of your shirt like a thick crystalline sheet of molten 
lava. Basically, you enter a world you do not wish to know. 
20. Are you happy with your job? 
Despite the occasional encounter with pepper spray, I 
like it. I like it immensely. I feel like I'm doing exactly what 
I should be doing. Besides maybe my team making a splash 
in the Final Four, this is the greatest feeling I have known. f 




painstaking detail the way in which Descartes's 
"modern self," though sometimes thought to be a 
natural development of the Augustinian tradition, actually 
deforms and distorts it. That is because Descartes has a 
"Deus without Trinitas" -which is to say, he has no "God-
man" to mediate between time and eternity, creature and 
Creator. This loss, Hanby writes, "is always accompanied 
by the substitution of another figure: the Man-God." Now, 
"the individual will-distinct and separated from the love 
of beauty, the longing for God, or the praise of Christ-
becomes a will to power." 
In the Triune God whom Christians worship, none of 
the three "persons" is ever alone, ever a monad, ever quite 
an individual in the way we (heirs of Descartes) tend to 
think of individuals. From eternity the Father begets the 
Son, from eternity the Son offers begotten life back to 
begetting life-all through the bond of love, which is the 
Spirit. Hence, heaven-where the redeemed are drawn 
into the endless giving and receiving that is God's triune 
life-is pictured as a city, a body, or, even, a choir. 
Our selfhood and our individuality must, therefore, 
always be found in relation to God and to others. We can 
never be independent-except, of course, in hell. This is a 
lesson that goes down very hard with us, however, and the 
will to power asserts and reasserts itself in our lives. It can 
do this in large and massive ways-as it did in mid-twen-
tieth-century. It can do it in smaller, less obvious ways, 
which only come to public attention on rare occasions. 
Not long ago there was such an occasion: Media atten-
tion was focused on the case of Terry Schiavo, a severely 
disabled woman whose tube feedings were withdrawn so 
that she would die. The decision to withdraw the feeding 
tube was a grave injustice, but here I focus on one aspect of 
the aftermath to the Schiavo case. 
F 
ROM MANY DIFFERENT QUARTERS THE ADVICE WENT OUT: 
get a living will. Don't let yourself get caught in such 
circumstances, with your wishes unknown or uncer-
tain. Exercise your autonomy and declare your wishes in 
advance-lest someone else, and not you, should one day 
be master of your fate. 
As if any of us ought ever think of ourselves as exer-
cising such mastery. As if autonomy of that sort were desir-
able, rather than a deformation of true individuality and 
true community. 
Gilbert Meilaender 
The notion of a living will has always been philosophi-
cally baffling, attempting, as it does, to assert our continued 
autonomy even in a stage of life when we are no longer 
autonomous. It is puzzling because it aims to abstract from 
the living body's personal history a moment-a kind of 
timeless moment-which is the true and masterful self. A 
moment in life to which all prior development leads and 
from which all future development is decline. That, of 
course, is the Cartesian moment, the modern self that is 
thought of as divorced from our biological nature and the 
body's history. This self exists entirely apart from relation-
ship, and it need never be dependent-on a body, on others, 
on God. And that, truth to tell, is the lure of autonomy. 
S
TILL, IF THIS NOTION, HOWEVER ALLURING, IS PHILO-
sophically incoherent-and if, even more important, 
its craving for independence and mastery is a meta-
physical illusion-it should not surprise us that it has not 
worked well in practice. People cannot predict their own 
future preferences accurately; they cannot articulate 
precisely what they want; proxies are often unable to inter-
pret a patient's wishes accurately; and it is very hard to 
know when to invoke the living will's provisions. (For 
example, on the day before death, the median prognosis for 
patients with heart failure is still a 50 percent chance to live 
six more months.) As the empirical evidence of its failure 
has mounted, continuing to recommend living wills is, as 
Angela Fagerlin and Carl Schneider have written, "the 
triumph of dogma over inquiry and hope over experience." 
These empirical problems might, as I noted, have been 
predicted. But they are only a symptom of the deeper 
problem. It is that lure of autonomy and mastery-of being 
in control of one's living and dying, of finding a self (a 
hidden monad, even if it is not, as Descartes hypothesized, 
connected to the pineal gland) that can stand outside the 
flow of history and the body's inevitable withering and 
decline-that is our problem. We do not want to be 
dependent-to hand ourselves over into the care of others. 
We want to be in control even when we are no longer in 
control. In a world for which every problem is finally an 
engineering problem, we want to engineer even our death. 
Yet, of course, to be dependent on no one-that is hell. 
As Iris Murdoch once put it, "Kant's man [offspring of 
Descartes's] had already received a glorious incarnation 
nearly a century earlier in the work of Milton: his proper 
name is Lucifer." 
Unless we want to be dependent, to share in the kind of 
giving and receiving that is the leitmotif of God's triune life, 
we cannot be saved-saved from our isolated independ-
ence, from our illusory will to mastery, from (as C. S. Lewis 
wrote) "that ruthless, sleepless, unsmiling concentration 
upon self that is the mark of hell." Or, as the Athanasian 
Creed, that most practical of dogmatic utterances, puts it: 
"This is the catholic faith: We worship one God in trinity 
and the Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons nor 
dividing the divine being .... Whoever wants to be saved 
should think thus about the Trinity." 'f 
Gilbert Meilaender teaches theology and ethics at 
Valparaiso University. 
CONVERSION ON HEARING PICTURES AT AN EXHIBITION 
FOR HARRY GERDY 
After the light mute as dust and flat, 
after the colors' crisp disappearing entirely, 
after the smother of warmed and rewarmed air, 
the panic for breath, 
after the thickening fatigue of arms, legs, 
seeping to each finger's web 
and each root of hair, 
after all this and after the surgeon 
carves your vessels like clay, 
after he holds the heft of your heart 
in his delicate fingers, 
the needles' stitch his finest embroidery, 
You awaken to sunlight 
making its bright tracks through slit blinds, 
and somewhere the bassoons and oboes 
of Mussorgsky, the glockenspiel and flute, 
the complexity of lines with the movement 
of light, the sunlight both steady 
and moving with shadows, 
And you are certain God has flared out 
like the sheen of lacquer on a silk-wrapped box, 
like the sweep and arc of wing, 
like the glisten on a wind-stirred pond. 
Jill Pelaez Baumgaertner 
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the peril and promise of dual citizenship 
AJ
OMMON THEME IN CHRISTIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 
rom Augustine to Luther to Niebuhr is the theme of 
ual citizenship. Christians are in statu viatoris, 
pilgrims on their way to the heavenly city, their true home-
land; yet, though on pilgrimage, they are also members of 
earthly cities to which they are duty-bound in various ways. 
Depending upon the political theology in question, one will 
emphasize either the relative harmony or conflict between 
these allegiances. But whatever the emphasis, be it sanguine 
or skeptical, thoughtful Christian reflection on politics has 
always recognized the complexity of dual citizenship. 
Even for thinkers with a high view of politics, such as 
Aquinas and Calvin, the political order poses a potential 
threat to the most basic Christian commitment-the 
worship of the true God. In its most explicit form, this threat 
takes the shape of an idolatrous command in the face of 
which Christians must defy the law, risking even death. For 
we Americans the perils posed by our double allegiance are 
rarely so dramatic. The republic prides itself on religious 
toleration; a blatantly idolatrous order would violate the 
founding principles of the regime (and would surely fail of 
majority support). Yet, there is reason to wonder whether 
the political culture of our day doesn't present a more subtle 
but nevertheless real danger to our primary allegiance. 
Beyond the obviously corrosive effects of capitalist excess 
and moral license, there is a deeper force that requires 
careful scrutiny in proportion to the influence it exercises on 
the minds and mores of Americans: the democratic ethos 
itself. 
Tocqueville noted long ago that democratic equality 
coupled with free-markets proved a potent solvent within 
which long-standing European traditions dissolved. The 
Americans repealed primogeniture and entail early on, 
destroying the basis of aristocracy and spurring dramatic 
social and economic mobility. While we regarded this as a 
signature triumph-having destroyed rigid feudal struc-
tures, men could rise as far as talent and ingenuity took 
them-Tocqueville perceived a less wholesome effect. 
Without strong ties to place, class, and family name, 
Americans were becoming an ahistorical people, forgetful 
of the past, heedless of the future. Commenting on our 
preoccupation with the present, he reflected that "the woof 
of time is every instant broken [here] and the track of gener-
ations effaced. Those who went before are soon forgotten; 
of those who will come after, no one has any idea: the 
Jeanne Heffernan 
interest of the man is confined to those in close propinquity 
to himself." And the parameters of such propinquity, he 
further observed, naturally shrink over time, ending in the 
individualism that was for Tocqueville the congenital weak-
ness of democratic society. 
The centrifugal effects of this dynamic registered not 
only in the social and economic spheres, but also in the intel-
lectual. Democratic equality fostered a certain habit of 
mind. "The nearer the people are drawn to the common 
level of an equal and similar condition," Tocqueville noted, 
"the less prone does each man become to place implicit faith 
in a certain man or certain class of men. But his readiness to 
believe the multitude increases, and opinion is more than 
ever mistress of the world." Underscoring the double-edged 
character of the egalitarian ethos, he cautioned that the very 
equality that "renders [the American] independent of each 
of his fellow citizens, taken severally, exposes him alone and 
unprotected to the influence of the greater number." 
What was true in 1831 remains so. The American mind 
jealously guards its freedom from traditional authorities, 
yet reflexively defers to majority opinion; it is, at once, inde-
pendent and submissive. The same soil produced Thomas 
Paine and George Gallup, after all, and not accidentally. A 
hearty resistance to received ideas coupled with an easy 
acquiescence to current opinion seems a hallmark of our 
disposition. The question is whether it is compatible with 
the tradition of Christian discipleship. 
In his new book, Democracy and Tradition, Jeffrey 
Stout celebrates one side of this composite and argues that it 
is compatible with religious traditions-conceived (or 
reconceived) in a particular way. Appealing to such figures 
as Whitman, Emerson, and Dewey, Stout praises the inde-
pendence, even iconoclasm, of the American spirit, which 
displays a "principled scorn for unquestioning acquiescence 
in authority of any kind." Schooled in a democratic milieu, 
so the argument goes, Americans rightly consider all author-
itative claims defeasible; they reserve the right to demand 
reasons for such claims and to reject them if unsatisfied. This 
disposition informs and is informed by the discursive mode 
of modern democracy. 
That such a mode marks genuine progress in the polit-
ical order is unquestionable for Stout. Yet its value is not 
simply political; ultimately, he finds American pragma-
tism's democratic re-conception of authority applicable to 
most other social phenomena, including religion. Here 
Stout endorses what he terms "self-reliant piety." Unlike 
earlier (and, for him, clearly inferior) religious dispositions, 
the preferred posture of "self-reliant democratic individ-
uals" is independent, not deferential. Having appropriated 
once-priestly tasks, ordinary men and women can now 
determine for themselves what the ultimate ground of their 
existence is, which beings are worthy of worship, and of 
what kind. "Self-reliant piety," in short, insists "that it is our 
own responsibility to imagine the sources on which we 
depend and to fashion lives worthy of our best imaginings." 
Piety has come of age; it has become democratic. 
B
UT IS IT STILL AUTHENTICALLY CHRISTIAN? IT ISN'T, AS 
Stout's brief but revealing treatment of Catholicism 
indicates. Noting with approval that Whitman's 
prediction-"There will soon be no more priests"-has 
largely come true, Stout suggests that while the office of 
Catholic priest remains, it has lost its authoritative status. 
Priests remain "important" to the life of the parish, but 
"their parishioners no longer defer the imaginative work of 
piety to them." Both pastor and congregation know this; it 
is only a reactionary Vatican, according to Stout, that 
opposes it, but its resistance is unavailing, since " [ t ]he feudal 
patterns of deference to ecclesial authority will not soon 
return." 
If Stout simply meant to reject the twin distortions of 
clericalism and lay passivity, that would be one thing, but he 
seems to mean quite another. What Stout quickly dismisses 
as an anachronism is arguably at the heart of Catholic eccle-
siology. As Yves Congar explained last century in The 
Meaning of Tradition, "the hierarchy, following the apos-
tles, have received the mandate, authority, and correspon-
ding power to keep the apostolic deposit and Gospel, and to 
explain them authentically." From a Catholic perspective, 
this distinctive commission can only be understood 
adequately with the eyes of faith, since the prerogatives of 
the magisterium reflect a particular grace attached to the 
teaching office. But constrained by political and sociological 
categories, Stout is blind to the theological substance behind 
ecclesial authority and reduces it crudely to power relations; 
hence his praise of those Catholics "openly fighting" to 
democratize the church. 
Given Stout's reductive standard for judging religious 
traditions, it is important to see that his critique applies to 
more than Catholicism. Irrespective of church polity, any 
Christian body that recognizes scripture, the ecumenical 
councils, classical Christian ethics, and other sources as 
authoritative will ultimately run afoul of what he considers 
the discursive demands of the democratic ethos. Why? 
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Because ultimately for Stout the "self-reliant democratic 
individual" is sovereign. 
This is a genuine threat to our primary allegiance. In fact 
it is a more dangerous threat than an idolatrous law, for it 
trades on an assumption that lies deep in our political 
consciousness and will find an easy resonance with Stout's 
audience: the most important matters are subjects for 
popular deliberation. With scarcely any acknowledgment 
that political and theological matters differ in kind, Stout 
applies the modus operandi of democratic politics to the 
church. Beyond doctrinal formulation by plebiscite, the 
logic of Stout's argument leads to an even more radical 
conclusion. With tradition divested of its proper weight, the 
individual is given final discretion to determine who God is 
and what is his due. As Stout forthrightly proposes, "In culti-
vating their own piety, citizens will take sustenance from 
whatever traditional stories, exemplary lives, communal 
structures, poetic images, and critical arguments prove valu-
able. It is up to them to make something of their inheritance 
and to discard those of its parts that insult the soul." The 
basic individualism of Stout's account is unmistakable: the 
evaluation of the tradition is done by each of us, "employing 
one's own standards of worth." 
But such a mode is incompatible with Christian disciple-
ship, for the life of a disciple is at its heart communal and 
receptive. We receive God's definitive self-disclosure in 
Christ socially, beginning with the authoritative witness of 
the apostles. We are participants in, not the architects of, 
salvation history. Our holy books and our sacred rites have 
been given to us, not constructed by us. And every element 
of the tradition we have received leads us into a realm of 
mystery that transcends discursive rationality. It is with 
respect to these fundamental things that the distinction 
between the church and the polis is clearest-and most 
needful. 
If the individualism that Tocqueville identified 
threatens our ability to live as self-governing citizens, it 
needs to be guarded against; democratic politics is an impor-
tant enterprise. But it is, in the end, a contingent arrange-
ment for achieving limited goods. If the same individualism, 
under the benign guise of democratic citizenship, is allowed 
to shape our understanding of and disposition toward the 
Christian tradition, the stakes are altogether higher. We risk 
a profound misunderstanding of what Stout himself has 
aptly called "the sources of [our] existence and progress 
through life." f 
Jeanne Heffernan teaches in the humanities program at 
Villanova University. 
Duane Litfin. Conceiving the 
Christian College. Grand Rapids, Ml: 
Eerdmans, 2004. 
As the President of Wheaton 
College, Duane Litfin sits atop evan-
gelical higher education in the United 
States. His is the institution that once 
nurtured the thought and convictions 
of Billy Graham. It has shaped 
alumnus Dennis Hastert, the current 
Speaker of the House. It has helped 
form the mind of President Bush's 
leading speech writer, Michael 
Gerson, once a theology student. 
Arguably America's leading religious 
historian, Mark Noll, teaches at 
Wheaton and he has thoughtful 
colleagues aplenty to keep him 
company. To take stock of this single 
Midwestern school, in other words, is 
to reckon with American evangeli-
calism itself and its far-flung cultural 
and political potency. A book by 
Wheaton's sitting president on "the 
Christian college" is, then, most 
welcome, if for no other reason than 
that it provides a window into the 
intellectual issues and theological 
debates that currently shape, inform, 
and regularly roil evangelical higher 
education. 
As a faculty member at a sister 
evangelical college, it would serve my 
vanity well were I able to write off 
Litfin as an intellectual light-weight. 
The book's substance, not to mention 
Litfin's multiple doctoral degrees, 
does not allow this. While Litfin 
recognizes that present-day exigen-
cies make it difficult for a president to 
serve as a college's intellectual leader, 
the book offers substantive intellec-
tual leadership. It's not a book that 
dwells on issues arising from what we 
assume occupies a college president's 
time these days: fund-raising calls, 
ceremonial appearances, engagement 
with alumni groups, and the like. The 
book is rather about ideas, in partic-
ular theological ideas, or what we 
might call a theology of education. 
For those who've closely followed 
discussions about church-related 
colleges and Christian scholarship 
over the past few decades, one will 
find little wholly original in Litfin's 
analyses. But originality is not Litfin's 
point. In fact, he's worried that the 
desire for novelty, compounded by 
external pressures for change, has led 
Christian educators away from the 
tried-and-true to the dubiously fash-
ionable. His own thoughts "are efforts 
to state again what must be stated 
again-and again, and again. They 
constitute an attempt to think through 
some age-old responses to our 
contemporary challenges." 
Litfin has done his homework, 
seriously engaging a wide variety of 
contemporary thinkers on faith-based 
learning, especially George Marsden, 
Mark Schwehn, Richard Hughes, D. 
G. Hart, Robert Benne, Mark Noll, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Nathan Hatch, 
and Arthur Holmes. (Litfin is particu-
larly fond of Holmes, an emeritus 
Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton.) 
Along with numerous Scriptural refer-
ences, Litfin also draws deeply-and 
ecumenically-from the Christian 
intellectual tradition, quoting 
Augustine in one passage, John Henry 
Newman in another. 
Interestingly, many figures that 
have defined mainstream evangeli-
calism-the brothers Wesley, Charles 
Finney, Billy Graham, Francis 
Schaeffer, Charles Colson, James 
Dobson, to name a few-make scant 
or no appearance. This itself is a 
revealing point, but it is perhaps 
churlish to belabor this since much of 
evangelicalism's academic firepower 
in recent years has been obtained by 
eliding certain evangelical hallmarks 
(relentless efforts to render the faith 
"relevant," revivalist preaching, polit-
ical acttv1sm, dispensationalist 
theology, and speculative prophecy) 
and engaging in selective borrowing-
'massive pillaging' might be the more 
appropriate term-from traditions 
that have historically placed more 
value on the vita contemplativa. The 
neo-Calvinism of Abraham Kuyper 
and the high-church Anglicanism of 
figures such as T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, 
and Dorothy Sayers remain among 
evangelicalism's mam academic 
lenders at present, although 
Catholicism is playing an increasingly 
influential role, especially modern 
Catholic social thought, the 
Thomistic natural law tradition, the 
"virtue ethics" espoused by philoso-
phers like Alasdair Macintyre, as well 
as the inspiration of Catholic authors 
with broader appeal such as G. K. 
Chesterton, Walker Percy, and 
Flannery O'Connor. 
But this brings us to the rub. Few, if 
any of the above figures, were they 
alive today, could get a job at Wheaton 
College because of its faith statement, 
which all faculty sign upon teaching 
and renew each year when they turn in 
their contract. The current statement 
(dating from 1926; revised in 1978 
and again in 1994 ), might be described 
as broadly Reformation-Protestant 
with lingering overtures to fundamen-
talist positions articulated in the 
"fundamentalist-modernist" contro-
versies of the early-twentieth century. 
The question of whether such as a 
statement serves a college with the 
intellectual aspirations of Wheaton 
has quietly gained steam in recent 
decades and presently it ranks among 
the most complex and consequential 
issues facing not just Wheaton but 
other academically serious evangelical 
colleges as well. Put interrogatively, 
can a school like Wheaton continue to 
deepen its intellectual engagement 
and theological rigor while main-
taining substantive ties to its (the word 
applies) fundamentalist past? Litfin is 
acutely aware of what's at stake, and 
thus spends the better part of two 
chapters painstakingly laying out a 
rationale for Wheaton's current prac-
tices with respect to faith statements 
Can a school/ike Wheaton 
continue to deepen its 
intellectual engagement 
and theological rigor 
while maintaining 
substantive ties to its 
fundamentalist past? 
and hiring-practices which foster a 
more-or-less theologically homoge-
nous professoriate. Wheaton shall 
remain a "systemic" Christian college, 
to use Litfin's own parlance, not an 
"umbrella" one like Pepperdine, 
Valparaiso, or Baylor; the former 
seeks a particular faith commitment 
from all faculty while the latter 
actively encourage Christian thought 
and the hiring of committed Christian 
faculty, but stop short of statutory 
requirements. Litfin values both 
models, but sees Wheaton squarely in 
the "systemic" camp. 
Litfin's positions on faith state-
ments are worked out in an extended 
argument with Boston College polit-
ical scientist Alan Wolfe, who, in a 
celebrated article in the Atlantic 
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Monthly, "The Opening of the 
Evangelical Mind" (October 2000), 
argued that faith requirements like 
Wheaton's and academic freedom 
represent mutually antagonistic prin-
ciples. In rebutting Wolfe, Litfin 
makes a persuasive case that doing 
away with faith statements would 
amount to a net loss for intellectual 
pluralism in the United States, insofar 
as groups of thinkers desirous to pool 
their collective brainpower would be 
deprived of an institutional locus 
where such pooling could take place. 
Freedom of expression should apply 
not only to individuals, in other 
words, but to communities and insti-
tutions as well. What is more, since 
signing Wheaton's statement is volun-
tary, and since many institutions and 
academic departments throughout 
academia practice myriad policies of 
de facto, if not de jure, exclusion, 
Wheaton's statement is neither illib-
eral nor dishonest, but respectful, 
even expressive, of genuine pluralistic 
principles. One could even argue that 
such statements are necessary for the 
rich and diverse voluntary associa-
tional environment that Alexis de 
Tocqueville and his many intellectual 
disciples have admired about 
American democracy. 
So touche, Professor Wolfe. 
But in defending the viability of 
faith statements in the abstract, Litfin 
knows that a thornier dilemma awaits 
him still, one that greets him not from 
the distant pen of a secular social scien-
tist but from the eyes of some of his 
most committed and promising 
faculty. "[T]he question must still be 
asked, how broadly or narrowly 
should ... confessional identity be 
stated? And more basic still: who 
decides?" 
In light of the dominant 
Protestant-Catholic split in America's 
confessional landscape, the question 
could be rendered more pointedly 
still: given the tremendous rapproche-
ment in attitude between Protestants 
and Catholics since the Second 
Vatican Council and under the Papacy 
of John Paul II, given the vibrancy of 
new interconfessional movements 
(such as Evangelicals and Catholics 
Together, or ECT), given the ecumeni-
cally-inclined, tradition-seeking or-
thodoxy of younger evangelical 
scholars, and given the truly shameful, 
anti-Catholic fear-mongering dis-
played by many past evangelical 
leaders, is it time that Wheaton 
broached the possibility-whether as 
a matter of principle in broadening its 
faith statement or (more prudentially) 
on a case-by-case basis of judicious 
exception-of allowing sympathetic 
Catholics to don cap and gown on its 
campus? Put differently, might 
Wheaton still solidly and proudly 
affirm its evangelical posture and 
history, but simultaneously recognize 
that the divisions of the sixteenth 
century and the doctrinal fall-out of 
twentieth -century intra-Protestant 
debates might not be the adamantine 
decrees of the Holy Spirit but are 
matters for constructive theological 
engagement by people of good will? If 
I may be forgiven for overplaying my 
hand as provocateur, has the time for a 
Catholic Jackie Robinson arrived? 
In answering this question nega-
tively in language at once erudite, 
patronizing, quixotic, trenchant, and 
hedged, Litfin reveals himself worthy 
of his high perch, though perhaps 
constrained by the constituencies that 
keep it aloft. Litfin's defense of the 
status quo depends heavily on warn-
ings against a slippery slope: once an 
institution makes certain concessions 
to confessional change, it is ipso facto 
on a course toward the deracination of 
its animating principles and then, ulti-
mately, to outright secularism. No 
doubt, for anyone who has pondered 
George Marsden's The Soul of the 
American University or James 
Burtchaell's The Dying of the Light, 
this "entirely predictable direction" 
toward secularism, as Litfin sees it, 
should constitute a genuine concern. 
Simply pooh-poohing fears of a slip-
pery slope is not the better part of 
wisdom. Still, the dangers of a slippery 
slope should be balanced by consid-
ering the problems of superattenuated 
retrenchment. That Litfin shrilly 
warns against one without sufficiently 
probing the consequences of the other 
does not comport well with a mind of 
Litfin's caliber. 
By far the most unsatisfactory 
aspect of this book comes when Litfin 
appears to lecture (presumably his 
own faculty?) on how they should 
think about the current statement of 
faith and its policies of enforcement. 
He is especially irked by those who 
sign the statement with tepid enthu-
siasm, or who do so while wishing for 
future modifications, or who interpret 
it according to their own hermeneu-
tical principles. Casting a president's 
task at one point as the interceptor of 
entropy, he makes clear that "no indi-
vidual is free to decide for himself or 
herself what the statement means. To 
have everyone affirming the statement 
only after construing it to mean what 
they prefer it to mean is to negate the 
unifying function of the statement 
altogether." A Counter-Reformation 
Pope could appreciate this sentiment. 
One wonders then where lies the locus 
of authority for interpretation? Alas, 
some of the problems that have 
dogged Protestantism since the 
sixteenth century haven't diminished. 
Yet alongside Litfin's more heavy-
handed pronouncements one finds 
countervailing sentiments that suggest 
how probingly he has pondered the 
confessional issue and what it means 
for Wheaton's future. One finds inti-
mations, in fact, of outright ambiva-
lence. When considering whether 
Wheaton should move in the direction 
of a more inclusive Ecumenically 
Orthodox Christian University 
(EOCU), Litfin demurs, but not before 
dropping a line that he's "not set in 
concrete on this question." When 
considering whether certain Catholic 
faculty should be brought on board, he 
plainly states that "this vision attracts 
me," before defending a contrary posi-
tion. And at one point, he makes 
allowance that a future consensus 
contrary to his own opinion may 
develop. "[U]ntil Wheaton as a whole 
is ready to amend its definition of 
itself, this [current identity] is the one I 
am quite happy to live with and will 
work to maintain." Finally, to his great 
credit, Litfin makes clear that 
"systemic" institutions like Wheaton, 
at their best, allow for robust discus-
sion of serious disagreements. "The 
healthiest give and take often occurs in 
the most cohesive groups, such as 
large, committed, garrulous families. 
Where there is an underlying climate 
of trust we typically find more open 
disagreement, not less .... Members of 
such communities are enabled and 
often encouraged to explore their 
differences, openly and fully, and 
when these differences wind up unre-
solved, to "agree to disagree, agree-
ably." 
Whether its members agree or 
disagree, colleges, like all human insti-
tutions, grow, develop, and change. 
Litfin recognizes this squarely, noting 
that "institutions are never static; they 
are living things and require a constant 
choosing, even if only a choosing not 
to change." Wheaton itself has found 
out as much in recent years as deci-
sions were made to relax behavioral 
policies against dancing and faculty 
drinking. The same faculty who have 
lovingly pored over the texts of C. S. 
Lewis may now enjoy a quaff of ale 
that Lewis himself would have 
relished. That a Catholic colleague 
might join them at the pub one day 
appears to remain an eschatological 
hope under Litfin's presidency, but 
then again eschatological longing has 
been the seedbed of many a concrete 
reform in Christian history. 
So cheers, President Litfin. 
Thanks for a learned book and let's 
continue this important conversation. 
Thomas Albert Howard 
Robert Darden. People Get Ready: A 
New History of Black Gospel Music. 
New York and London: Continuum 
International, 2004. 
It was in the 1930s that the influ-
ence of black gospel music first 
extended beyond the walls of the 
church. Since then, black gospel has 
become a staple of American popular 
culture, impacting media ranging 
from radio to motion pictures. Despite 
its enormous presence in the American 
musical tapestry, this genre has only 
recently become the subject of serious 
scholarship. The earliest comprehen-
sive efforts to document the history of 
black gospel music were published in 
the 1970s, and in more recent years, 
the likes of Mellonee Burnim, Portia 
Maultsby, Horace Boyer, Jerma 
Jackson, and Deborah Pollard have 
continued to expand the perimeters of 
research into this subject. In People 
Get Ready: A New History of Black 
Gospel Music, Robert Darden of 
Baylor University seeks his place 
among those who offer well-grounded 
discourse on this important topic. 
Richly detailed and colorfully 
told, People Get Ready owes much of 
its narrative flavor to Darden's years 
of experience as the gospel music 
editor of Billboard Magazine. Darden 
states that rather than write an "ency-
clopedia of gospel music," his goal 
instead is to "somehow put it all in 
order, find the connections, and tell 
the stories of some of the most fasci-
nating people on the planet." In 
roughly the first half of the text, 
Darden provides historical context for 
the emergence of black gospel by 
examining its West-African roots and 
the antebellum ancestry of the music, 
considering both slave religion and the 
Negro spiritual. He then examines the 
societal conditions of the 
Reconstruction era, the rise of 
Pentecostalism, and the northward 
migration of African Americans early 
in the twentieth century as forces that 
give rise to the music. In the course of 
this discussion, he addresses the 
connection between the barbershop 
quartet and the jubilee quartets. He 
also examines the place of African 
Americans in the blossoming 
recording industry. 
In the last half of the book, Darden 
shifts his focus to the seminal person-
alities of black gospel. He begins this 
discussion with biographical sketches 
of pioneering artists William 
Sherwood, Charles Tindley, Lucie 
Campbell, and Thomas Dorsey. He 
then examines the contributions of 
mid-century artists including Clara 
Ward, Rosetta Tharpe, Mahalia 
Jackson, and the Soul Stirrers. Alex 
Bradford, James Cleveland, Edwin 
Hawkins, and Andrae Crouch are the 
focus of Darden's discourse on black 
gospel's shift toward contemporary 
styles and larger commercial venues 
during and after the 1960s. Finally, 
Darden concludes with a look at 
current artists like Donnie 
McClurkin, Fred Hammond, and Kirk 
Franklin. While some readers may 
take issue with the scarcity of actual 
gospel music examples in the text, and 
others may complain that Darden 
could have given much more attention 
to Holy Hip Hop-black gospel's 
most recent trend-Darden's mastery 
of story-telling more than compen-
sates for whatever omissions might be 
perceived. Although his lively and 
engaging narrative style owes much to 
his prior journalistic experience with 
Billboard, it is to his credit that he cites 
his own work only occasionally (I 
counted fewer than a dozen self-cita-
tions) and that instead, he uses sources 
that convey his wealth of knowledge 
and broad grasp of discourse on the 
topic. 
At the outset, Darden announces 
to his readers that People Get Ready is 
neither a musicological study nor a 
theoretical treatise. One need not 
apply the rigor of professional musi-
cology, however, to notice that the text 
was perhaps not as carefully proofread 
as it could have been. While his major 
points are largely intact, certain details 
are treated with such inaccuracy 
and/or inconsistency that they 
compromise an otherwise enjoyable 
reading experience. For example, 
Darden cites varied and conflicting 
dates for the Great Awakening, a flaw 
noticeable to even the reader who may 
not necessarily know what the Great 
Awakening was. The reader will 
certainly be confused to read that this 
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eighteenth-century religious revival 
took place in the 1730s, in the 1740s, 
and again during the nineteenth 
century. (This reviewer noticed the 
flaw in both the uncorrected, advance 
proof copy of People Get Ready, and in 
the final version of the book that was 
released to the public for sale.) 
This flaw notwithstanding, People 
Get Ready is rich with history, 
insightful commentary, and sprinkled 
with heavy doses of passion and jour-
nalistic flare. Darden includes care-
fully chosen photographs to enhance 
his well-crafted narration, images 
which include publicity stills and 
candid shots of live performances, as 
well as historical field shots from the 
Library of Congress's famous Lomax 
collection. Music buffs will find its 
discography of particular use, and 
researchers will benefit from the wide 
array of bibliographic sources cited. 
The magnum opus of books on 
black gospel music has yet to be 
written. In the meantime, however, 
true lovers of American music should 
certainly make a space for People Get 
Ready in their personal libraries. 
Teresa L. Reed 
Keith B. Miller, ed. Perspectives on an 
Evolving Creation. Grand Rapids, Ml: 
Eerdmans, 2003. 
The evangelical world has not 
handled evolution well. Furthermore, 
this sad condition need not have been, 
and it can be corrected. This is the 
message that motivates all the contrib-
utors to Perspectives on an Evolving 
Creation, a collection of essays skill-
fully selected by Keith B. Miller to 
effect a much-needed reconciliation 
between evolutionary biology and 
evangelical Christian theology. 
Especially worrisome to the contribu-
tors, all of whom are professing evan-
gelicals, is the influence of young-
earth creationism within the evangel-
ical community. Hence each essay is 
specifically directed toward those 
who are in any way inclined to 
respond to perceived tensions by 
attacking the merits of evolutionary 
theory. 
Every potential source of tension 
receives its due regard in Miller's 
collection. We are supplied with essays 
on biblical hermeneutics, the problem 
of animal suffering and death, original 
sin, cognitive neuroscience and its 
implications for our conception of the 
human soul (though Warren Brown's 
paper on this topic creates a 
misleading impression that "non-
reductive physicalism" (the view he 
defends) is the only intellectually 
viable option for evangelicals), envi-
ronmental ethics, the aims and 
methods of the natural sciences, and 
any other topic that has ever led an 
evangelical Christian to raise ques-
tions about evolutionary biology. 
Apparent conflicts are treated forth-
rightly, but also with a pastoral sensi-
tivity that reflects the authors' own 
intellectual struggles. It is frequently 
acknowledged that there are many 
areas where a fully satisfying solution 
must wait until a great deal of further 
research (both biological and theolog-
ical) is completed. 
An especially welcome touch are 
several brief devotional reflections 
interspersed throughout the book, all 
designed to invite the reader to view 
the evolutionary history of the 
universe as an awesome and praise-
worthy display of the wisdom and 
power of God as Creator. These devo-
tionals also serve the purpose of 
assuring evangelical readers that the 
contributors' acceptance of evolu-
tionary theory has not led to any 
diminution in their ability to relate to 
God on a personal level, nor has it 
tended to stunt their growth in 
Christian character. Creation, under-
stood as the doctrine that every aspect 
of the universe was intentionally given 
to it by its Creator, is strongly affirmed 
by all the contributors, yet the work of 
creation is regarded as having been 
carried out via the method of a gradual 
evolutionary development. 
Several essays make it clear that 
this less antagonistic (or "concordist") 
approach to the natural sciences has 
deep historical roots. Conrad Hyers 
and Edward B. Davis both cite John 
Calvin as a hermeneutical authority in 
support of the view that Scripture (and 
Genesis in particular) was never 
intended to teach the historical details 
of creation, but rather to present a 
framework within which we are 
taught general truths about God's 
nature and character, and our relation 
to Him. It is somewhat curious that 
Augustine is seldom cited in this 
volume (perhaps because he seems 
further removed from the evangelical 
community), but in fact he makes this 
very point as forcefully as anyone and 
therefore supplies us with an even 
deeper historical precedent for it. 
Davis does attempt to place the point 
of departure from this traditional view 
somewhere in the late nineteenth 
century, shortly after Darwin. Yet 
Mark Noll and David Livingstone 
show that, even after Darwin, there 
was significant support for a 
concordist approach within the evan-
gelical community. The concordist 
view is clearly exemplified in the 
thought of such figures as Asa Gray, 
Charles Hodge, and especially 
Benjamin B. Warfield. Noll and 
Livingstone then issue a clarion call to 
evangelicals to return to the legacy of 
Warfield, et al., and reclaim the intel-
lectual ground that was forfeited (they 
say) in the early twentieth century. 
If there is a point at which evangel-
ical readers might sense that Miller 
and his contributors are pressing their 
point beyond what is strictly necessary 
for the reconciliation they seek, it 
must be their nearly unanimous aver-
sion to any sort of "intervention" in 
the course of natural history. It is 
important to note that this aversion is 
not a rejection of miracles. A willing-
ness to affirm the historicity of the 
biblical miracles is usually regarded as 
a mark of evangelicalism, and most of 
the authors bear that mark as willingly 
as anyone. Thus they do not descend 
into deism. But when it comes to 
natural history (as opposed to salva-
tion history), the attitude changes 
dramatically. An anti-interventionist 
attitude is clearly discernible in almost 
every article, and it is not merely a 
concern that evangelicals have tended 
to put too much stock in our current 
inability to connect all the evolu-
tionary dots. That concern is present 
too, and Miller himself contributes 
two papers (the second co-authored 
with David Campbell) that throw cold 
water on any attempt to argue for 
divine intervention on the basis of 
either a present lack of transitional 
forms in the fossil record or the 
remarkable "explosion" of life forms 
in the Cambrian period (Miller makes 
a strong case that the alleged lack of 
transitional forms is often grossly 
exaggerated). These have often been 
cited, mostly by evangelicals, as 
evidence that seems to require some 
sort of supernatural intervention as 
the only plausible explanation. But 
such "gappy" arguments are exceed-
ingly perishable in any case (i.e., they 
"perish" as soon as someone does 
enough research to close the "gap" in 
our understanding), and so the 
authors are wise to counsel against any 
reliance upon them as a basis for 
natural theology. At most, evangelicals 
should take a "wait-and-see" attitude 
regarding the outcome of attempts to 
construct a fully naturalistic path 
through natural history, and that atti-
tude is explicitly endorsed by several 
of the contributors. 
Nevertheless, several authors 
make the much stronger claim that 
historical Christian theology (within 
which evangelical theologians surely 
wish to place themselves) should lead 
one to expect that the development of 
life on earth occurred naturalistically. 
In other words, evangelicals should 
not only lower their expectations for a 
natural theology derived from 
apparent gaps in natural history, but 
they should positively desire, for theo-
logical reasons, that there be no such 
gaps. The idea is that a creation that 
must be tinkered with is less praise-
worthy and impressive than a creation 
that does not require occasional 
adjustments. Furthermore, we should 
expect the God revealed in the 
Christian Scriptures to create in the 
most praiseworthy way. Therefore, we 
should expect Him to create without 
any "untidy" interventions. 
This argument is presented most 
clearly and forcefully by Howard J. 
Van Till. Van Till claims that the 
creation possesses a "robust forma-
tional economy." This is his technical 
way of saying that the creation 
contains within itself all the resources 
necessary to form all the life forms we 
actually observe. Mter making the 
non-problematic (to evangelicals) 
pointthat non-theists have no business 
cttmg the "robust formational 
economy" of the creation as evidence 
against theism or in favor of any claims 
of purposelessness or randomness in 
the universe, Van Till goes on to claim 
that anything less than a robust forma-
tional economy would reflect badly on 
the Creator. 
Needless to say, such a view makes 
one positively eager to see all "gaps" 
closed, and indeed that eagerness is 
found in many of the contributors. 
This eagerness is sometimes reflected 
in their tendency to lump young-earth 
creationism together with the more 
recent "intelligent design" movement 
as the target of their critique. Some 
authors occasionally suggest that both 
views are equally destructive of the 
intellectual development of the evan-
gelical community. This suggestion is 
unfair, however, since many intelli-
gent design theorists are perfectly 
comfortable with the common 
ancestry of all life on earth (this fact is 
occasionally acknowledged), and 
some are amenable even to Van Till's 
robust formational economy (though 
this fact is never acknowledged), 
although those who insist on special 
creation can tolerate neither. 
Loren Haarsma, in a paper 
devoted to the compatibility of theistic 
belief and scientific method, presents 
this very issue in the form of a question 
about an historical case study, and 
(perhaps more modestly) leaves the 
answer up to the reader without 
explicitly weighing in on it himself. He 
describes a very similar situation to 
ours that confronted our eighteenth-
century forbears. In those days it was 
not clear whether Newton's laws of 
motion entail that the orbits of the 
planets are stable over very long spans 
of time. Newton himself assumed that 
the orbits are unstable, and therefore 
suggested that God occasionally sends 
comets (or other natural phenomena) 
into the solar system in order to 
prevent the planets from careening off 
into space. If he had been correct 
about this, it would have constituted 
powerful evidence for a special, active, 
and (in some sense) interventionist 
view of God's governance of the 
creation. But if Van Till is correct, it 
would also have looked like an inferior 
work of design. As it turned out, 
Newtonian mechanics does yield 
stable orbits. But Haarsma asks us to 
consider what our reaction would 
have been if things had turned out 
differently. Suppose that the planetary 
orbits were unstable. "Would 
Christians consider that a good thing, 
or a bad thing?" he asks. The answer 
we give will reveal the theological 
presuppositions we have before we 
even take up the case of biological 
evolution, and which will surely be 
reflected in our response to "gap 
closures." Haarsma concludes with a 
simple and well-directed admonition 
to reflect on our theological presuppo-
sitions. We may at least acknowledge 
that the situation is puzzling, and not 
easily settled by quick appeals to 
Scripture or tradition. Yet if a cautious 
Who would want to be God for a day? 
How to know the raccoon 
dead on the side of the road 
was done with his ribbon 
of life? How to know 
whether the truck passing 
should or shouldn't kill us all? 
How to know when to bring 
the rains to the pine forest 
and when to let them burn? 
How to know when 
the tadpoles should birth 
and rise steaming to the surface 
of this pond, exactly 
here, in 100 Mile House, 
Northern BC on August 10 
at sunrise? 
I'd rather 
float right by like a moth 
on a warm current, 
with only my body 
and the faith the sky 
will hold me, for a while. 
Emily Wall 
"wait-and-see" attitude is indeed the 
most proper attitude to take, then 
Haarsma's admonition is just as appli-
cable to those who expect all gaps to be 
closed as it is for those who are too 
inclined to cite gaps as evidence of 
divine intervention. 
Perspectives on an Evolving 
Creation will be extremely valuable 
for anyone who is concerned about 
how Christians in general (not just 
evangelicals) should think about the 
relationship between science and 
theology. Every article is thoughtful, 
spiritually sensitive, and very well-
informed. One can earnestly hope that 
it will bear the fruit of reconciliation 
that Miller and his contributors intend 
it to bear. 
John Mullen 
a portrait of a Christian as a young intellectual 
first published in June 1961; a commencement address given at Wittenberg University 
on june 6, 1960. 
0 
NCE UPON A TIME-AND A VERY 
good time it was-being an 
intellectual meant being a 
Christian. These words, with apolo-
gies to James Joyce, describe a situa-
tion that exists no longer. By the judg-
ment of many, being an intellectual 
today means being anything but a 
Christian-a judgment in which, for 
strange reasons, the fanatical secu-
larist and the fanatical sectarian 
concur. We have met here this 
morning because we believe that this 
judgment is wrong. This university 
strives for academic excellence 
because of, not in spite of, its loyalty to 
the Christian faith. The church and the 
university need each other, for neither 
without the other can fulfill its high 
vocation. Indeed, I suspect that 
neither without the other can be 
trusted, and therefore I pledge my alle-
giance to both. An institution that is 
pledged to both, to Academe and to 
the Cross, must give special attention 
to the dilemma of the Christian intel-
lectual, the not-so-simple believer, the 
child of God who has left the kinder-
garten. When the gimmick replaces 
the Geist, even on the campus; when 
piety is identified with sentiment and 
the ethic of the kingdom of God with 
conformity-then it is time to paint 
the portrait of the Christian intellec-
tual for all to see. 
"Each generation," said G. K. 
Chesterton, "seeks its saint by instinct; 
and he is not what the people want, but 
rather what the people need." What 
the people want today is not the 
Christian intellectual, whom both the 
church and the world repudiate; but 
that may well be what the people need. 
For without the cultivation of the life 
of the mind, the church betrays its own 
great tradition, the very tradition in 
whose name the church often suspects 
the life of the mind. The task of the 
Christian university is, therefore, to 
call the church back to its tradition. 
On this Whitmonday, standing 
between the feast of Pentecost and the 
feast of the Holy Trinity, I want to 
summarize three principal features of 
that tradition. In keeping with the 
celebration of Trinity Sunday, I shall 
call these features: a passion for being; 
a reverence for language; and an 
enthusiasm for history. This 
Trinitarian portrait characterizes the 
Christian intellectual and the educa-
tion in which he participates. 
a passion for being 
The Christian intellectual has a 
passion for being. He believes that by 
the power of the God who has created 
and goes on creating all things new 
every day, all things have an essential 
goodness, impervious to any destruc-
tive force. Sometimes, I fear, our 
preoccupation with sin, guilt, and 
forgiveness has obscured this passion 
for being in Christian thought. We 
have so emphasized the corruption of 
all creation through the Fall that its 
continuing derivation from God and 
dependence upon God could no 
longer be recognized. For centuries, 
until Petrarca climbed the mountain, 
Christian thought neglected the good-
ness of all created being; although 
John Calvin lived in Geneva for more 
than half his life, he rarely if ever 
mentions the Alps in his sermons and 
books. But if we really mean it when 
we confess in the Credo that God is 
"Maker of heaven and earth and of all 
things visible and invisible," then we 
need to remember the struggle of the 
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early church to assert and defend this 
confession against those who identi-
fied sin with the material world. The 
trouble with the world, so they main-
tained, is that it is made of stuff, which 
is intrinsically evil. In opposition to 
this the Christian faith declares that 
the material world is intrinsically 
good, encrusted though it may be with 
the scabs of sin and evil. Because it is 
intrinsically good, we ought to love it 
as God's good creation. As a Christian 
doxology confessed almost a century 
ago: 
The world is charged with the 
grandeur of God. 
It will flame out, like shining from 
shook foil; 
It gathers to a greatness, like the 
ooze of oil 
Crushed. Why do men then now 
not reck his rod? 
Generations have trod, have trod, 
have trod; 
And all is seared with trade; 
bleared, smeared with toil; 
And wears man's smudge and 
shares man's smell: the soil 
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, 
being shod. 
And for all this, nature is never 
spent; 
There lives the dearest freshness 
deep down things; 
And though the last lights off the 
black West went 
Oh, morning, at the brown brink 
eastward, springs-
Because the Holy Ghost over the 
bent 
World broods with warm breast 
and with ah! bringt wings. 
The first quality of the Christian 
intellectual, then, is such a passion for 
being. Perhaps the greatest Christian 
intellectual of them all, St. Augustine, 
said (if you will pardon a little Latin) 
that esse qua esse bonum est, "being is 
good simply because it is being." The 
material world, because it is God's 
good world, is invested with His holi-
ness and is the object of His continuing 
love. Fallen and bent it is, but there is 
still "the dearest freshness deep down 
things." More even than his fellow-
believers, the Christian intellectual is 
one who recognizes this freshness and 
loves the stuff of the universe not as a 
substitute for, but as a corollary of, his 
love for God. This passion for being 
has become, if not any easier, then 
certainly more profound in our time 
because of the achievements and 
discoveries of the natural sciences. 
Since we are still recalling the centen-
nial of Charles Darwin's Origin of 
Species, the embarrassment of many 
Christian intellectuals with the natural 
sciences deserves mention. They have 
found themselves and their faith 
threatened by the picture of the 
universe that came from telescope and 
microscope. In part at least, the cause 
of this embarrassment was the extrav-
agance of some natural scientists, who 
strayed into theology as often as the 
theologians strayed into science. 
Today the chastening of the past 
century has produced greater sobriety 
on all sides; and on campuses like this 
one Christian thought is beginning to 
reappraise its picture of creation and 
to discover that the size and the age of 
the world are no threat to a mature 
Christian worship of the Ancient of 
Days. With this reappraisal is begin-
ning to come a deeper and more 
passionate love of the created 
universe, not as the object of man's 
exploitation but as the bearer and 
arena of God's grace. Certainly there is 
in the Christian view of creation an 
imperative that forbids man to pollute 
the atmosphere with the garbage of his 
thermonuclear orgies and thus to 
change forever the genetics of the 
beaver and the sea anemone. To love 
God is to love what God loves, and to 
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love it with passion and zeal. The 
Christian intellectual is charged with 
the responsibility of exemplifying this 
passion for being in his life and 
thought, so that men may look up from 
their gadgets and peer beyond their 
billboards to view the grandeur of 
God. For if the Christian intellectual 
neglects this responsibility, God will 
have to turn, as he has turned so often, 
to the Nicodemuses in His hidden 
church, who will do in secret what His 
disciples are afraid to do in public. 
the reverence for language 
It is, I fear, the Nicodemuses of the 
hidden church who often preserve the 
second feature of the Christian intel-
lectual as well, the reverence for 
language. Yet the Christian cause 
depends upon language, and without 
it the life of the church would be 
impossible. I do not pretend to know 
why Johnny can't read; but I do know 
that if enough Johnnies can't read, 
Christian faith and thought as we 
know them will end. Pardon me for a 
personal reference. Today I, a theolo-
gian, am becoming a Doctor of Letters 
of this university. My gratitude for this 
honor is matched by my conviction 
that "letters," that is, the careful use 
and discrimination of language, is one 
of the theologian's primary responsi-
bilities. In fact, much of the history of 
theology, which is the special area of 
my research and writing, is the history 
of words-the origin of theological 
words, often outside the Christian 
tradition; the application of these 
words to Christian revelation and 
their consequent refinement and clari-
fication; the distortion of words by 
popular superstition. Thus the critics 
of theology are right when they 
describe it as a conflict over "mere 
words." 
But there is nothing "mere" about 
words, and it is the task of the 
Christian intellectual to insist upon 
this. When the God of the universe, 
the Lord of heaven and earth, chose to 
make Himself known to men, He 
spoke to them through the prophets; 
and when the early Christians sought 
to describe what God had done to 
them and for them through Jesus, they 
called Jesus the Logos, the Word and 
Mind of God. The Christian intellec-
tual knows, therefore, that man's 
capacity for speech lies somewhere 
near the center of his uniqueness. Both 
the misery and the grandeur of 
humanity are bound up with the gift of 
language. The serpent spoke to Eve in 
the garden; God spoke to Moses on the 
mountain. And ever since then the 
temptations and the revelations of 
man have come through language. 
They still do. Hence a reverence for 
wha:t language can do if it is used prop-
erly and a horror of what language can 
do if it is misused belong to the equip-
ment of the educated man. Hear one 
educated man, E. B. White, who also 
incarnates the chastity of English 
prose style, giving voice to this rever-
ence and horror: "Muddiness is not 
merely a disturber of prose; it is a 
destroyer of life, of hope: death on the 
highway caused by a badly worded 
roadsign, heartbreak among lovers 
caused by a misplaced phrase in a well-
intentioned letter, anguish of a trav-
eler expecting to be met at a railroad 
station and not being met because of a 
slipshod telegram"-and, let the 
theologian add, betrayal of the faith 
once handed down to the saints by 
careless or deliberate ambiguity in the 
language of theology or devotion. 
Unless the books and journals that 
cross my desk are unrepresentative 
samples, I fear that this virtue of rever-
ence for language is not important in 
the moral theology of the American 
churches. At times I am tempted to 
paraphrase St. Paul and to say that 
there are three fundamental virtues-
faith, hope, and clarity-and that the 
greatest of these is clarity. As the 
church and the school imitate adver-
tising and government in debasing the 
mother tongue, the church school 
must be one place of refuge where a 
reverence for language and a chastity 
of style still prevail. In the so-called 
Dark Ages, which were not as dark as 
the textbooks say but were dark 
enough, lack of communication 
brought on the breakdown of 
language and the impoverishment of 
culture. In our age, by contrast, the 
very growth of communication is 
bringing on the same results. An 
industry that spawns sights and sounds 
from 7:00 a.m. to midnight seven days 
a week is understandably impatient 
with the nuances of conjunctions or 
with the discrimination of English 
synonyms. Recent best-seller lists 
suggest that the publishing of books in 
the United States, while growing 
rapidly, may be becoming a satellite of 
television, to which one title after 
another owes its success. Perhaps, like 
the Irish monasteries of that earlier 
age, the Christian college may quietly 
cultivate the humanistic disciplines 
until their hour strikes again. Perhaps a 
generation that learns Russian on 
account of the sputniks may go on to 
read Dostoevsky in his own language. 
If we wait long enough, the poignancy 
of the human situation may persuade 
someone to take another look at the 
language of Sophocles, Aeschylus, 
Plato, and Paul. 
But one language at a time, and 
clarity begins at home. I can think of 
no service more important for our 
culture than the growth of a reverence 
for language. Sins against syntax are 
often funny, but sometimes they are 
serious. Abraham Lincoln, Winston 
Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and Charles 
de Gaulle all prove that language does 
not merely describe action; it is action, 
and sometimes the only action equal to 
the despair or the glory of the hour. In 
the beginning was the Word: the 
capacity for words is still the point at 
which God contacts man, still the 
point at which the devil finds man 
most vulnerable. If you carry away 
from your courses in literature and 
language no more than an awe for the 
fearful potentialities of human speech 
and a zeal to make that awe a light of 
your life in home, church, and 
community, this university has served 
you well. A Christian intellectual is not 
necessarily one who has read all the 
Great Books on the lists compiled at 
the University of Chicago, though he 
could do worse in his reading and 
probably will. But a Christian intellec-
tual is one whose reading and writing, 
speaking and listening, are informed 
by a reverence for language as the 
divine gift for which the ancient hymn 
for Whitsunday extols the Holy Spirit: 
True promise of the Father Thou, 
Who dost the tongue with speech 
endow. 
an enthusiasm for history 
To the passion for being and the 
reverence for language a third feature 
of the Christian intellectual must be 
added if our portrait is to be accurate: 
an enthusiasm for history. The history 
of philosophy shows that a passion for 
being has often been accompanied by a 
horror of becoming. The processes of 
change have seemed to corrode reality, 
and the infinite variety among individ-
uals seemed to threaten the unity of all 
things in God. The Christian interpre-
tation of God's activity in the world 
has never been satisfied with a passion 
for being; it has always felt obliged to 
come to terms with becoming, with 
change, with process, with variety. 
And therefore the Christian doctrine 
of God requires the doctrine of the 
Holy Spirit, for He is the Agent of 
change and the Ground of variety. 
There are many dispensations, but 
there is only one Spirit. Much of what 
Jesus was and did in the days of His 
flesh remained obscure to the disciples 
until the Spirit came to teach them all 
things and to bring all things to their 
remembrance. The Spirit still operates 
in the history of the people of God, 
opening up ever new opportunities 
and creating ever new variety while 
remaining one and the selfsame Spirit. 
To be open to the activity of the 
Spirit, unpredictable though it is; to be 
appreciative of the variety of the 
Spirit, distressing though this often is 
to our preconceived notions; to be 
heedful of the leading of the Spirit in 
the church, novel though this 
continues to be-that is the enthu-
siasm for history which marks the 
Christian intellectual. Here, too, so-
called secular studies, those of the 
social sciences, have made available 
new insights into the variety and the 
change in human history. Instead of 
panicking at these insights and trying 
to evade them, as much of Christian 
thought has done, we need to recog-
nize their validity and their limits as 
guides to human thought and 
behavior. What if these insights shake 
our stereotypes of what men are or 
puncture our cliches about how men 
act! The activity of the Holy Spirit has 
proved itself throughout history to be 
plastic enough for any such insights. 
An enthusiasm for His activity in its 
infinte variety and underlying unity 
permits us to do justice to all that 
present-day study can tell us about 
human personality and human society. 
It gives us the courage to work for 
improvement in society, and the 
wisdom to recognize just how limited 
any such improvement is. It releases, 
us from the anxieties about saving 
ourselves that poison the minds and 
lives of so many; and it gives us the 
serenity to face every change, 
including our own eventual death, 
with dignity and faith. 
A passion for being; a reverence 
for language; an enthusiasm for 
history: by this time you are probably 
wondering which, if any, of these 
features can be discerned in your grad-
uation picture, and whether your 
graduation picture is a portrait of the 
Christian as a young intellectual. It is, I 
hope, even though (please pardon the 
pun) it may still be undeveloped and 
unenlarged; for the responsibility of 
this university is only for the exposure. 
As your parents, professors, and 
friends pray that the benediction of 
Almighty God, Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, may descend upon you and 
abide with you, we pray as well that 
you may grow in the virtues of the 
Christian intellectual: a passion for 
being because the Father is the Creator 
and Source of all being; a reverence for 
language because Jesus Christ is the 
Word and Mind of the Father; an 
enthusiasm for history because the 
Holy Spirit works through history to 
produce variety and to unite all men in 
Himself. To this end may God grant us 
all His grace. f 
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